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COMPARISON OF THE ILLINOIS COMMISSION
REPORT ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT WITH THE
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SYSTEM IN CALIFORNIA
Robert M. Sanger*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On Saturday, January 11, 2003, Governor George H.
Ryan took the historic step of commuting all death sentences
of all prisoners on Illinois' death row to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.1 In his words, he did so because:
I must act.
Our capital system is haunted by the demon of errorerror in determining guilt, and error in determining who
among the guilty deserves to die.
Because of all of these reasons today I am commuting the
sentences of all death row inmates.2
California has the largest death row population of any
state in this country,3 more than three and one half times lar* Member of the California State Bar. Partner, Sanger & Swysen, Santa
Barbara, California. B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles. Certified Criminal Law Specialist, the State
Bar of California Board of Legal Specialization.
1. Governor George H. Ryan, Speech at the Northwestern University
Ryan
Speech],
11,
2003)
[hereinafter
School
of
Law
(Jan.
(last
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/RyanSpeech.htm
visited Sept. 18, 2003).
2. Id.
3. According to the official statistics of the California Department of Corrections, there were 622 condemned inmates as of April 9, 2003. See CAL. DEP'T
OF

CORRECTIONS,

CONDEMNED

INMATE

LIST

SUMMARY,

at

http://www.corr.ca.gov/communicationsoffice/capitalpunishmentPDF/2003-04S
ummary.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2003) [hereinafter CONDEMNED INMATE
SUMMARY]. There were 608 condemned males almost all of whom were housed
at San Quentin State Prison and 14 condemned females at Chowchilla State
Prison. Id. Texas and Florida follow California with the next largest death row
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ger than that of Illinois when Governor Ryan acted.4 California lawyers, judges, legislators, and voters need to ask: "How
does the California death penalty system compare to that of
Illinois?" Toward that end, this article will compare the system in California to the comprehensive study of the Illinois
system conducted by Governor Ryan's blue-ribbon Commission. The Commission's report identified the shortcomings of
the Illinois death penalty system,' and formed the basis for
the Governor's ultimate decision of commutation.6

populations of 453 and 380, respectively. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATION FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. (Winter 2003) [hereinafter NAACP,
DEATH Row U.S.A.].

4. Governor Ryan commuted the sentences of 167 condemned people, 164
to life without the possibility of parole, and 3 others to conform to the sentences
of their co-defendants. See Jeff Flock, 'Blanket Commutation"Empties Illinois
Death
Row,
at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/11/illinois.death.row/index.html (last visited
Oct. 5, 2003).
5. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, GOvERNOR'S
COMMISSION
ON
CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
(Apr.
15,
2002),
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission-report/index.html
(last
visited Aug. 12, 2003) [hereinafter ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT].
6. Other states, prompted in part by Governor Ryan's initial moratorium,
have undertaken studies of their death penalty systems. None, so far, has produced a report as comprehensive as that of the Illinois Commission. The State
of Connecticut issued its report of its Commission on the Death Penalty on
January 8, 2003. See THE CONNECTICUT COMMISSION ON THE DEATH PENALTY,
STUDY PURSUANT TO PUBLIC ACT NO. 01-151 OF THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY
IN
CONNECTICUT
(Jan.
8,
2003),
http://www.opm.state.ct.us/pdpdl/CDP/DCPFinal-Report-Jan2003.doc.
The
Commission was unfunded and was limited to fourteen questions posed by the
legislature. See id. at 4-5, Appendix A. Nevertheless, the Connecticut Commission came to the same conclusions as the Illinois Commission on several issues. See, e.g., id. at 35 (recommending that preliminary decisions to seek the
death penalty be reviewed by a statewide committee comprised of State's Attorneys, similar to Illinois recommendation 30), 56-62 (recommending changes to
police procedures to ensure "best practices" in criminal investigations, similar to
Illinois recommendations 1 through 19).
Nevada issued a compilation of recommendations to the legislature prepared
by outside agencies also concurring in many of the recommendations of the Illinois Commission Report. Work Session Document, Legislative Commission'
Subcommittee to Study the Death Penalty and Related DNA Testing (Assembly
Concurrent Resolution No. 3 [File No. 7, Statutes of Nevada 2001 Special Session],
June
14,
2002),
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/lcb/research/03InterimReports/Bulletin3-05.pdf.
(eliminating "great risk of death to more than one person" as an aggravating
circumstance).
Arizona created a Capital Case Commission, which issued a report critical of
the death penalty process in that state. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, CAPITAL CASE COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, 14 (Dec. 31,
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II. THE ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT

Illinois Governor George H. Ryan declared a moratorium
on executions in his state on January 31, 2000.' On March 4,
2000, he appointed a special Governor's Commission to study
how the death penalty system in Illinois could be reformed.8
The Governor took this dramatic action because thirteen people who had been condemned to Illinois' Death Row were
subsequently determined to be innocent.9
Nevertheless, the Governor made clear in his instructions
to the Commission that it was to study how to reform the
death penalty system, not to debate whether or not the death
penalty should be abolished. 10 The Governor's Executive Order forming the Commission and setting forth its mission
stated:
The Commission, upon concluding its examination and
analysis of the capital punishment process, shall submit to
the Governor a written report detailing its findings and
providing comprehensive advice and recommendations to
the Governor that will further ensure the administration
of capital punishment in the State of Illinois will be fair
and accurate."
Governor Ryan, a Republican, selected members from
across the political spectrum, all of whom were familiar with
Illinois' death penalty system. 2

2002),
http://www.attorneygeneral.state.az.us/CCC/Capital%20Case%2Commission%
20-%20Final%20Report.pdf. Their report, released December 21, 2002, included
a number of recommendations that were in-line with those made by the Illinois
Commission. See, e.g., id.at 15 (recommending audio or video recording of suspect interrogations, similar to Illinois recommendation 4), 17-18 (recommending
minimum competency standards for capital defense counsel, similar to Illinois
recommendations 40 and 42).
7. See Press Release, Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on Execution,
Will Appoint Commission to Review Capital Punishment System (Jan. 31, 2000)
http://www.state.il.us/gov/press/00/Jan/morat.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2003)
[hereinafter Ryan Press Release].
8. See Exec. Order No. 424 Ill. Reg. 7439 (Mar. 4, 2000), available at 2000
WL 635067.
9. See Ryan Press Release, supra note 7. However, by the time Governor
Ryan' commuted the sentences of the remaining condemned inmates, seventeen
people had been exonerated. See Ryan Speech, supranote 1.
10. See Ryan Press Release, supranote 7.
11. Exec. Order No. 424, supra note 8.
12. Former federal prosecutor and First Assistant Illinois Attorney General,

104
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On April 15, 2002, after two years of study, the Illinois
Governor's Commission issued its Report." The Report made
eighty-five specific recommendations for corrections to the Illinois death penalty system, backed by 207 pages of analysis
and appended materials. 5 Although discussion of the death
penalty's abolition was not within the mandate of the Commission, after reporting on the various reform recommenda-

tions, the Commissioners stated: "The Commission was
unanimous in the belief that no system, given human nature
and frailties, could ever be devised or constructed that would
work perfectly and guarantee absolutely that no innocent
person is ever again sentenced to death." 6
III. KNOWN DEFICIENCIES IN CALIFORNIA'S CAPITAL SYSTEM
The author maintains that at one time California was
perceived to be at the forefront of modern jurisprudence. It
has fallen far from that status, particularly with regard to

Judge Frank McGarr served as the Commission's Chairman.
ILLINOIS
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 1. Judge McGarr spent eighteen years on
the federal bench and served as Chief Judge of the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois between 1981 and 1986. Id. A former member
of the Illinois General Assembly and the United States Congress, Senator Paul
Simon served as Co-Chair. Id. Since he retired from the United States Senate
in 1997, Senator Simon has been a professor at Southern Illinois University and
Director of its Public Policy Institute. Id. Thomas P. Sullivan also served as
Co-Chair. Formerly a United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois from 1977 to 1981, Mr. Sullivan is now in private practice at Jenner &
Block. Id. The Commission included six former prosecutors: Judge Frank
McGarr (Chairman), Thomas P. Sullivan (Co-Chair), Former Deputy Governor
Mathew R. Bettenhausen (Member and Executive Director), William J. Martin,
Thomas Needham, and Scott Turow. Id. The Commission also included four
current or former criminal defense attorneys: Kathryn Dobrinic, Rita Fry, Theodore Gottfried, and Andrea Zopp. Id. The Commission also included two current or former judges: Judge Frank McGarr (Chairman) and Judge William H.
Webster. Id. The remainder of the committee included Senator Paul Simon
(Co-Chair and former member of the Illinois General Assembly and the United
States Congress), Mike Waller (the elected State's Attorney of Lake County, Illinois), Donald Hubert (former President of the Chicago Bar Association), and
Roberto Ramirez (founder of the Jesfis Guadalupe Foundation to financially assist Latino students in pursuit of higher education). Id. Refer to the "Commission Members" section of the Illinois Commission Report for more information.
Commission Members, ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/memberinfo.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2003).
13. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 1.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 207.
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criminal justice issues and specifically with regard to the
death penalty. The Columbia University Liebman study revealed that California has the largest death row population of
any state in the nation." People sentenced to death in California have to wait four to six years before counsel is appointed to represent them. In all, condemned people in California have to wait almost ten years before their direct
appeals and post conviction petitions are heard by the California Supreme Court. 9 Even after that long wait, the court
affirms almost all convictions, no matter what issues are
raised."
A. Problems Identifiedby San Jose Mercury News
InvestigativeReports
Extensive investigative reporting by the San Jose Mercury News has also unearthed disturbing evidence that the
California death penalty system is not functioning.2' Lead re17. Liebman et al., A Broken System, PartII: Why There Is So Much Error
in CapitalCases, and What Can Be Done About It, THE JUSTICE PROJECT, Appendix A (2002), at http://justice.policy.net/cjreform/dpstudyliebman2.pdf (last
visited Aug. 11, 2003).
18. Michael Millman, Director of the California Appellate Project, estimated
the delay at four to five years. Interview with Michael Millman, Director, California Appellate Project, in Monterey, Cal. (Mar. 1, 2003)[hereinafter Millman
Interview]. The California District Attorneys Association (CDAA) and the
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation issued a report stating that the delay in appointment of counsel for condemned inmates in California is currently five to six
years. CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
LEGAL

FOUNDATION,

PROSECUTORS PERSPECTIVE

ON CALIFORNIA DEATH

PENALTY, at 18 (2003), http://wwwcdaa.org/whitepapers/DPPaper.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2003) [hereinafter CDAA PROSECUTOR'S WHITE PAPER].
19. See Liebman et al., supranote 17, at Appendix A-7.
20. See id. Since the voters removed Chief Justice Rose Bird and two other
Justices in 1986, the California Supreme Court has been even more reluctant to
reverse death sentences.
See Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the
Rights/Remedies Split, 88 Va. L.Rev. 1, 62-64 (2002). More recent figures show
a greater disparity in recent years between the low reversal rate in California
state court and the high reversal rate of California cases in federal court. See
Howard Mintz, State, US. Courts at Odds on Sentences: Different Standards
Lead to Reversals, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 15, 2002,
http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/special-packages/3067231.htm
(last visited Aug. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Mintz, Different Standards].
21. See Howard Mintz, Death Sentence Reversals Cast Doubt on System:
Courtroom Mistakes Put Executions on Hold, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr.
14,
2002,
http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/special-packages/3062323.htm
(last visited Aug. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Mintz, Courtroom Mistakes]; see also
Mintz, Different Standards, supra note 20; Howard Mintz, Under Fire, Court
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porter Howard Mintz incorporated some of the research of the
Liebman Study and further corroborated it with case studies
from California. "The Mercury News study examined seventy-two California cases reversed by state and federal courts
since 1987 and 150 appeals pending in the federal courts."2 2
It found that even though California spends more money on
capital cases than other states, its convictions are reversed
because of problems similar to those in other states that
spend less money, such as Alabama or Texas. These problems include incompetent lawyers, prosecutorial misconduct,
and judicial errors.23
The Mercury News study found no minimum statewide
standards for the qualifications of defense lawyers appointed
to death penalty trials.24 According to the study, the main issue on appeal is the penalty, as opposed to guilt or innocence.
Two-thirds of reversals are reversals of the penalty phase;
and fewer than one-third of those whose sentences were reversed on appeal have received the death penalty on remand." The study also found that California conflicts with
the federal courts more than any other state. The California
Supreme Court's reversal rate is 10%, the lowest in the country, while the federal courts have reversed 62% of the death
sentences affirmed by the California Supreme Court, the
highest rate nationally. 26 The combined reversal rate for California cases, however, is roughly in line with the national average found in a Columbia University study performed by
Eases Limits on PresentingNew Evidence, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 2,
2002,
http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/special-packages/3184491.htm
(last visited Aug. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Mintz, UnderFire].
22. Mintz, Courtroom Mistakes, supranote 21.
23. Id.
24. California has enacted minimum standards for the appointment of
counsel in capital cases on appeal under California Rule of Court 76.6 (effective
Feb. 27, 1998). Condemned people in California must wait nearly ten years before their direct appeals and post conviction petitions are heard by the California Supreme Court, however. See note 18, supra. Therefore, few if any condemned people on California's death row are represented by counsel appointed
under this rule. Similarly, California's minimum standards for the appointment of trial counsel in capital cases under under California Rule of Court 4.117
became effective on January 1, 2003. Because capital trials typically take between one and two years to complete, it is unlikely that any of the death row
residents were represented at trial by counsel appointed under this new rule.
25. See Howard Mintz, Courtroom Mistakes, supra note 21.
26. See id.
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James S. Liebman and colleagues."
B. California'sProceduresCompare Unfavorably with Those
of Other States
In addition, California's death penalty procedures compare unfavorably with the procedures of other states. In part,
this is because the system introduced in 197728 and reintroduced in 197829 was not well thought out. Since its enactment it has been amended repeatedly, creating a patchwork of provisions rather than a coherent system." Whatever
the reasons, most other states that impose the death penalty
have checks and balances and procedural safeguards not present in California. 3 Some of these deficiencies may also violate the Federal Constitution, and they should give Californians pause to think.32
1.

CaliforniaLaw Failsto Narrow the Pool of Death
Eligible Defendants

California's death penalty statute does not meaningfully
narrow the pool of people convicted of murder to a smaller
group eligible for the death penalty.33 As in all states that
have the death penalty, the death penalty is actually imposed
on a small fraction of those who are death eligible. 4 As a
matter of constitutional law, the selection of those who are to
receive the death penalty cannot be capricious; instead, a ra27. See Liebman et al., supra note 17, at Appendix A-15.
28. See CAL. PENAL CODE
PROPOSITION 7 (Nov. 7, 1978).

§§ 190-190.4

(West

1977),

repealed by

29. Known as the Briggs Initiative on the November 7, 1978 general election ballot, Proposition 7 repealed and replaced California Penal Code Sections
190, 190.1, 190.2, 190.3, and 190.4, and repealed Penal Code Section 190.26.
30. See Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty
Scheme: Requiem for Furman9 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1314-17 (1997).

31. Id. at 1316-18.
32. Examples include (1) the failure to narrow the categories of death eligible murder cases as set forth below, see infra text accompanying notes 33-40; (2)

the failure to have meaningful narrowing factors in aggravation and mitigation,
see text accompanying notes 41-48, infra; (3) the failure to require proof beyond
a reasonable doubt to establish aggravating factors, see infra text accompanying
notes 50-57; and (4) the failure to permit inter-case proportionality review, see
infra text accompanying notes 59-60.

33. See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 30, at 1283.
34. A meticulous study of California murder cases showed that less than
one in eight (11.4%) of people convicted of death eligible murders receives a
death judgment. See id. at 1332.
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tional narrowing process is required.35 Purportedly, California narrows the field of death eligible convicts by requiring a
finding of "special circumstances" in addition to simple guilt.36
Those special circumstances are so numerous and so broad,
however, that they encompass nearly every first degree murder.37 There are twenty-five special circumstances under the
35. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972), declared the then existing death penalty schemes unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution on the grounds that death was being imposed arbitrarily. See id. at 240. The Court has described this process as narrowing. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1992). Before the
United States Supreme Court acted in Furman,the California Supreme Court
had already found the California death penalty system constitutionally flawed.
See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 899 (Cal. 1972). Chief Justice Wright
concluded that
[C]apital punishment is impermissibly cruel. It degrades and dehumanizes all who participate in its processes. It is unnecessary to any
legitimate goal of the state and is incompatible with the dignity of man
and the judicial process. Our conclusion that the death penalty may no
longer be exacted in California consistently with article I, section 6, of
our Constitution is not grounded in sympathy for those who would
commit crimes of violence, but in concern for the society that diminishes itself whenever it takes the life of one of its members.
Id. The Chief Justice then went on to quote Lord Chancellor Gardiner of the
House of Lords, debating abolition of capital punishment in England:
[W]hen we abolished the punishment for treason that you should be
hanged, and then cut down while still alive, and then disembowelled
while still alive, and then quartered, we did not abolish that
punishment because we sympathized with traitors, but because we
took the view that it was a punishment no longer consistent with our
self respect."
Id. (quoting 268 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (5th Series) (Lords, 43d Parl.,
First Sess., 1964-1965) (1965) p. 703).
36. See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.2-190.3 (West 2003).
37. California's broad construction of the "felony murder," "lying in wait,"
and other enumerated special circumstancesmeans that more than 84% of convicted first degree murderers are statutorily death eligible under the California
statutory scheme. See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 30, at 1332 ("When juvenile
first degree murderers are excluded from the calculation, the result is that more
than 84% of convicted first degree murderers are statutorily death-eligible under the present California Scheme."). Further in 2000, Proposition 18 changed
the elements of the "lying in wait" special circumstance from one committed
"while lying-in-wait" to one committed "by means of lying-in-wait," the same
standard required for non-capital first degree murder. Cal. Penal Code
§190.2(15) (West 2003); California Secretary of State, Murder.-Special Circumstances. Legislative Initiative Amendment. Analysis by Legislative Analyst,
available
at
http://primary2000.ss.ca.gov/VoterGuide/Propositions/18analysis.htm (last accessed Oct. 5, 2003) (describing the changes made by the Proposition to California Penal Code Section 190.2). This change should render the statute unconstitutional, because there is no longer any meaningful way to distinguish between
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current California statutes, many with subsections, rendering
over thirty-six actual circumstances in which capital punishment may be sought.38
One scholarly article has identified seven restricted, theoretically possible categories of first degree murder that would
not be capital crimes under the California statute. 39 These
seven restricted categories of non-capital murder stand in
contrast to the twenty-five special circumstances making
cases death eligible. Given that some of the narrowing special circumstances are so broad, it can hardly be claimed that
they fulfill their constitutionally mandated job of narrowing
at all. The seven exceptions are so restricted that the process
is turned on its head: rather than having almost all murders
ineligible with limited exceptions, almost all murders are
death eligible with limited exceptions."
In the second phase of the narrowing process, the jury
considers whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors." One aggravating factor, the circumstances of
the crime,42 has been interpreted so broadly that prosecutors

capital and non-capital murder committed by means of lying-in-wait. Furthermore, since "lying-in-wait" requires virtually no "lying" or "waiting," nearly any
intentional homicide can become "death-eligible" first degree murder.
38. California Penal Code section 190.2 has twenty-two subdivisions setting
forth special circumstances. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2003). In addition, special circumstances are found in Military and Veterans Code section
1627(a) and in Penal Code sections 37, 128, 219, and 4500, pursuant to Penal
Code section 190.3 . CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 1627(a) (West 2003); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 37, 128, 219, 4500 (West 2003). This figure does not include the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" special circumstance declared invalid in People v. Superior Court, 647 P.2d. 76 (1982); accord Maynard v. Cartwright 486 U.S. 356
(1988). California Penal Code section 219 is also listed in section 190.2(17)(1) as
a felony special circumstance in conjunction with a conviction for first degree
murder. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(17)(I) (West 2003). Therefore, twenty-one
special circumstances remain under section 190.2, and four additional circumstances remaining under section 190.3, totaling twenty-five. See id. However,
if the separate subdivisions of section 190.2(17) are counted, there are thirty-six
special circumstances. If all of the qualifying felonies are counted, there would
be thirty-nine total. Conservatively, California has twenty-five special circumstances, and over thirty-six if subsections are counted.
39. See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 30, at 1324-26.
40. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994); Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
41. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003).
42. See id. § 190.3(a). For portions of the analysis in the text associated
with notes 43-48, and the notes themselves, the author is indebted to the work
of the California Appellate Project and draft briefing collected and prepared by
that office. These arguments have been included in various briefs filed in the

SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW

[Vol: 44

can argue practically any case warrants the death penalty.
The California Supreme Court has never interpreted this factor in a way that would make it a narrowing circumstance.
To the contrary, the court has approved the use of this factor
to allow the prosecution to argue that the defendant should
get the death penalty on the grounds that the defendant had
a "hatred of religion, 43 or because three weeks after the crime
the defendant sought to conceal evidence,44 threatened witnesses after his arrest, 45 or disposed of the victim's body in a
46
manner that precluded its recovery.
In actual practice, prosecutors throughout California
have argued that the jury could weigh in aggravation almost
every conceivable circumstance of the crime, even those that,
from case to case, are absolutely opposite to each other.4 7 For
instance, prosecutors have argued that cases were aggravated
and death verdicts should be returned because the victim was
killed (1) in the middle of the night, (2) late at night, (3) early
in the morning, or (4) in the middle of the day. 48 These and
countless other examples demonstrate that no rational narrowing process exists. Therefore, courts impose death sentences based on the unfettered discretion of prosecutors and
jurors.
2.

CaliforniaLacks ImportantProcedural

Safeguards
Furthermore, California does not have many of the safeCalifornia Supreme Court including briefs filed by the author. See, e.g., Appellant's Opening Brief in People v. Turner (No. S009038) (brief on file with the
California Supreme Court); Appellant's Opening Brief in People v. Lewis (No.
S020570) (brief on file with the California Supreme Court). As adapted and expanded here, the author accepts responsibility for any deficiencies.
43. See People v. Nicolaus, 817 P.2d 893, 908 (Cal. 1991).
44. See People v. Walker, 765 P.2d 70, 90 n. 10 (Cal. 1988).
45. See People v. Hardy, 82 P.2d 781, 899 (Cal. 1992).
46. See People v. Bittaker, 774 P.2d 659, 697 n.35 (Cal. 1989).
47. The California Appellate Project assembled a collection of these arguments for inclusion in their amicus brief filed in Tuilaepa v. California,512 U.S.
967, 972 (1994). The anomalous results are summarized in Appellant's Opening
Brief in People v. Turner (No. S009038) (brief on file with the California Supreme Court).
48. See, e.g., People v. Fauber (No. S005868, RT 5777) (early morning killings); People v. Bean (No. S004387 RT 4715) (middle of the night killings); People v. Avena (No. S004422 RT 2603-04) (late-night killings); People v. Lucero
(No. S012568RT 4125-26) (middle of the day killing). All briefs are on file with
the California Supreme Court.

2003]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

guards common to death penalty sentencing schemes in other
states that guard against the arbitrary imposition of death.
In California, juries do not have to make written findings on
the basis for their death verdict.4 9 Nor do they have to decide
unanimously upon which aggravating circumstances they are
relying." The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
not required for the proof of aggravating circumstances, nor is
it required for the jury to find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The jury is
not even required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
death is the appropriate penalty."' In fact, except as to the existence of other criminal activity and prior convictions, juries
are not instructed on any burden of proof at all.5'
Twenty-seven states require that factors relied on to impose death in a penalty phase must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and three additional states
have related provisions. 3 Only California and Florida fail to
49. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-191 (West 2003); see also THE COMMITTEE
ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, 8.88 (West 2003)
[hereinafter CALJIC].
50. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003); CALIC, supra note 49, at
8.88.
51. CALJIC, supra note 49, at 8.88, in relevant part, instructs the jury:
In weighing of various [aggravating and mitigating] circumstances you
determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and
appropriate considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances
with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without the
possibility of parole.
Id.
52. See id. at 8.86; see also People v. Robertson, 655 P.2d 279, 298-300 (Cal.
1982).
53. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55-165 (Michie 1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603
(Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103(d) (repealed 2002); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1)(a) (1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(c) (Harrison
1990); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(h) (Michie 1993); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/91(f) (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(a),(e) (West 1992); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 532.025(3) (Michie 1992); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West
1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d), (f), (g) (1957); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19103 (1993); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032 (West 2002); MONT. LAWS 154 (2003);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. '175.554(3) (Michie 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5
(2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.04 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1993); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iii) (West 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A),
(C) (Law. Co-op 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-5 (Michie 1988); TENN.
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address the matter statutorily.54
Three states require that the jury must base any death
sentence on a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that death is
the appropriate punishment.55 The supreme court of a fourth
state, Utah, reversed a death judgment because that judgment was based on a standard of proof that was less than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In contrast, California
does not require that a reasonable doubt standard be used
during any part of the penalty phase, except as to proof of
prior criminality relied upon as an aggravating circumstance. Even in that context, the required finding need not
be unanimous."
Unlike other states, California has no requirement of
proportionality review whereby the trial and appellate courts
can compare the nature of the offense and offender to unrelated cases or to the cases of co-defendants. In fact, proportionality review is actually prohibited in California. Therefore, the courts have no means to review individual cases on
the basis that individual defendants are being treated in a
disparate fashion, though non-capital defendants have that
right of review.

CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(f) (1991); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(c)
(Vernon 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1990); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-2-102(d)(i)(A), (e)(i) (Michie 1992); see also State v. Stewart, 250 N.W.2d
849, 863 (Neb. 1977); State v. Simants, 250 N.W.2d 881, 888-90 (Neb. 1977);

State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338-48 (Ut. 1977).
54. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141-921.142 (West 2003).
55. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(a)(3) (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE

ANN. § 10.95.060 (West 1990); see also State v. Goodman, 257 S.E.2d 569, 577
(N.C. 1979).

56. See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83-84 (Utah 1982).
57. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003); CALJIC, supra note 49, at
8.86.
58. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190-191 (West 2003); CALJIC, supranote 49, at

8.84-8.88.
59. According to the Illinois Commission study, nineteen states provide for
proportionality review: Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Washington. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at
166.
60. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
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C. RacialDisparitiesCastDoubt upon California'sDeath
PenaltySystem

Serious racial disparities permeate California's death
penalty system."

Recent studies in Pennsylvania and Mary-

land confirm significant racial bias in the death penalty sentencing systems of those states.6 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Committee found that, "[e]mpirical studies conducted
in Pennsylvania to date demonstrate that, at least in some
counties, race plays a major, if not overwhelming, role in the
imposition of the death penalty."" The Maryland study concluded that, "[o]ffenders who kill white victims, especially if

the offender is black, are significantly and substantially more
likely to be charged with a capital crime."" Although Californians may think their system is not subject to the same criticism, the preliminary studies show that it is racially biased in
exactly the same way.65 More significantly, since California

has no proportionality review either in the trial courts66 or the
state supreme court, 7 no mechanism exists to bring the issue
of racial bias before the courts of this state.

61. See id. Since the death penalty was re-instituted in California in 1977,
only twelve white defendants were executed for killing blacks while 180 blacks
were executed for killing whites. See NAACP, DEATH Row U.S.A., supra note 3;
see also Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region and Death Sentencingin Illinois, 81 OR. L. REV. 39 (2002).
ON

62. See FINAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE
RACIAL AND GENDER BIAS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 218 (2003),

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/Index/Supreme/BiasCmte/FinalReport.pdf [hereinafter Pennsylvania Report]; PATERNOSTER ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
MARYLAND'S DEATH SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF
RACE
AND
LEGAL
JURISDICTION,
FINAL
REPORT
36
(2003),

http://justice.policy.net/relatives/21200.pdf. [hereinafter Maryland Report].
63. Pennsylvania Report, supranote 62, at 218.
64. Maryland Report, supranote 62, at 36.
65. A noted sociologist and author of studies on race and the death penalty
in other states, Michael Radelet states that preliminary studies show a significant disparity between the race of victim and the race of defendant regarding
those who get sentenced to death in California. Interview with Michael
Radelet, Sociology Professor, University of Colorado, in Gaviota, Cal. (Mar. 2,
2003). Racial minorities convicted of murdering a white person are at least
twice as likely to receive the death penalty as those who murder blacks. See id.
66. The trial judge has no authority to do an inter-case proportionality review. See People v. Marshall, 790 P.2d 676, 692 (Cal. 1990). However the judge
can do an intra-case review to determine if the punishment is proportionate to
the individual defendant's culpability. Id. at 691-92. See also People v. Dillion,
668 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983).
67. See People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 662 (Cal. 1989).
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D. DNA Evidence Has ExoneratedMany Death-rowInmates
There is also good reason to suspect that some of the people on California's death row are actually innocent. Approximately 111 condemned people in this country have been released from death row since the death penalty was reinstated
in the 1970s." Though DNA testing has exonerated many of
these people, DNA trace evidence is available in only a small
percentage of the cases." Therefore, many innocent people
will never have the opportunity to bring forth scientific evidence of their innocence."
To determine how such injustice occurs, the Institute for
Law and Justice has analyzed twenty-eight cases in which
the defendant was shown conclusively to be innocent.7 ' The
studies show that most of those cases involved positive identifications or police misconduct."
California has not established procedures to minimize these wrongful convictions.
Significantly, many California death-row cases have not
been reviewed. Of the approximately 620 people condemned
in California, roughly 140 have no lawyer to represent them
at all. 73 Another 110 have an appellate lawyer but no lawyer
to do the habeas corpus investigation and petition.74 A death

68. According to data compiled by the DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innoc.html (last visited Aug. 12,
2003), there have been 111 exonerations since 1973. The California District Attorney's Association and the conservative Criminal Justice Legal Foundation
concluded that, as of the time of their writing, only thirty-four of these people
were actually innocent. See CDAA PROSECUTOR'S WHITE PAPER, supra note 18,
at vi. Using suspect methodology, they contend-contrary to the Constitution-that even if acquitted, a person can be deemed "not innocent." For in-

stance, they disagree that Patrick Croy was innocent, even though the jury acquitted him based on self-defense, because he killed a police officer. Id. at vii.
However, it is not necessary to quibble over numbers. Whatever the number of

exonerated people condemned to death, it is a significant number and it reflects
a larger number of condemned people who have not yet been-and some who
will never be-discovered.
69. See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 278 (2002).
70. See Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case
Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial, NIJ
RES. REP. 15 (1996), http://www.ilj.org/infotech/dnaevid.pdf.

71. Id. at 1.
72. Id. at 15.

73. Millman Interview supra,note 18.
74. See id. Since the habeas corpus defense team examines innocence
claims, forty percent (140 without an attorney plus 110 without habeas corpus
representation) of the 620 people presently condemned in California have not
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row inmate must wait approximately four to six years before
the California Supreme Court appoints a lawyer." Furthermore, the California Supreme Court takes approximately ten
years before it considers the direct appeal and state habeas
petition. 6 Meaningful review often does not occur until the
case reaches the federal court. 7 As a result, most of the condemned people on California's death row have not had a
chance to have their innocence claims advanced or tested.
Given the experience of other states, including Illinois, it
is likely that innocent people have also been condemned to
death in California. Illinois courts have discovered that almost ten percent of their death row population were factually
innocent." Since no one knows how many other innocent
people simply had their sentences commuted or, more tragically, have been executed, ten percent is probably a conservative figure. 9 California's death row population is approximately 620.80 If California's rate of wrongful conviction were
the same as Illnois', that would mean that over sixty innocent
people have been condemned to death in California.
E. California'sDeath PenaltySystem Conflicts with
InternationalLaw
Finally, California's death penalty system does not comply with international law.8 Almost all industrialized nations
yet had anyone begin examining their innocence claims. Once that examination
begins, it can take years before any significant information about those claims
comes to light.
75. See id.; see also CDAA PROSECUTOR'S WHITE PAPER, supra note 18, at
18.
76. See Liebman et al., supranote 17, at Appendix A-7.
77. Id.
78. Since the death penalty was re-instituted in Illinois in the 1970's, there
were seventeen people exonerated. See Ryan Speech, supra note 1. Governor
Ryan commuted the sentences of 165 people, almost all to life in prison without
the possibility of parole. Id. In addition, thirty-three other people condemned
in Illinois have been exonerated since the death penalty was initially established in that state. Id.
79. See id. Certainly many of the people who were condemned to death in
Illinois are probably guilty. However, Governor Ryan was not able to ascertain
whether or not all of the remaining condemned 167 people were in fact guilty.
Id.
80. See Millman Interview, supra note 18.
81. See generally ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE
PERSPECTIVE (3d ed. 2002). Turkey eliminated the death penalty in August
2002, meaning that there are no European nations which have retained the
death penalty. Id. at 8. The four nations that now account for the most execu-
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have abandoned the death penalty. For instance, the European Union denies admission to a country with the death
penalty." Ninety percent of the world's known executions are
conducted by four nations: China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the
United States."3 Beyond that, the death penalty and the
manner in which California imposes it conflict with numerous
provisions of international treaties and conventions to which
the United States claims to be a party.84
F. Summary
Therefore, as the Columbia University and the San Jose
Mercury News studies show, the system in California is not
working. Compared with constitutional law and procedures
in other jurisdictions, California's system does not contain
even the basic safeguards to avoid capricious, erroneous, and
discriminatory application of the death penalty. A strong
probability exists that dozens of innocent people are awaiting
death on California's death row. Finally, California's system
conflicts with international law. In light of these concerns,
California could benefit from adopting the recommendations
of the Illinois Commission.
tions in the world are China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Id. at
90-91.
82. Id. at 17; see also DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, THE DEATH
PENALTY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (summarizing the number of abolitionist
countries
as
of
August,
2002),
at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=127&scid=30 (last visited Aug.
11, 2003).
83. See HOOD, supra note 81. In 2001, there were 3,048 known executions
in 31 countries, 90% of which took place in China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the
United States. Id. at 89.
84. The International Court of Justice, known as the World Court, has issued orders seeking to halt executions pending in the state of Texas. See Case
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States),
2003 WL 256903 (I.C.J.) (Jan. 21, 2003). Case information is available at the
International
Court
of
Justice's
website
at
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm).
The ICJ's provisional order of
02/05/03
is
available
at
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imusjiorder_20030205.PDF.
Treaties
which raise issues with this country's use of capital punishment include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 9, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture), Dec. 10, 1984,
39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 1966, 660 U.N.TS.
195, and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), 1963, 596
U.N.T.S. 261.
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IV. COMPARISON OF CALIFORNIA WITH THE ILLINOIS
COMMISSION REPORT

Given the deficiences described in Part III, an inquiry
into whether California follows the Illinois Commission's
recommendations will aid in evaluating California's system.
California adopts the Illinois recommendations at a dismal
rate of 6.17%. Far from being a leader in jurisprudence in the
country, California fails miserably when measured against
the standards set by the Illinois Commission.
The Illinois Commission Report tracks the system of
criminal justice in capital cases systematically from the inception of a case to its conclusion.85 The Report acknowledges
numerous flaws, many of which either have resulted in the
conviction of the innocent or are likely to contribute to those
results. 6 The recommendations, for the most part, neither
hamper the conviction of the truly guilty nor place an undue
burden on law enforcement, the courts, or the defense function.87 Some are simple, common sense measures.88 Others
ultimately save resources by giving a greater assurance that
things will be done right the first time. 9
A. Overall Comparison
Appendix A of this article summarizes the comparison of
the Illinois Commission Report to current California law.9"
85. See generally ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5.
86. Id. at 7-11.
87. See, e.g., id. at 34 (recommending that eyewitnesses should be told that
the suspect may not be present in a lineup, that the witness need not select
anyone from the lineup, and that the witness should not assume that the person
conducting the lineup knows which person in the lineup is the suspect). Id. at
93-101 (recommending initial and particular education, ongoing education, and
minimum educational standards for judges hearing capital cases).
88. See, e.g., id. at 20-21 (recommending that police continue to pursue alternate leads even after acquiring a suspect); id. at 28 (recommending that a
homicide suspect's unrecorded statements to police be repeated back to him or
her on tape and his or her comments recorded).
89. See, e.g., id. at 55-56 (recommending the establishment of minimum
standards for DNA evidence); id. at 56-57 (recommending that the state establish a comprehensive DNA database); id. at 57-58 (recommending that capital
defendants have an opportunity to conduct a court-ordered search of the DNA
database to identify others who may be guilty of the crime).
90. The Illinois Commission Report is quite specific in its recommendations.
ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 207. Many of the recommendations are improvements on existing law enforcement procedures or portions of
the existing judicial system. As such, the recommendations should be taken
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The recommendations were determined to be "Met" by current California law, "Met with Qualifications," "Not Met,"
"Constitutionally Required," or in one case "Not Applicable."
California does not meet seventy-six of the Recommendations.
It meets three; two other recommendations have been "Met
with Qualifications." Three recommendations are required by
the United States Constitution, as construed by the Supreme
Court. One recommendation is arguably peculiar to Illinois
and will not be compared in this analysis.9 '
Therefore, out of eighty-one recommendations that a
state could choose to meet; California does not follow seventysix. This renders an adoption rate of 6.17% including the
three recommendations that are "Met" and the two that are
"Met with Qualifications."9 In short, California fails to adopt
the recommendations of the Illinois Governor's Commission.
B. Substantive Comparison
The Illinois Commission studied twelve areas of the
criminal process relating to the conduct of capital cases."
both in letter and spirit to require real and specific reform, not mere rhetorical
compliance.
91. Recommendation 77 "recommend[s] the reauthorization of the Capital
Crimes Litigation Act." Id. at 178-79. California does not have such an act and,
therefore, by definition, California does not adopt the recommendation. This
recommendation is peculiar to Illinois, so it will be deemed inapplicable for the
purpose of this study.
92. A critic of this analysis might argue that California should get "credit"
for complying with the three recommendations which are compelled by the
United States Supreme Court in all states. However, compliance with constitutional requirements rarely requires that the California legislature or courts act
to change its capital punishment system. Therefore, crediting California with
meeting these three recommendations would suggest, erroneously, that the legislature had been more active than they have been in responding to issues underlying the Illinois Commission's findings. Even including these three recommendations, however, California's adoption rate would only be eight of eightyfour or 9.52%.
93. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496, n.17 (1977) (discussing statistical significance); see also FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, 80-177 (2d ed. 2000). This article presents a correlation study of the actual system in California, compared to the recommendations
for the Illinois system. It is not a regression analysis employing a comprehensive statistical database. Nevertheless, the adoption of only 6.17% of the recommendations in California leads to the conclusion that no meaningful correlation exists between the Illinois recommendations and actual practice in
California.
94. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5. The twelve areas in the
Report are (1) Police and Pre-trial Investigations: Recommendations 1 through
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Starting with an analysis of police procedures, the Commission studied investigation, pre-trial matters, trials, and sentencing.95 From those areas of study came eighty-two specific
recommendations.9 6 The Commission concluded with a general section in which it made three more recommendations."
Overall, the Commission found that every stage of the criminal process in Illinois needed serious repair to avoid injustice,
including the ultimate injustice of convicting and executing
innocent people." It concluded that even meeting all of the
recommendations would not eliminate the possibility of executing an innocent person.99
This paper compares the California criminal process with
the Illinois recommendations. California has virtually none
of the police practices recommended to promote the integrity
of investigations. These recommended practices are designed
to solve the crime and advance the probability that the real
killer is arrested, prosecuted, and convicted.' As Illinois discovered, unchecked police practices not only condemn innocent people but also leave the real killers free to continue kill0
ing.'
As described in Part III, California lists twenty-five special circumstances that make a murder death eligible in Cali-

19; (2) DNA and Forensic Testing: Recommendations 20 through 26; (3) Eligibility for Capital Punishment: Recommendations 27 and 28; (4) Prosecutors Selection of Cases for Capital Punishment: Recommendations 29 through 31; (5)
Trial Judges: Recommendations 32 through 39; (6) Trial Lawyers: Recommendations 40 through 45; (7) Pretrial Proceedings: Recommendations 46 through
54; (8) The Guilt-Innocence Phase: Recommendations 55 through 59; (9) The
Sentencing Phase: Recommendations 60 through 64; (10) Imposition of Sentence: Recommendations 65 through 69; (11) Proceedings Following Conviction
and Sentence: Recommendations 70 through 75; and (12) Funding: Recommendations 76 through 82. Id.
95. Id. at 19.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 187-200 (describing general Recommendations 83 through 85).
98. Id. at 207.
99. Id.
100. See ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 19.
101. See generally THOMAS FRISBIE & RANDY GARRETT, VICTIMS OF JUSTICE
(1998). This book chronicles the police practices, some well intentioned, some
simply incompetent, and some corrupt, that led to the death sentences of two
innocent men. See generally id. While the police and prosecutors were forcing
the case through the courts and resisting reviews and retrials, the real killer
continued to rape and kill others, including an eight-year-old girl. Id. at 18,
287.
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fornia.'0 ' Many of them have subparts, resulting in over
thirty-six factors. 01 3 The Illinois Commission recommends
that there be five and only five.14 In contrast, the California
system makes virtually any murder death eligible. Arguably,
California does not even comply with the Federal Constitution on this point.'
California is so far out of line with the
Illinois Commission recommendations on narrowing that the
adoption of other recommendations in the Report would still
render California's system fundamentally flawed.' °
Having noted the major differences between California's
system and the Illinois Commission's recommendations, this
paper will take the Illinois Commission Report segment by
segment and compare California's requirements with each
recommendation.
1.

Police and Pre-trialIn vestigations:
Recommendations I Through 19

California does not meet any of the nineteen recommendations made by the Commission in this category.' 7 In essence, these recommendations are designed to bring police
practices up to minimum requirements in order to avoid false
confessions, misrecollected and misinterpreted events, false
identifications, and contaminated testimony.'
They also require police to receive training on issues that have caused
wrongful convictions and to encourage police practices which
really result in finding the actual perpetrator.' 9
California adopts none of these recommendations. If the
police investigation is a search for the truth, as it should be,

102. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2003); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE
(West 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 37, 128, 219, 4500 (West 2003) (pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3).
103. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2003).
104. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 65-80.

§ 1627(a)

105. See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 30, at 1283.
106. Id. at 1283, 1288; see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305 (1987) (the
death penalty cannot be imposed without "rational criteria that narrow the de-

cision maker's judgment."); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50 (1984) (emphasizing the importance of the "constitutionally necessary narrowing function of
statutory aggravating circumstances."). See generally,Furman v. Georgia, 480
U.S. 238 (1972) (striking down the death penalty based on the infrequency in

which it was applied).
107. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 19-50.
108. See id. at 19.
109. See id.
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California should implement these recommendations.
Recommendation 1:
After a suspect has been identified, the police should continue to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether
these point towards or away from the suspect."°
The Illinois Commission recognized that established research has identified "tunnel vision""' as an impediment to
law enforcement arresting and prosecuting the real criminal."' At the time of the Commission's study, Illinois released
thirteen wrongfully convicted people from death row."3 For
many of them, the Commission found that "tunnel vision" or

"confirmatory bias" led to the wrongful condemnation."'

California law does not require that police pursue inquiries that point away from the defendant."' The law does not

penalize the prosecution for law enforcement's failure to pursue leads, interview witnesses and collect evidence."'
Recommendation 2:
(a) The police must list on schedules all existing items of
relevant evidence including exculpatory evidence, and
theirlocation.
(b) Record-keeping obligationsmust be assigned to specific
police officers or employees, who must certify their compliance in writing to the prosecutor.
110. See id. at 20.
111. The Illinois Commission suggests that tunnel vision occurs "where the
belief that a particular suspect has committed a crime often obviates an objective evaluation of whether there might be others who are actually guilty." Id. at
20. Officers become so convinced that they have arrested the correct person
that they often ignore information pointing in another direction. Id. at 20-21.
112. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 20-21; see also, Stanley
Fisher, The Prosecutor'sEthical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police
Hands:Lessons from England,68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379 (2000).
113. Id. at 20.
114. See id.
115. Part IV of the California Penal Code contains those sections controlling
the detection and apprehension of criminals. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1100611010 (West 2003). Nowhere within is there a requirement or direction to look
beyond the first suspect identified. Id.
116. The California Supreme Court has followed the United States Supreme
Court in holding that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the
part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." People v. Catlin, 26 P.3d 357, 408 (Cal.
2001) (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988)).
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(c) The police must give copies of the schedules to the
prosecution.
(d) The police must give the prosecutoraccess to all investigatorymaterialsin theirpossession."7

The Illinois Commission recognized problems with giving
the prosecutors and the courts the responsibility to document
evidence and ensure that it will be disclosed to the defense."'
Although prosecutors ultimately have that burden, the study

showed that evidence was not being disclosed by law enforcement to the prosecutors and, if it was, sometimes not until long after the prosecution was completed." 9
California law does not require that police perform the

kind of record keeping recommended. Various police agencies
throughout the state may have their own record keeping requirements, but no statewide standard or standards from
agency to agency within particular counties exist."'

Since

county-wide prosecutors and the state-wide Attorney General's Office deal with multiple agencies, no expectation exists
that records will be maintained in a uniform fashion.12
117. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 22.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11006-11010 (West 2003).
121. There are fifty-eight counties and over a thousand cities in the State of
California.
California
Association
of
Counties
at
http://www.csac.counties.org/counties-close-up/ca-county-map.html. There are
well over a thousand independent law enforcement agencies in this state. Law
Enforcement Agencies at http://www.post.ca.gov/library/other/agency-page.asp.
For instance, in Santa Barbara County, local law enforcement agencies include:
the Santa Barbara County Sheriff; the Santa Barbara Police Department; the
Santa Maria Police Department; the Guadalupe Police Department; the Santa
Barbara Airport Patrol; the Lompoc Police Department; the Santa Barbara
Harbor Patrol; the University of California at Santa Barbara Police; the District
Attorney's Investigator staff; the Santa Barbara County Fire Inspectors; the
Fire Inspectors of the city Fire Departments of Carpinteria, Santa Maria,
Lompoc, Santa Barbara, and Vandenberg; Elder Abuse Investigators; the Santa
Barbara County Probation Department; and, by contract with the Santa Barbara Sheriff, the Goleta Police, the Solvang Police, and the Buellton Police. See
id. Santa Barbara prosecutors may have investigations involving evidence collected by state agencies, such as the Department of Justice Criminalistics
Laboratory, the California Highway Patrol, the Department of Fish and Game,
the State Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, the State Park Rangers, the
Alcohol Beverage Control, the State Franchise Tax Board, the California
Department of Forestry, the Department of Corrections, the State Fire Marshal,
Department of Motor Vehicles Investigators, State Parole, and several others.
Additional evidence may be collected by other quasi-law enforcement agencies,
such as Child Protective Services, Welfare Fraud Investigators, Child Support
Investigators, the Air Pollution Control District, and various city and county
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Recommendation 3:
In a death eligible case, representation by the public defender during a custodial interrogationshould be authorized by the [state]legislature when a suspect requests the
advice of counsel, and where there is a reasonable belief
that the suspect is indigent. To the extent that there is
some doubt about the indigency of the suspect, police
should resolve the doubt in favor
of122allowing the suspect
S
to have access to the public defender.
The Illinois Commission noted "the inherent coerciveness
of station house interrogations."'2 3 False confessions have
been documented as a serious factor in the conviction of the
innocent."' The Commission believed that Recommendation
3 would reduce false confessions while
imposing relatively lit12 5
system.
the
on
burden
tle financial
California law does not require a court to provide the
public defender or any counsel for an adult at the time of an
interrogation.'26 If the suspect invokes his or her rights pur27 the police are supposed to stop. 12' The
suant to Miranda,'
public defender is only appointed for adults at the arraignment.'29 Therefore, invocation of right to counsel by an arrestee results in returning the arrestee to custody until ar-

the Air Pollution Control District, and various city and county administrative
agencies. Finally, of course, Santa Barbara prosecutors, like prosecutors from
other counties, depend on evidence collected from agencies in other counties,
special agents, police officers, and inspectors general from the multitude of federal agencies, as well as agents from other countries and organizations like Interpol.
122. Id. at 23.
123. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 24.
124. See generally Richard Ofshe & Richard Leo, The Decision to Confess
Falsely. Rational Choice and IrrationalAction, 74 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 979
(1997).
125. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 24.
126. A public defender or other counsel is appointed when criminal proceedings begin at arraignment. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 27706(a) (West 2003); but
see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 625 (West 2003) (right to counsel for a juvenile
at interrogation during temporary detention).
127. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1964).
128. See id. at 437; see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
In California, police officers have been trained to continue with the interrogation, because it may provide other leads or be admissible for the purpose of impeachment under Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). People v. Neal, 72
P.3d 280, 297 (Cal. 2003) (Baxter J., concurring).
129. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 27706(a) (West 2003).
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raignment.'
Arrestees often "voluntarily"
waive their right
131
awaiting arraignment.
while
to counsel
California law does not even require law enforcement to
interrupt an interrogation when a lawyer comes to the jail or
station house to see the client. 3 ' Some prosecutors argue that
officers may deliberately violate Miranda in order to obtain
confessions that can be used for further investigation and impeachment if the defendant testifies.'33 Conflicting case law
exists on this issue.3
Recommendation 4.
Custodial interrogationsof a suspect in a homicide case
occurring at a police facility should be videotaped.
Videotaping should not include merely the statement
made by the suspect after interrogation, but the entire
interrogationprocess.

The Illinois Commission observed that prosecutors sometimes used false confessions to convict people later found to be
innocent.'3 6 These purported confessions came at the end of
lengthy interrogations." 7 The Commission also concluded
that videotaping would help to establish that valid confessions were obtained without physical coercion or undue influ13
8
ence.California
law does not require law enforcement to tape

130. Invocation of Mirandarights simply require the police to stop their interrogations, not to provide the suspect with an attorney. Neal, 72 P.3d at 281.
131. See People v. Williams, 941 P.2d 752, 774 (Cal. 1997).
132. Incredibly, where a lawyer is waiting in the lobby of the police station,
the police may exclude him or her and not even tell the subject that the lawyer
is there. See People v. Ledesma, 204 Cal. App. 3d 682 (1988); People v. Gott,
117 Cal. App. 3d 125, 128-30 (1981).
133. See Neal, 72 P.3d at 297.
134. See People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal. 1998) (holding statements
made by a suspect to police officers in deliberate violation of Miranda may be
admitted at trial to challenge the suspect's credibility).; but see Cal. Attorneys
for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039 (Cal. 1999) (holding that officers
who deliberately violated suspects' Mirandarights were potentially civilly liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for those constitutional violations).
135. Id. at 24.
136. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 24-25.
137. Id. at 25, n.16; see also Gail Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic Recording of CustodialInterrogations,6
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719 (1997).
138. Id. at 24-25.
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record interrogations at all.139 Videotaping does sometimes
occur in practice but is not required. Furthermore, law enforcement commonly videotapes only after preliminary discussions with the defendant have taken place. 4 °
Recommendation 5:
Any statements by a homicide suspect which are not recorded should be repeated4to the suspect on tape, and his
orher comments recorded.11

The Illinois Commission recognized practical limitations
on videotaping all statements of all suspects, notwithstanding
its recommendation that videotaping be done whenever possible.'

The Commission noted that suspects often make

statements on the way to the police station or when videotaping is not a realistic option.' In such instances, the Commission recommends that the suspect repeat statements on video
as soon as it is practical.'" Adoption of this recommendation
would not only help avoid false confessions, but4 also would
help law enforcement document valid confessions. 1
California law does not require that law enforcement record a suspect's statements or specify the manner with which
recording should be conducted. Thus, California does not
adopt this recommendation.
Recommendation 6:
There are circumstances in which videotapingmay not be
practical,and some uniform method of recordingsuch interrogations, such as tape recording, should be established. Police investigatorsshould carry tape recordersfor
use when interviewingsuspects in homicide cases outside
the station,
and all such interviews should be audio146
taped.

The Illinois Commission recommended this as a corollary
to the preceding recommendations. Videotaping aids police in
139. See People v. Neal, 72 P.3d 280, 297 (Cal. 2003) (Baxter J., concurring).

140. See, e.g., Neal, 72 P,3d 280.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

ILLINOIS COMMISSION
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.

REPORT,

supra note 5, at 28.
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preserving statements they believe to be reliable.14 '7 However,
videotaping may be impractical for many interrogations in
the field, especially after a hot pursuit.1 4 In these situations,
it is important to have a backup method of recording
impor9
14
tant statements that may be used later in court.
California law does not require officers to record interrogations or carry tape recorders. Many agencies provide their
officers with tape equipment in the field, but there is no state
standard.
Recommendation 7.
The [state] eavesdropping act should be amended to permit police taping of statements without the suspects'
knowledge or consent in order to enable the videotaping
and audio taping of statements as recommended by the
Commission. The amendment should apply only to homicide cases, where the suspect is aware that the person asking the question is a police oflicer.150
The Illinois Commission recommends that the Illinois
eavesdropping statute be amended to allow surreptitious recording of a suspect's statements of a suspect, but only in
homicide cases where the suspect knows that he or she is
talking to a police officer.' 5 '
California follows this recommendation with qualifications. California Penal Code section 633 allows a blanket exception to the California "eavesdropping statutes" for law en-2
forcement personnel or anyone acting at their direction."1
California law meets the goal of allowing greater latitude in
the recording of homicide suspects' statements, but does not
limit surreptitious recording to homicide suspects. 153 Furthermore, California law allows the recording to take place
even if the officer does not identify him or herself as an officer
or even
if a non-officer is acting at law enforcement direc15 4
tion.
Not only do exceptions to California's eavesdropping stat147. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 29.
148. Id.
149. Id.

150.
151.
152.
153.

See id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 29-30.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 633 (West 2003).
See id.; ILLINOIS COMMISSIONN REPORT, supra note 5, at 29-30.

154. CAL. PENAL CODE § 633 (2003).
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statutes permit greater invasion of privacy than the Illinois
Commission recommends, they may also lead to unreliable
statements. Unaware that he is speaking to an officer, a suspect does not expect that his statements may be used against
him later. For instance, law enforcement often instigates
"cool calls." A civilian witness during a "cool call" may be
asked by the police to call the subject and engage in a conversation for the purpose of eliciting admissions or adoptive admissions. The civilian may draw on his or her relationship
with the subject. The subject, not knowing that the call is insincere, may try to avoid talking about issues relating to
criminal allegations and instead try to maintain the personal
relationship with the civilian. The prosecution at trial may
claim that the failure to deny the allegations is an adoptive
admission.1 5'
Recommendation 8:
The police should electronically record interviews conducted of significant witnesses in homicide cases where it
that their testimony may be
is reasonably foreseeable
6
challengedat trial.1
The Illinois Commission found that recording witness
statements was important in order to ensure accurate testimony at trial."7 If the witness's account changes at trial, the
judge and the jury will be able to view the original account on
tape." 8 The Commission found a number of questionable witness statements in the cases of the thirteen condemned people released from death row."9 However, California law does
not require that witness statements be recorded.' °

155. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1221 (2003).
156. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 30.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See People v. Fauber, 831 P.2d 249, 269 (Cal. 1992) (holding that failure
to record the entire interview did not violate the defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment rights to disclosure of exculpatory evidence, nor did it suppress
evidence favorable to the defendant). Because the defendant established only
the possibility that the co-defendant's unrecorded remarks would help him attack the co-defendant's credibility, the Fauber court concluded that the failure
to record did not amount to a loss of material substantial evidence. Id. at 270.
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Recommendation 9."
Police should be requiredto make a reasonableattempt to
determine the suspect' mental capacity before interrogation, and if a suspect is determined to be mentally retarded, the police should be limited to asking nonleading
questions and
prohibited
from implying they believe the
• 1
161
suspect is guiltY.
The Illinois Commission found that police need to take
special care when interrogating mentally retarded people "because they may be inclined to agree with the police version of
events in an effort to seek approval, or may be easily led." 6 '
Nevertheless, California law does not require that the police either attempt to determine a suspect's mental capacity
or use appropriate procedures to avoid false confessions. Recent research demonstrates the substantial danger of obtaining false confessions from the mentally retarded, who may
confess falsely even without coercion.'63 California does mandate police officer training regarding the interrogation of
mentally retarded people;"' however, there are no limitations
as set forth by this recommendation.
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Vir65
ginia,1
states may not execute mentally retarded people.
Nevertheless, the evaluation of the suspect's mental capacity
and the determination of mental retardation are critical at
the earliest stages of the investigation. Individuals with reduced mental capacity are likely to give false confessions and
cannot meaningfully assist their counsel, making their defense more difficult.'66 Early determination will help ensure
that defendants' rights are protected, reducing the likelihood
that they will harm their defense or distract police from pursuing the real killer.

161. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 30.
162. Id.
163. See Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution:Safeguards
Against UntrustworthyConfessions,32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105, 123 (1997).
164. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1315.25(4) (West 2003) (describing training on
appropriate language to use when interacting with mentally ill or developmentally disabled people).
165. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
166. Id. at 320-2 1.
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Recommendation 10:
When practicable,police departments should insure that
the person who conducts the lineup orphotospreadshould
not be aware of which member of the lineup or photo
spreadis the suspect.'6'
California law does not require that a lineup or photospread be conducted "blind.' 6 8 To the contrary, the investigating officers conducting the identification usually know the
suspect's identity. The Illinois Commission recommends a
"double-blind" procedure, which requires that neither the
administrator nor the witness know in advance who in the
lineup or the photospread is the subject. 6 '
Studies have shown that the investigator conducting a
lineup or photospread can have an effect on the choice made
by the witness.'
The Illinois Commission concluded that, "if
the person who administers the lineup or photospread knows
the identity of the suspect, the administrator can consciously
or unconsciously - for example, by eye contact, facial expression, tone of voice, pauses, verbal exchanges - signal his or
her knowledge of the witness." 7 ' This proposal is critical to
accurate identifications, because it reduces the possibility
that the identifications will be compromised.
Recommendation 11:
(a) Eyewitnesses should be told explicitly that the suspected perpetratormight not be in the the lineup or photospread, and therefore they should not feel they must
make an identification;
(b) Eyewitnesses should also be told that they should not
167. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 32.
168. Tom Perrotta, Hynes Endorses Double-Blind Police Lineups, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 13, 2002, at page 1, col. 3. New Jersey is the only state that conducts double blind and sequential lineups. Id. Although not required statewide, Santa
Clara County, California has adopted procedures for both double blind and sequential lineups. Id.
169. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 32-33.
170. See generally Wells & Olsen, supra note 69 (reviewing the literature
over the last thirty years). Studies continue to be published regarding this issue. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54
ANNU. REV. PSYCHOL. 277 (2003); Amy L. Bradfield et al., The DamagingEffect
of Confirming Feedback on the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and
IdentificationAccuracy, 87 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 112 (2002).
171. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 32.
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assume that the person administeing the lineup or pho72

tospreadknows which person is the suspect in the case.1
The Illinois Commission based this recommendation on
Gary Wells' study of eyewitness identification procedures.'7 3
Gary Wells found a substantial amount of evidence showing
that false eyewitness identifications are the primary cause of
the conviction of innocent people. 74 In such instances, the
eyewitnesses were almost certain that they identified the correct person."' Their misidentification was often influenced by
outside circumstances.' 6 The United States Department of
Justice commissioned a study which came to the same conclusions.' 7 The DOJ study found that "[e]ven honest wellmeaning witnesses can make errors, such as identifying the
wrong person or failing to identify the perpetrator of the
crime."'78 Based on that evidence, the study outlines procedures similar to the Illinois Commission's to obtain the most
reliable and accurate information from eyewitnesses. '
Since California law does not require a "double-blind"
identification procedure, 80 officers do not give this admonition. Based on the author's experience, officers in California
may give a version of the admonition, stating that the perpetrator may not be in the lineup. California should adopt a
double-blind requirement because it increases the likelihood
that the actual perpetrator will be identified and protects
against any intentional or unintentional outside influence.
Recommendation 12."
If the administratorof the lineup or photospread does not
know who the suspect is, a sequentialprocedureshould be
used, so that the eyewitness views only one lineup mem172. Id. at 34.
173. See generallyGary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness IdentificationProcedures.Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads,22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603
(1998).
174. Id. at 603, 606-08.
175. Id. at 624.
176. Id.
177. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,
TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, EYEWITNESS
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, (Oct. 1999) at 2-3, available at

http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf.
178. Id. at 1.
179. Id. at 2-3.
180. See Perrotta, supra note 168.
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her or photo at a time and makes a decision (that is the
perpetratoror that is not the perpetrator)regardingeach
person before viewing anotherlineup member orphoto.TM
California law does not require that officers conduct
lineup or photospread procedures sequentially." 2 The Illinois
Commission referred to scientific studies demonstrating that
a sequential process was more reliable than a process that
places all subjects in front of the witness at once.'83 The
Commission recognized, however, that sequential photospreads and lineups, without a double-blind 4procedure produce a higher rate of mistaken identifications.1
California should institute a sequential procedure only if
the procedure is "double-blind," since the risk of false identification increases if the administrator knows the suspect's
85
identity and shows subjects to the witness one at a time.'
Recommendation 13:
Suspects should not stand out in the lineup or photo
spread as being different from the distractors, based on
the eyewitness'previous description of the perpetrator,or
based on6 other factors that would draw attention to the
suspect.1

The Illinois Commission specifically recognized that the
distractors, or "fillers," in a lineup or photospread procedure
should resemble the description of the perpetrator,not the
suspect.' 7 In other words, studies show that when the fillers
are chosen to resemble the suspect, the suspect is more likely
to be chosen.'
California law does not dictate the manner in which the
lineup should be constructed. Case law may require suppression at trial of an unduly suggestive line-up or photospread.' 9
181. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 34.

182. See Perrotta, supranote 168, at page 1, col.3
183. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 39.
184. Id. at 35.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 37.
187. Id.
188. See Wells et al., supra note 173, at 630-35.
189. See Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967) (referring to earlier
studies conducted); see also Bradfield et al., The DamagingEffect of Confiring
Feedback on the Relation Between Eyewitness Certaintyand IdentificationAccuracy, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112 (2002) (referring to more recent studies
conducted).
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However, California does not comply with the recommendation to the extent that it requires the distractors be similar to
the description of the person observed rather than to the suspect in custody. In actual practice, officers conducting a photospread or live line-up procedure usually look for distractors
who resemble the suspect. They either go through "mug"
books for photographs or through the jail for live subjects.
Typically, they take the photo of the actual suspect and try to
find similar people as distractors. Studies show that the suspect then bears a familial resemblance to all of the distractors
even if they do not bear a resemblance to each other.19 ° This
makes it more likely that the suspect will be falsely identified. 9 Also, research shows that a false identification at an
improper line-up or photospread can contaminate the identifying witnesses' testimony.'9 2
Recommendation 14:
A clear written statement should be made of any statements made by the eyewitness at the time of the identification procedure as to his or her confidence that the identified person is or is not the actual culprit. This statement
should be recordedprior to any feedback by law enforcement personnel.19'
The Illinois Commission found that law enforcement
feedback has a significant effect on the confidence level of
witnesses who then testify before juries.'
Scientific studies
show that witnesses who receive positive feedback from the
police will testify that they have more confidence in their
identification.' 9' In addition, these witnesses are more likely
to make stronger claims about their ability to observe the
subject at the scene.'96 This dramatic increase in confidence
occurs even where the
eyewitnesses have made totally incor97
1
identifications.
rect
190. Wells et al., supranote 173, at 630-35.
191. See id.; TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE,
EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, 29-30 (Oct. 1999), at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf.
192. See generallyWells et al., supranote 173.
193. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 37.
194. Id. at 38.
195. See Wells et al., supranote 173, at 635.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 645-36.
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California law does not require officers to make a clear
written record of the statements of eyewitnesses at the time
of the identification procedure, let alone before law enforcement gives any feedback. Since false eyewitness identifications often account for the conviction of the innocent, the trier
of fact should have accurate information about the confidence
of the eyewitness at the time of an identification procedure.'9 8
Recommendation 15:
When practicable,the police should videotape lineup pro99
cedures,includingthe witness' confidence statement.'
Although the leading study did not recommend videotaping, the Commission unanimously recommended it. Videotaping requires three synchronized cameras, which would be
expensive. Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that
videotaping would aid in resolving disputes between the defense and prosecution."'
California law does not require that lineup procedures be
videotaped. Videotaping does not necessarily enhance the reliability of the lineup results, but it creates a record to review
later, and ensures that participants are more likely to abide
by the rules.
Recommendation 16:
All police who work on homicide cases should receive periodic trainingin the following areas, and experts on these
subjects should be retained to conduct training and prepare manuals on these topics: (1) The risks of false testimony by in-custody informants (j''ailhouse snitches". (2)
The risks of false testimony by accomplice witnesses. (3)
The dangers of tunnel vision or confirmatorybias. (4) The
risks of wrongful convictions in homicide cases. (5) Police
investigative and interrogationmethods. (6) Police investigating and reporting of exculpatory evidence. (7) Forensic evidence. (8) The risks offalse confessions.20 1
California law does not require that police officers be
trained on these particular issues. Supplemented by the

198.
199.
200.
201.

See ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 39-40; see People v. Pierce, 290 N.E. 2d 256, 262 (Ill.
1972).
ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 40.
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Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training
(P.O.S.T.), state law sets forth the training standards."2
Training includes courses on such issues as civil disobedience, °3 elder abuse, °4 interaction with developmentally dis206
abled and mentally ill, 05 high technology crime, sexual assault 07 first aid and CPR, °8 domestic violence,2 stalking,210
sudden infant death,2 ' racial profiling,2"2 gang and drug encar
forcement,213 hate crimes,214 high speed vehicle pursuit,
2
7
216
cinogenic materials, chemical agents, shotguns and rifles,"1 wiretapping, 19 and disaster response."'
However, the state does not require training on the risks
of false testimony by "jailhouse snitches," the risks of false
testimony by accomplice witnesses, the dangers of tunnel vision or confirmatory bias, the risks of wrongful convictions in
homicide cases, police investigative and interrogation methods, police investigation and reporting of exculpatory evidence, forensic evidence, or the risks of false confessions.
Since all of these problems have been demonstrated to contribute to the possibility of a wrongful conviction, police officers ought to be trained on how to minimize this risk.
Recommendation 17:
Police academies, police agencies and the [state] Department of Corrections should include within their training
curricula information on consular rights and the notification obligations to be followed during the arrest and de202. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 832-832.3 (West 2003).

203. See id.§ 13514.5.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See id. § 13515.
See id, § 13515.25.
See id. § 13515.55.
Seeid.§ 13516.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13518.
Seeid.§ 13519.
Seeid.§ 13519.05.
Seeid.§ 13519.3.
Seeid.§ 13519.4.
See id. § 13519.5.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519.6.
See id. § 13519.8.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1797.187 (West 2003).
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403 (West 2003).
See id. § 12020(b)(1).

219. See id. § 629.24, repealedby Cal. Stat. 1997.
220. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8607 (West 2003).
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221

tention of foreign nationals.
The Illinois Commission recognized Illinois' efforts within
certain agencies to train their officers regarding the requirements of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
('CCR").222 Nevertheless, the Commission found that "more
consistent efforts
...would serve to protect the rights of for22 3
nationals."
eign
California law does not require specific training on consular rights and notifications. In light of the recent attention to
the VCCR,224 police academies and agencies have undoubtedly
discussed consular rights and notifications. A larger, more
diverse state with more law enforcement agencies than Illinois, California would also benefit from more consistent
treatment of foreign nationals.
Recommendation 18:
The [state] Attorney General should remind all law enforcement agencies of their notification obligations under
the Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations and undertake regularreviews of the measures taken by state and
local police to ensure full compliance. This could include
publication of a guide based on the United States State
DepartmentManual.225
California law now requires advisement of rights under
the VCCR. 226 The extent to which the VCCR's requirements
have reached the officers and detectives working throughout
all of the law enforcement agencies in California is unknown.
The publication list of the California Attorney General does
not list the VCCR, 2 7 and California does not require regular
221. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 41.

222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Lisa Adams, Review Sought for Mexicans on Death Row, Sun-Sentinel
(Ft. Lauderdale Fla.), Jan. 10, 2001, at 17A. Amnesty International reported in
August 2001 that there is a disregard for the consular rights of foreign nationals
charged with capital crimes in the United States. United States of America: A
time for Action-Protectingthe ConsularRights ofForeign NationalsFacingthe
Death
Penalty,
Amnesty
International
(Aug.
2001),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR511062001 (last accessed Oct.
11, 2003).
225. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 42
226. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 834(c) (West 2003).
227. See http://caag.state.ca.us/publications/index.htm (last visited Oct. 11,
2003).

SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW

[Vol: 44

reviews to ensure compliance with the VCCR.
Recommendation 19."
The statute relatingto the [state]Law Enforcement Training StandardsBoardshould be amended to addpolice perjury (regardlessof whether there is a criminal conviction)
as a basis upon which the Board may revoke certification
of a peace officer.228
Noting the existence of agency rules against officer perjury,229 the Commission recommended an amendment to the
state statute to make police perjury a basis for revoking certification, whether or not a conviction resulted.3 °
A police officer who files a false police report commits
perjury under California law. 3' Perjury in a capital case is
itself a capital offense. 32 However, police officers are seldom,
if ever, prosecuted for these offenses. 33 California law does
not revoke a peace officer's P.O.S.T. certificate if the officer
commits perjury. Thus, California does not follow this recommendation.
2.

DNA and ForensicTesting: Recommendations
20 Through 26

The Illinois Commission made seven recommendations
regarding DNA and forensic testing. 3 ' California follows only
one, with qualifications. The Commission recommends adequate funding and supervision of DNA and forensic testing
and mandatory minimum state standards. 35 California follows these recommendations in the sense that it makes funds
available, at the trial court's discretion and within limitations
on appeal, for defense experts and testing. 6 Otherwise, California does not follow the recommendations.

228. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5,

at 42.

229. Id.
230. Id. at 42-43.
231. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 118.1 (West 2003).
232. See id. § 128.
233. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 42.

234. Id. at 51-63.
235. See id.
236. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9(a) (West 2003).
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Recommendation 20:
An independent state forensic laboratory should be created, operated by civilian personnel, with its own budget,
separatefrom any police agency or supervision.237
The Illinois Commission found that a laboratory truly independent of law enforcement is critical to promoting confidence, both in the prosecution and the defense, that "results
have been fairly and completely analyzed, and honestly reported." 23" The Commission states, "Crime labs should function "as
2 9 an independent third force in the criminal justice sys3

tem.

California's state-wide forensic services are provided by
the Bureau of Forensic Services. 210 The bureau is not an independent agency as the Illinois Commission contemplated,
but is located within the California Department of Justice.2 4'
Its services are available to "state and local law enforcement
agencies, district attorneys, and the courts," but not to defendants.24 2
Recommendation 21:
Adequate funding should be provided by the [state] to hire
and train both entry level and supervisory level forensic
scientists to support expansion of DNA testing and
evaluation. Support should also be provided for additional
up-to-date facilities for DNA testing. The state should be
prepared to outsource by sending evidence
to private com24
panies for analysis when appropriate. 1
The Illinois Commission appreciated the importance of
DNA testing." It also recognized the backlog of requests for
DNA testing throughout the nation.2 45 Even though DNA evidence is relevant to only a small percentage of homicide cases,
testing should be mandated where it may establish innocence.

237. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 52.

238. Id. at 53.
239. Id.
240. See CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, The Bureau of Forensic SeMces, at
http://caag.state.ca.us/bfs/index.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 54-55
244. See id.
245. See id.
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Some funding and outsourcing is available in California,
but not to the extent that this recommendation contemplates.
Various local agencies, many of which are underfunded and
24 6
overburdened, perform DNA testing throughout the state.
Neither state nor local facilities have the capacity to analyze
evidence for the purpose of evaluating innocence claims.
Recommendation 22.'
The Commission supports the [state supreme court47 rule]
establishingminimum standardsfor DNA evidence.

California law does not set minimum standards for DNA
evidence. The California courts, including the California Supreme Court,
have dealt with DNA standards on a case-by4
case basis.

1

Recommendation 23:
The federal government and the [state] should provide
adequate funding to enable the development of a compre249
hensive DNA database.

California law provides for a database system25 and has
authorized a DNA database program for missing persons."'
There is also a data collection and data bank program set up
under the direction of the California Attorney General. 5 ' As
the Illinois Commission reported, all fifty states have enacted
similar legislation. 53
At the federal level, the United States Congress had not
enacted the proposed Innocence Protection Act; however, the
federal program (CODIS).54 is in place and subject to expan246. See, e.g., Alison Soltau, Lab Short on DNA Dough, EXAMINER, July 24,
2002, at http://www.examiner.com/news/default.jsp?story=n.dna.0724w
(last
visited Aug. 2, 2003).
247. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 55 (referring to Illinois
State Supreme Court Rule 417).
248. See, e.g., People v. Venegas, 954 P.2d 525 (Cal. 1998).
249. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 56.

250. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 295-295.1 (West 2003).
251. See id. §§ 14250-14251 (providing funding through Jan. 1, 2006).
252. See id. §§ 296-296.2.
253. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 56.
254. CODIS is the FBI's (CO)mbined D(NA) (I)dentification (S)ystem, a database superstructure intended to enable federal, state, and local crime labs to
exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIONS, THE FBI'S COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM: CODIS, 2 (2000), at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/brochure.pdf. The federal government currently
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sion.
The Commission recommends adequate funding for these
programs."' If California does not obtain federal funding in
the near future, adequate funding may not be secure. California is facing a severe budget crisis and programs are being
cut statewide.
Meanwhile a backlog of samples still waits
to be tested.
Recommendation 24:
[State] Statutes should be amended to provide that in
capital cases a defendant may apply to the court for an order to obtain a search of the DNA database to identify others who may be guilty of the crime. 7
California law does not allow a defendant to apply for a
court to order a search of the DNA database.
California law
allows a defendant, after he or she has been convicted, to apply for an order to have DNA testing done.59 This statute
does not apply to defendants in the trial courts and does not
modify the discovery statutes for pre-conviction cases.6 °
Furthermore, the California statute provides that the
DNA data bank information can only be disclosed to and used
by law enforcement. A specific exception allows DNA information "of the defendant" to be released to the defendant's attorney in compliance with discovery. 1 California does not
follow the Illinois Commission recommendation, which seeks
to ensure that an accused has the ability to potentially exonrequires that CODIS be supplied with DNA samples from certain classes of federal offenders. 10 U.S.C. § 1565 (2003) (military personnel convicted of qualifying felony or sexual offenses); 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a) (2003) (anyone convicted of a
qualifying offense who is in the Bureau of Prisons' custody); 42 U.S.C.
§ 14135(b) (2003) (District of Columbia offenders convicted of a qualifying offense). For more information, see the FBI's DNA & Databasing Initiatives brochure (2000), availableat http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/fbidna.pdf.
255. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 56.

256. Gregg Jones, The Nation, State Needs FastBillions to Deal with Budget

Crisis,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2002, at Al.
257. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 57.

258. There is an argument that there is a constitutional right to postconviction DNA testing. See Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix,

Double Bind: FactualInnocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 547 (2002).

259. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2003).
260. See id. §§ 1054-1054.9; see also id. § 1054.9(e) (regarding the applicability of section 1405 to post-conviction cases).
261. See id. § 299.5(f).
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erate him or herself at any stage of the proceedings. 6 '
Recommendation 25:
In capital cases, forensic testing, including DNA testing
pursuantto 725 ILCS 5/116(3), should be permitted where
it has the scientific potential to produce new, noncummulative evidence relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence, even though the
63 results may not completely exonerate the defendant.
California law does not provide the broad access to DNA
testing recommended by the Illinois Commission. The California statute allows DNA testing of evidence at the defendant's request, but only in post-conviction cases and does not
modify the provisions of discovery for trial cases.2
Recommendation 26:
The provisions governing the Capital Litigation Trust
Fund should be construed broadly so as to provide a
source of funding for forensic testing pursuant to 725
ILCS 5/116(3) when the defendant faces the possibility of
a capital sentence. For noncapital defendants, provisions
should be made for payment of costs offorensic testing for
indignets from
sources other than the Capital Litigation
265
Trust Fund.

California follows this recommendation, with qualifications. California law provides that the state will provide
funds for capital defense at the trial level in cases where the
defendant can show indigence.266 Individual trial court judges
26 7
have wide discretion to grant or deny particular requests.

Furthermore, the California Supreme Court limits funds
available to the defense on direct appeal and habeas corpus
proceedings. 266 The funds available are not sufficient for ex262.

ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT,

supranote 5, at 58.

263. Id. at 58-59.
264. California Penal Code section 1405 permits a post-conviction court order
based on a motion and on a showing. CAL PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2003).
Section 1054.9(e), effective January 1, 2003, makes it clear that section 1405 is
the post-conviction exception to the general discovery rules. Id. § 1054.9.
265. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 60.
266. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West 2003).
267. See, e.g., People v. Alvarez, 926 P.2d 365, 423 (Cal. 1996).

268. See CAL.

SUPREME CT. STATEMENT OF POLICIES REGARDING CASES

ARISING FROM JUDGMENT OF DEATH § 3:2-2.1 (1989).
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pensive procedures or complex cases.269 While prosecutors use
the resources of police investigators, the FBI, and other agencies, defense attorneys must pay for similar services out of
the money provided for defense services.27 ° Private attorneys
sometimes try to subsidize the costs at serious personal risks
to themselves, but the majority cannot afford to make that
choice.2 7' For example, one Alabama lawyer reported that the
cost of defending a capital case exceeded $340,000 and pushed
him into bankruptcy.272
3.

Eligibilityfor CapitalPunishment:
Recommendations 27 and 28

The Illinois Commission made two recommendations addressing the "narrowing" of death eligible cases to a smaller
subset.272 It recommended that there be five and only five circumstances which would make a murder case death eligible.
In contrast, California has twenty-five special circumstances
2 74
which actually break down into more than thirty-six.
As mentioned above, California's system is so far askew
from the recommendations that this area alone makes our
system a failure. California can hardly claim that it complies
with the Federal Constitutional requirement of a narrow
class of death eligible murder defendants when nearly all
murder cases in California are death eligible.
The point of narrowing is not simply to limit the total
number of death sentences handed down. In fact, only a
small percentage of death eligible cases result in a death sentence. The issue here is whether California has a rational basis to narrow the class of cases, so that actual death judgments are1 based on principles and not capriciousness or
prejudice. 7
269. Douglas W. Vick, PoorhouseJustice: UnderfundedIndigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 375 (1993). In
California, lawyers are not paid at a rate that is "adequate to attract enough
attorneys to represent all defendants appealing their death sentences." Id. at
375.
270. Id. at 395.
271. Id. at 397.
272. Id.
273. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 65-79.
274. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2003); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE
§ 1627(a) (West 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 37, 128, 4500 (West 2003) (pursuant
to section 190.3).
275. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994); Zant v. Stephens,
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Recommendation 27."
The current list of 20 eligibility factors should be reduced
to a smaller number.7 6
The Illinois Commission concluded that, "[r]educing the
number of eligibility factors should lead to more uniformity in
the way in which the death penalty is applied in Illinois, and
provide greater clarity in the statute, while retaining capital
punishment for the most heinous of homicides. 77
The Illinois statutory death penalty scheme is quite similar to California's. The first step in Illinois is to determine if
a homicide case fits into one of the statutory definitions that
would make the defendant death eligible. 78 This is equivalent to a finding of "special circumstances" under California
law. However, like California, Illinois law contains twenty
such eligibility factors some of which are so broad that,
"nearly every first degree murder in Illinois could be eligible
for the death penalty under one theory or another.,1 79 Therefore, as in California, there is little rational narrowing.
California currently lists twenty-five separate eligibility
factors called "special circumstances" under California Penal
Code section 190.2 and the additional sections referred to in
section 190.3, many of which have subparts. 8 ° Because these
special circumstances encompass such a broad area, California's statutory scheme does not meaningfully narrow the
class of cases as discussed above.28' Hence, as observed by the
author, death row in California prisons is disproportionately
populated by the poor, the uneducated, those who had poor
representation, the mentally ill, the developmentally disabled, those whose victims were white or prominent, those
462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
276. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 66.
277. Id. at 67.
278. Id. at 65.
279. Id. at 66. The Illinois Commission Report does not discuss an even
greater problem associated with California's law: In California, almost all murders can be construed to be first degree murder, thereby making the available
pool even larger and the restraints on abuse of discretion, prejudice and caprice
even less meaningful. See Shatz & Rivkin, supranote 30, at 1318.
280. The issue of the breadth of the California statute has been briefed in a
case now pending before the California Supreme Court; the briefs drew heavily
on the fine work of the California Appellate Project. Appellant's Opening Brief
in People v. Turner (No. S009038) (brief on file with the California Supreme
Court).
281. See supra text accompanying note 33-40.
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who suffered child abuse themselves, those from certain geographic locations, and sometimes the innocent. To reduce
this disparity, California should adopt Recommedation 27.
Recommendation 28:
There shouldbe only five eligibilityfactors:
(1) The murder of a police officer or firefighterkilled in
the performance of his/herofflcial duties, or to prevent the
performance of his/her official duties, or in retaliationfor
the performing ofhis/her ofTicial duties.
(2) The murder of any person (inmate, staff, visitor, etc.),
occurringat a correctionalfacility.
(3) The murder of two or more persons as set forth in [current Illinoislaw].
(4) The intentionalmurder of a person involving the infliction of torture. For the purposes of this section, torture
means the intentionaland depraved infliction of extreme
physical pain for a prolonged period of time prior to the
victim's death; depravedmeans the defendant relished the
infliction of extreme pain upon the victim evidencing debasement or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a
sense ofpleasurein the infliction of extreme physicalpain.
(5) The murder by a person who is under in vestigation for
or who has been charged with or has been convicted of a
crime which would be a felony under [the] law, of anyone
involved in the investigation, prosecution or defense of
that crime, including,but not limited28to,
2 witnesses,jurors,
judges, prosecutorsandinvestigators.
The Illinois Commission identified four policy reasons in
favor of capital punishment: (1) certain crimes, when compared to other first degree murders, are especially heinous
and shocking; (2) certain people have clearly demonstrated a
propensity to murder again; (3) some situations seem to suggest that capital punishment is the only meaningful form of
punishment; and (4) some victims deserve special consideration, because they risk their lives for the sake of public

safety.283

Arriving at the five categories of death eligible

homicides, the Commission reported, "[i]f the death penalty
282. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 67-68.

283. Id. at 69.

144

SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW

[Vol: 44

continues to be applied in Illinois, a majority of Commission
members believed that it should be tailored to further these
objectives, while minimizing the opportunities for arbitrary
application of this most severe form of punishment.""
California has virtually no limitation on death eligible
homicides.285 The very act of trying to limit the selection of
death eligible cases begs the question of whether such a list
can be rationally devised at all. If death sentences are imposed on irrational criteria, then capital punishment should
be abolished. For instance, if the race of the victim significantly influences the ultimate decision to kill a prisoner, few
people would publicly argue that the decision making process
is valid. 86 If we seek to reject race as a significant influence,
we have to agree on rational criteria or agree that capital
punishment cannot remain a part of our society's laws.287
If the selection is to be made, it is noteworthy that four of
the Illinois Commission's five eligibility factors are similar to
existing "special circumstances" in California: murder of a police officer or firefighter; 88 murder of two or more persons;289
murder involving torture;29 ° and murder of a person involved
in the investigation, prosecution, or defense of a crime by a
person under investigation or a defendant.29' Although not
identical, these four eligibility factors are approximately the
same as ten of the California special circumstances. Therefore, the Illinois Commission recommendation that its list be
284. Id.
285. See supratext accompanying note 33-40.
286. Nationwide, the death penalty is imposed on an extremely skewed racial
basis. Since the death penalty was re-instituted in 1973, only twelve white defendants were executed for killing blacks while 180 blacks were executed for
killing whites. See NAACP, DEATH Row U.S.A, supra note 3. Preliminary
studies show significant disparity between race of victim and race of defendant
regarding who gets sentenced to death in California. See Interview with Michael Radelet, supra note 65. Racial minorities convicted of murdering a white
person are at least twice as likely to receive the death penalty as those who
murder blacks. See id.
287. Justice Virginia Long of the New Jersey Supreme Court, in dissent,
stated this fact succinctly: "It is time for the members of this Court to accept
that there is simply no meaningful way to distinguish between one grotesque
murder and another for the purpose of determining why one defendant has been
granted a life sentence and another is awaiting execution." See State v. Timmendequas, 773 A.2d 18, 52 (N.J. 2001) (Long, J., dissenting).
288. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(7)-(9) (West 2003).
289. See id. § 190.2(a)(2)-(3).
290. See id. § 190.2(a)(18).
291. See id. § 190.2(a)(10)-(13).
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limited to five eligibility factors does not include the other fifteen to twenty-six special circumstances listed in California.
More importantly, they do not include the most abused and
overbroad categories, "felony murder"29 ' and "by means of lying in wait."9 '
4.

Prosecutors'Selection of Casesfor Capital
Punishment."Recommendations 29 Through 31

The Illinois Commission made three recommendations
regarding the manner in which prosecutors should select
cases for death.294 The recommendations attempt to create a
rational system under which prosecutors in capital cases select defendants whose cases meet the theoretically narrowed
category of death-eligibility.
Prosecutors would be required
to follow statewide standards, and to articulate their reasons
for choosing particular defendants for death.
California does not have any such standards. Prosecutors are permitted, from county to county, to choose death
cases based on their own criteria or none at all.296 This results
in a wild and unprincipled disparity from county to county,
such that the location of the case can determine the outcome.
Some of California's fifty-eight counties have few or no death
cases at all, while others account for the vast majority of
death row inmates. 9 7
Recommendation 29:
The [state] attorney general and the [state's prosecutor
association]should adopt recommendations as to the procedures [prosecutors]shouldfollow in deciding whether or
not to seek the death penalty, but these recommendations
should not have 299
the force of law, or be imposed by court
rule or legislation.

The great disparity in filing decisions from county to
292. See id. § 190.2(a)(17).
293. See id. § 190.2(a)(15).
294. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 81-92.
295. Id. at 81.
296. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26500 (West 2003) (granting prosecutors power over
prosecutions within their jurisdiction). See also People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d
1081, 1097-98 (Cal. 1988) (confirming that prosecutors have discretionary power
to seek the death penalty).
297. See CONDEMNED INMATE SUMMARY, supranote 3.

298. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 82.
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county in California gives rise to a serious geographical denial of equal protection.299 Since California re-instituted the
death penalty in 1977, thirty percent of the condemned inmates were sentenced out of Los Angeles County, and significant numbers of inmates came from counties with smaller
populations like Riverside, Kern, San Bernardino, Sacramento, San Diego, and Santa Clara. °° On the other hand,
sixteen counties have never imposed the death penalty and
eleven have only done so once.3"' The District Attorney of San
Francisco, Terrence Hallinan, has refused to seek the death
penalty at all, although three condemned people were con0
victed in San Francisco before his term in office began."
The Illinois Commission found similar geographic disparities within Illinois." 3 Even without a sophisticated study,
it is apparent that there is a significant geographical disparity in California. One way to address this issue, the Commission found, is to require a statewide protocol, including statewide recommendations to guide the local prosecutors.
California leaves local prosecutors the discretion to decide whether or not to allege special circumstances and, if so,
whether to seek the death penalty.0 4 The defense can only
299. The California Supreme Court held that "prosecutorial discretion to select those eligible cases in which the death penalty will actually be sought does
not in and of itself evidence an arbitrary and capricious capital punishment system or offend principles of equal protection, due process, or cruel and/or unusual
punishment." Keenan, 758 P.2d at 1097-98. The fact that a small group of counties prosecute the majority of capital cases in California indicates unequal
treatment. See CONDEMNED INMATE SUMMARY, supra note 3. The county in
which an individual commits his crime ultimately determines whether he gets
life or death.
300. CONDEMNED INMATE SUMMARY, supra note 3. The California Department of Corrections website contains the statistics as of April 9, 2002.
301. Seeid.
302. See The Death Penalty Upheld in San FranciscoRobbery, Killing,MET.
NEWS-ENTERPRISE, Dec. 6, 2002. San Francisco District Attorney Hallinan not
only refused to seek the death penalty in his county but also refused to file a
motion to set an execution date in a case predating his taking office. Id. at 3.
The Attorney General of California stepped in and signed the motion. Id.
303. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 82.
304. See People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081, 1109 (Cal. 1988); see also Shatz &
Rivkind, supra note 30, at 1292. Neither the California Code nor the state Attorney General's office sets forth standards. Prosecutors exercise their discretion to varying degrees, as evidenced by the differing number of convicts that
each county has sent to death row. See generally CONDEMNED INMATE
SUMMARY, supra note 3. A full study of the geographical disparity in the imposition of the death penalty in California should be conducted. However, it is
clear from the raw data derived from the Department of Corrections that a glar-
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challenge that decision on the basis that the prosecutor engaged in intentional and invidious discrimination.3 5 Absent
evidence of such discrimination, the court lacks the pre-trial
jurisdiction to preclude the death penalty in the furtherance
of justice." 6
Recommendation 30.
The death penalty sentencing statute should be revised to
include a mandatory review of death eligibility undertaken by a state-wide review committee. In the absence of
legislative action to make this a mandatory scheme, the
Governor should make a commitment to setting up a voluntary review process, supported by the presumption that
the Governor will commute the death sentences of defendants when the prosecutorhas not participatedin the voluntary review process, unless the prosecutor can offer a
compelling explanation, based on exceptional circumstances, for the failure to submit the case for review.
The state-wide review committee would be conposed of
five members, four of whom would be prosecutors. The
committee would develop standards to implement the legislative intent of the General Assembly with respect to
death eligible cases. Membership of the committee, its
terms andscope ofpowers are set forth in the commentary
below. °7
As a matter of fundamental Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the death penalty may only be imposed if it is imposed on a rational basis."' The Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia, and subsequent cases, held that it cannot be imposed based on random factors, on the basis of race, or on uning disparity exists. See id. (indicating that nineteen counties have not imposed
any death sentences and thirteen more have imposed less than three, while four
have imposed more than forty each. San Francisco, a large metropolitan
county, has imposed only three.). Some of the largest counties have contributed
fewer inmates than much smaller counties (e.g. San Francisco County contributed three while Kings County contributed four). Id. The denial of equal protection based on geographical location may raise constitutional issues per the
Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
305. See Keenan, 758 P.2d at 1109.
306. The court cannot use Penal Code section 1385, allowing dismissals in
the furtherance of justice, to preclude the prosecution from seeking the death
penalty by pre-trial order. See People v. Superior Court (Bridgette), 189 Cal.
App. 3d 1649, 1652 (1987).
307. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 84.
308. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972).
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fettered prosecutorial discretion. 9
The Illinois Commission recognized that one means to
help control prosecutorial discretion would be to create a
statewide committee to review death penalty charging decisions.31 ° Absent such a legislative enactment, the governor
could set up a voluntary review process and commute death
sentences which were not so reviewed.3 1' This would promote
uniformity and adherence to a set of rational guidelines in selecting death cases.
California law does not require either a statewide committee to review death eligibility or any presumption flowing
from a failure to participate in a voluntary review process."'
Since the death penalty was re-instituted in 1977, no California governor has commuted a single death sentence.313 The
imposition of the death penalty in California varies dependIndisputably,
ing on the court's geographical location.
prosecutorial discretion is a major factor."' Yet, there is no
statewide committee to review the decisions. Furthermore,
California's governors have done nothing to remedy the disparity.
Recommendation 31:
The Commission supports [Illinois] Supreme Court Rule
416(c) requiring that the state announce its intention to
seek the death penalty, and the factors to be relied upon,
but in no event later than 120 days
as soon as practicable
6
afterarraignment.
At the time of the Commission's study, the Illinois Su-

309. See id.
310. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 84.
311. Id.

312. CAL. CONST. art 5, § 13. The California Attorney General is the only
person in the state with the power to review decisions of the prosecutor. Id.
313. For the period from 1977 (when the death penalty was re-instituted in
California) until 2002, the Department of Corrections received 717 condemned
inmates. See CAL. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, Death Sentence Status, 1978 to Pre(2002),
sent,
http://www.cdc.state.ca.us/CommunicationsOffice/CapitalPunishment/deathse
ntencestatus.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2003). The death sentence was overturned in 60 cases, 13 committed suicide, 22 died from other causes, and 10
were executed. Id. The governor did not commute any of the sentences. Id.
314. See supranote 304.

315.

ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note

316. Id. at 89.

5,
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preme Court had already issued a rule instituting this recommendation. As discussed below, defense counsel in California may not know until almost the day of trial whether the
prosecution intends to seek the death penalty. California law
does not require that the prosecutor announce his or her intention to seek the death penalty in a timely fashion. The
only certain deadline by which the prosecutor must alert the
defense that she or he will seek the death penalty is just before jury selection begins." ' This requirement exists only because the defendant has the right to "death-qualify" a jury
where the death penalty is sought." 8
The death penalty cannot be imposed in California unless
the prosecution charges and proves one or more special circumstances.319 If the district attorney files a felony complaint
and information, she or he may allege one or more special circumstances therein.32 ° If the prosecutor indicts the defendant,
she or he may ask the grand jury to return one or more special circumstances.32 '
Whether a defendant is arraigned on an information or
an indictment, 2 2 the prosecutor may thereafter amend the accusatory pleading to allege one or more special circumstances
if evidence was adduced at the preliminary hearing or grand
jury to support them.323

317. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 223 (West 2003).
318. See id. § 223 (West 2003); see also People v. Pike, 372 P.2d 656 (Cal.

1962).
319. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3-.4 (West 2003).
320. See id. § 806.

321. See id. § 952.

The cases in which district attorneys commonly seek

grand jury indictments are murder and sex crimes. Some Aspects of the California GrandJurySystem, 8 STAN. L. REV. 631, 644 (1956).
322. For an information, a complaint is filed and a preliminary hearing is
held before a magistrate. The magistrate determines if there is sufficient evidence to hold the defendant to answer. The evidence at the preliminary hearing
may be hearsay and the standard of proof is "probable cause" meaning that

there is a strong suspicion that a crime was committed and that the defendant
committed it. If the defendant is held to answer, the prosecutor then files a
charging document called an "information" in the superior court. The defendant

is then arraigned on the information and proceeds to trial. With an indictment,
the prosecutor goes before a secret grand jury. Neither the suspect nor his or
her counsel are allowed in the grand jury room and usually are not given any

notice that the grand jury has been convened. After hearing the evidence presented by the prosecutor, the grand jury decides whether to return an indict-

ment. The indictment is then the charging document filed in the superior court
upon which the defendant is arraigned and proceeds to trial.
323. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1009; but see Talamantez v. Superior Court,
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Even where special circumstances are alleged, the defendant still may not be certain that he or she faces the death
penalty. If the prosecutor intends to introduce evidence in
aggravation during the penalty phase, she or he must give
the defendant reasonable notice prior to trial.324 A lack of notice does not mean that the prosecutor will not seek the death
penalty, however, since the notice requirement does not apply
to evidence that will also be used as proof of the offense or
special circumstances. 25 This is likely where, for example,
the prosecutor intends to rely only on the "circumstances of
the crime" aggravating factor.326
Finally, even the district attorney's statement that she or
he will not seek the death penalty is not conclusive. The California Court of Appeal has held that the Constitution does not
necessarily bar the prosecutor from changing her or his mind
later.327 In Leo v. Superior Court, the California Court of Appeals found that the district attorney's decision did not violate
either the United States or the California Constitution, because the decision was not random, arbitrary, or capricious.2
The absence of any timely notification requirement under
California law is a serious procedural gap. It is easily remedied by compliance with this recommendation.
5.

TrialJudges. Recommendations 32 Through 39

The Illinois Commission made eight recommendations
regarding the administration of the trial courts. 29 These recommendations are designed to increase the level of knowledge
and performance by the judges trying capital cases. They also
provide for more centralized management and oversight.
Recommendation 32.
The [state]supreme court shouldgive consideration to en122 Cal. App.3d 629, 633-36 (1981) (suggesting in dicta that amending an indictment to add a special circumstance would change the offense charged in violation of California Penal Code section 1009).
324. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003).
325. See id.
326. See id. § 190.3(a); see also Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 30, at 1293.
327. See Leo v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.App.3d 274, 285 (1986).
328. Id. at 284 (stating that since the trial had not begun, the defendant had
adequate time to prepare a defense as one for a capital offense and, thus, there
was no violation of due process of law).
329. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 93-101.
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couragingthe [state administrativeoffice of the courts] to
undertake a concerted effort to educate trial judges
throughout the state in the parameters of the Capital
Crimes Litigation
and330the funding sources available
r ..Act
.
for defense of capitalcases.
The Illinois Commission recognized that the State of Illinois also had a funding act and that the Illinois Supreme
Court had instituted a training program on capital cases.33 '
In fact, the recommendation goes beyond what was in place
both to train on the specific issues of funding and to ensure
that the actual trial judges responsible for funding decision
receive the training.332
California law does not require that judges be educated
specifically on capital case funding issues. Funding for services related to defense of capital cases in the trial courts is
established primarily by statute.33 3 The individual judges determine how much money, if any, will be allowed for any particular request. 334 These judges must determine what kinds of
experts, investigators, and other defense services are appropriate in a death penalty case, and how much money should
be allocated to each request.33 ' Furthermore, no mechanism
exists to ensure that the judges responsible for administering
the funds have access to the information they need to make
educated decisions on funding.33 1 Judicial education on funding issues, as well as other issues related to capital litigation
recommended in Recommendations 36 through 38, is critical
to developing statewide judicial competence in death penalty
cases. It is unrealistic to think that all of the judges from all
the various jurisdictions within the state, rural and urban,
will have the experience and knowledge necessary to rule on
the funding issues related to these complex cases. Certainly,
judges have to exercise judgment in refusing or reducing
some defense requests, but they must also have the training

330. Id. at 93-94.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 94.
333. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West 2003).

334. See id.
335. See id.
336. California judges are obligated to obtain ongoing judicial education. See
CAL. CT. R. APPENDIX § 970. There are, however, no oversight procedures in
place to ensure that judges meet this oblication or that judges have training in
capital case issues prior to accepting assignment of a capital case.
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and experience in capital litigation necessary to understand
what requests should be granted.
Recommendation 33:
...The [state]supreme court sould be encouragedto undertake more action as outlined in this report to insure
the highest quality training and support are provided to
anyjudge trying a capitalcase.
The Commission also supports the revised Committee
Comments to new Supreme Court Rule 43, which contemplate that capital case training will occurprior to the time
ajudge hears a capitalcase. The Supreme court should be
encouraged to consider going further and requiring that
331
judges be trainedbefore presidingover a capitalcase.
At the time of the Commission's report, the Illinois Supreme Court provided training through the Illinois Judicial
Conference and had specifically established "Capital Litigation Regional Seminars" for judges who may preside over
death penalty cases. 338 Nevertheless, the Commission unanimously recommended that, "the Supreme Court go one step
further and specifically require that judges who are going to
hear capital cases undertake this training prior to hearing
capital cases., 339 The Commission determined that this training is necessary to ensure that judges "understand the parameters of the Capital Crimes Litigation Act and the funding sources available for the defense of capital cases" and that
judges hearing capital cases be the most qualified and best
trained. '
California does not require a judge to have any particular
training prior to assignment to a capital case beyond the requirements to pass the bar examination.3 4' The sole qualification to become a superior court judge in California is that the
candidate has been a member of the California State Bar for a
period of ten years.342 Even inactive membership can qualify
a candidate.3 43
337. ILLINOIS COMMISSION
338. Id. at 94-95.
339. Id. at 95.

REPORT,

supranote 5, at 94.

340. Id.

341. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 15.
342. See id.
343. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6006 (West 2003).
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After judges take the bench, they receive general training
through the auspices of the California Judicial Council.344
Presiding judges of each county are responsible for scheduling
the judges' attendance at schools. 45 The California Standards
of Judicial Administration specify some general requirements
for initial and continuing judicial education. 346 They do not
require education regarding capital litigation.347 However,
they do expound specific educational standards regarding assignment to jury trials, family court and juvenile dependency
court.38 Because the issues involved in capital cases are at
least as weighty as those in family or juvenile dependency
court, the Standards of Judicial Administration should also
include specific educational standards for death penalty
cases.
If the judges were all trained on the issues involved in
homicide and death penalty cases, conviction of the innocent
would be less likely, and the results in those cases would be
more reliable. To comply with the letter and the spirit of the
recommendations, judges should be trained, at a minimum,
regarding capital case funding" 9 and on the law of capital litigation.35 ° Judges should also be trained in advance of the
management of the discovery process related to capital litigation,351 and the legal and evidentiary problems which have led
to conviction of the innocent.352 The latter would include
training regarding the risks of false testimony by in-custody
informants, the risks of false testimony by accomplice witnesses, the dangers of tunnel vision or confirmatory bias, the
risks of wrongful convictions in homicide cases, police investigative and interrogation methods, police investigating and
reporting of exculpatory evidence, forensic evidence, and the

344. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 68551 (West 2003).
345. See CAL. CT. R. APPENDIX § 6.603(c)(2).
346. See id.§ 25.1.
347. Id. § 25.2(a). The Center for Judicial Education and Research issues two
chapters in a general workbook on criminal law which relate to death penalty
trials. CJER California Judges Benchguides 98 and 99 (2001). These chapters
are 88 and 86 pages long, respectively.
348. See id. § 25.2.
349. See ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 94 (Recommendation 32).
350. See id. at 97 (Recommendation 36).
351. See id. at 96 (Recommendation 34).
352. See id. (Recommendation 35).
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risks of false confessions.353
To adopt this recommendation for judicial education
would require that California first implement other substantive changes. For instance, California first would have to enact the recommendations pertaining to management of the
discovery process and then institute judicial training regarding it. However, other aspects of the proposed mandatory
training could be instituted immediately such as education on
funding and legal and evidentiary issues which have led to
conviction of the innocent.
Recommendation 34.
In light of the changes in Illinois Supreme Court rules
governing the discovery process in capital cases, the Supreme Court should give consideration to ways the Court
can insure that particularizedtrainingis provided to trial
judges with respect to implementation of the new rules
governing capital litigation, especially
35 4 with respect to the
management of the discoveryprocess.

California law does not require individual judges to have
any training on new or existing rules regarding capital litigation, or any new or existing discovery process. 35 The Illinois

Commission recommended new discovery and pre-trial procedures3 which, if adopted in California, would require additional training.57 However, a judge without substantial death
penalty case experience would also benefit from training, and
such training would raise the standards of justice and fairness in the individual cases.

353. Id.
354. Id. at 96. (Recommendation 34)
355. See CAL. CT. R. APPENDIX§ 25.1-.3.
356. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 115-21 (Recommendations 46, 49, 50, and 51).
357. By their terms, many of the Commission's recommendations will implement procedures not currently required or available in California. See id. (Recommendations 46 (permitting discovery depositions); 52 (requiring a pre-trial
evidentiary hearing to evaluate the reliability of an in-custody informant); 53
(requiring the court to closely scrutinize any prosecution tactic that might induce an involuntary or untrustworthy confession)). Judges will certainly require additional training to ensure correct and uniform implementation of these
new procedures.
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Recommendation 35
All judges who are tr4ng capital cases should receive periodic trainingin the following areasand experts on these
subjects be retained to conduct training and prepare
trainingmanuals on these topics: (1) The risks offalse testimony by in-custody informants ("'ailhouse snitches9; (2)
The risks of false testimony by accomplice witnesses; (3)
The dangers of tunnel vision or confirmatory bias; (4) The
risks of wrongful convictions in homicide cases; (5) Police
investigative and interrogationmethods; (6) Police investigating and reportingof exculpatory evidence; (7) Forensic evidence; and (8) The risks of false confessions.

The Illinois Commission studied the thirteen cases in Illinois where people had been released from death row, as well
as a number of scholarly writings and government-sponsored
reports.3 59 Based on its two-year review, the Illinois Commission concluded that "many of these recommended training
subjects cover areas where capital cases can go painfully
wrong.", 6 O
California law does not require judges to receive training
on the risks of false testimony by "jailhouse snitches," the
risks of false testimony by accomplice witnesses, the dangers
of tunnel vision or confirmatory bias, the risks of wrongful
convictions in homicide cases, police investigative and interrogation methods, police investigating and reporting of exculpatory evidence, forensic evidence, or the risks of false confessions.36 '
Recommendation 36:
The Illinois Supreme Court and the Administrative Office
of the Courts should consider development of and provide
sufficient funding for state-wide materials to trainjudges
in capital
cases, and additional staff to provide research
362
support.

The Illinois Commission found that despite Illinois' ex358. See id. at 96.
359. Id. at 5-6.
360. Id. at 96.
361. CAL. CT. R. APPENDIX § 25.1-.3. Note that the Center for Judicial Education and Research Benchguides 98 and 99, supra note 347, do not cover any of
these topics.
362. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 97.
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tensive effort to improve judicial training, judges handling
death penalty cases needed access to additional resources to
do the job well. 63 The Illinois Commission looked to New Jersey and New York to find examples of effective ways to provide such access.3" Likewise, California could also increase
judges' access to resources, but needs to take the next step.
Recommendation 36 is actually two recommendations in
one. First, it mandates statewide funding for materials to
train judges in capital litigation. Second, it requires the funding of additional staff to provide research support.
California trial judges do not have a statewide manual
covering the topics recommended by the Illinois Commission,
and have not been provided with additional staffing for capital cases.365 Regarding statewide materials, the CJER training materials include only two brief chapters on capital litigation.366 Those chapters cover, in outline form, the basics of
death penalty cases, but they barely scratch the surface of
current California law.367 Furthermore, to comply with this
part of the recommendation, the materials should contain information on other issues under the recommendations which
have not been implemented, such as management of the discovery process and police practices which have yet to be reformed.
Regarding provision of research support, there is no provision in California law for additional court staffing. In order
to comply with this recommendation, the courts would have
to budget resources to provide law clerks or research attorneys for judges handling capital cases. This would be of particular importance to smaller courts or to courts which have a
high volume of capital cases.
Recommendation 37"
The IllinoisSupreme Courtshould consider ways in which
information regarding relevant case law and other resources can be widely disseminatedto those tryingcapital
363. Id.
364. Id at 97-98.
365. Although continuing judicial education is provided for in general, there
are no statutory provisions requiring a capital litigation manual or an increased
support staff for capital cases. See supra text accompanying notes 341-48.
366. See CJER California Judges Benchguides 98 and 99, supra note 347.
367. See id.
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cases, through development of a digest of applicable law
by the Supreme Court and widerpublication of the outline
of issues developed by the State Appellate Defender or
6 s the
State Appellate Prosecutorand/orAttorney General.1
The Illinois Commission recommendation contemplates
more than just a summary of the advance sheets.3 69 Although

it also recommended increased proficiency for death penalty
lawyers, the Commission emphasized that the courts play an
important role in raising the quality of capital trials. 7 '
California does not require that this information be provided to the judges or lawyers handling capital cases. However, defense attorneys can get information through the California Appellate Project. 7' Prosecutors have access to similar
material from the California District Attorney's Association. 72
This recommendation suggests that these materials be assimilated into one form, for distribution by the courts.7
Recommendation 38:
The Illinois Supreme Court, or the chiefjudge of the various judicialdistricts throughout the state,should consider
implementation of a process to certify judges who are
qualified to hear capital cases either by virtue of experience or training. Trial courtjudges should be certified as
qualified to hear capital cases based upon completion of
specialized training and based upon their experience in
heaing criminal cases.
Only such certified judges should
374
hearcapitalcases.

Judges need not be certified in order to hear capital cases
in California. Nothing in California law prevents a judge
with no criminal experience, either as a lawyer or a judge,
from hearing a capital case. The Illinois Commission under368. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 98.

369. See id.
370. Id. at 93.

371. Attorneys actively defending a death row inmate can get assistance from
the California Appellate Project's San Francisco office.
See generally
CALIFORNIA

APPELLATE

PROJECT

http://www.cdaa.org/assoc.html

-

SAN

(last visited

FRANCISCO,

Aug.

5,

ABOUT

2003)

CAP,

at

[hereinafter

CALIFORNIA APPELLATE PROJECT].
372. See
CALIFORNIA
DISTRICT
ATTORNEY'S
ASSOCIATION,
CDAA
ASSOCIATION AND STAFF, at http://www.cdaa.org/assoc.html (last visited Aug.
12, 2003).
373. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 98-99.
374. Id. at 99.
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stated the point when it said, "[mlany problems typically associated with capital trials can be averted by a trial judge
who is particularly familiar with capital cases."375
Trial lawyers for both the defense and prosecution are all
too familiar with the problems associated with litigating a
complex case before a judge who is not steeped in the procedure, forensics, evidence, and other unique aspects of death
penalty litigation. The litigators should litigate and the judge
should have independent expertise upon which to draw in
managing this life or death litigation.376
Recommendation 39.
The [state]supreme court should consider appointment of
a standing committee of trialjudges and/or appellatejustices familiar with capitalcase management to provide resources to trialjudges throughout the state who are responsible for trying capitalCases.377
California law does not provide for such a standing committee. The Illinois Supreme Court had already established a
standing Committee on Capital Cases. 7 ' The Commission
suggested that the Committee continue its work analyzing
the death penalty system, but also recommended that the
Committee expand its role throughout the state to act as a resource panel for judges handling capital cases.79 A California
standing committee would make resources available to judges
presiding over capital cases, helping to ensure that trial
judges have the latest information available and improving
the uniformity of managing capital sentencing procedures. 8 '
Judges would also benefit from the knowledge of others who
375. Id. at 100.
376. For instance, we expect that Major League Baseball umpires be more
than general sports enthusiasts. We expect that they not only be experts on the
rules of baseball but have experience in calling professional games under pressure. We expect that the umpire will be more qualified when there is more on
the line-the division championship or the World Series, for example. Although the author ordinarily eschews sports metaphors, it is rather compelling
to compare the demand of the public for the best referees in sporting events
with the relative lack of concern for requiring judges with the most relevant experience when it comes to refereeing a trial in which the loser may be put to
death.
377. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 100.
378. Id.
379. Id at 100-01
380. Id. at 101.
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have experienced similar problems in their cases.3 8 '
6.

Trial Lawyers: Recommendations 40 Through 45

The Illinois Commission made six specific recommendations pertaining to trial lawyers who handle capital cases.382
Recommendations 40 through 45 establish levels of training
and experience for members of the capital bar and assure that
all persons handling capital cases meet them.383 Recommedation 41 also creates a Capital Litigation Trial Bar.3
Recommendation 40:
The Commission supports new Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 416(d) regardingqualificationsfor counsel in capital
385
cases.
California law does not establish minimum qualifications
for retained defense counsel or for the prosecuting attorney.3 86
In California, there are minimum requirements for appointed
defense counsel at trial387 and appointed defense counsel on
direct appeal and habeas corpus,8 8 but these requirements do
not apply to retained counsel or to the prosecutor.
The American Bar Association has recently revised the
guidelines for defense counsel in capital cases. 88 The guidelines now apply to all lawyers handling capital cases rather
than just to appointed counsel."' The Illinois Commission
specifically supports the Illinois Supreme Court Rule that
also applies these standards to retained counsel.391 If the goal
is to avoid the conviction of the innocent and ensure fairness
and justice, retained counsel should also meet minimum stan381. Id.
382. Id. at 105-14.
383. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 105.
384. Id. at 106-07.

385. Id. at 106.
386. See CAL. R. CT. 4.117 (2003) (establishing qualifications for appointed

trial counsel in capital cases but not for privately retained counsel or prosecutors).
387. Id. R. 76.6.
388. Id. R. 4.117.
389. AM. BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE
OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (2003) [hereinafter ABA

GUIDELINES FOR APPOINTMENT].

390. Id.at 35.
391. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 106 (quoting Illinois Su-

preme Court Rule 416(d)).
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standards.
California also does not comply with this recommendation, since it does not set any standards for prosecutors." 2
The Illinois Commission found that prosecutorial misconduct
led to over twenty-six percent of reversals in Illinois, and constituted an "error that did not warrant reversal" in a significant number of other cases.393 Prosecutorial misconduct also
contributes to appellate reversal of California cases.
Certainly, no prosecutor wants to have a case reversed, particularly a capital case. Mandatory training of prosecutors would
help to reduce the incidence of misconduct. This would help
avoid the unfairness associated with that misconduct and
would also avoid retrials and, on occasion, reversals where retrial is barred.
Recommendation 41:
The Commission supports new Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 701(b) which imposes the requirement that those appearingas lead or co-counsel in a capital case be first admitted to the CapitalLitigation Bar underRule 714.

California has neither a Capital Litigation Trial Bar nor
a requirement that lead or co-counsel belong to such a bar.
The Illinois Commission noted: "Society as a whole has an
important interest in the fair and just administration of capital punishment."3 96 Therefore, minimum standards should
apply to "counsel for all capital defendants."397 To accomplish
this goal, California should create a Capital Litigation Trial
Bar, and require counsel to apply for certification to be admitted as a member of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar.
Recommendation 42:
The Commission supports new Illinois Supreme Court
392. CAL. CT. R. 4.117, 76.6.
393. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 105.

394. See, e.g., People v. Batts, 30 Cal. 4th 660 (2003) (overturning a defendant's murder conviction because prosecutor misconduct at the first trial barred
the subsequent retrial); People v. Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800 (1998) (reversing defendant's multiple convictions-including first degree murder-because prosecutor's misconduct created a poisonous atmosphere that prevented a fair trial).
395. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 107.
396. Id. (quoting SUPREME COURT STANDING COMMITTEE SUPPLEMENTAL
REPORT 7 (Oct. 2000)).
397. Id.
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Rule 714 which imposes requirements on the qualifica., 1 398
tions of attorneyshandlingcapitalcases.

The Illinois Commission recognized that standards will
not eliminate poor advocacy on behalf of death penalty defendants. 99 They conceded that some attorneys who have demonstrated poor advocacy would still have met the minimum
qualifications."' Nevertheless, the Commission recognized
that the minimum standards
and continuing education would
401
have a positive impact.

The Illinois Commission recommendation also allows a
lawyer to sit "third chair" and thereby gain experience in
capital litigation.4 2 There is also a procedure for a waiver of
the strict qualifications if a particular lawyer warrants admission despite a lack of compliance with the minimum qualifications.03
Recommendation 43:
The office of the State Appellate Defender shouldfacilitate
the dissemination of information with respect to defense
counsel qualified under the proposed Supreme Courtproc404
ess.

California law does not require that the State Public Defender participate in locating qualified counsel around the
state. The California Appellate Project does work with the
California Supreme Court in locating qualified counsel for
appointment to direct appeals and habeas corpus proceedings
in capital cases.4 " There is no centralized process to qualify
trial counsel, however. The Commission found that the State
Appellate Defender should take this action because the state's
new certification rules created practical concerns about the
availability of qualified local counsel for capital defendants
tried in small counties. 6 While California does not have certification rules for the trial level, the rational underlying the

398. Id. at 108.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 108.

402. Id. at 109.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 110.
405. See CALIFORNIA APPELLATE PROJECT, supra note 371.
406. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 110.
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recommendation is applicable. California has many small
counties where qualified local counsel may be difficult to find.
Recommendation 44."
The commission supports efforts to have training for
prosecutors and defenders in capital litigation, and to
have funding provided to insure that trainingprograms
continue to be of the highest quality.4 7
The Illinois Commission recommended that the training
be mandatory for both prosecution and defense lawyers. °8 In
addition the Commission recommended that the training be
of the highest quality and adequately funded.4 9 California
does not meet this recommendation because capital case
training is not mandatory. Based on the author's observa-

tions, lawyers can take on death penalty cases in California
without any formal training in capital cases. Without public
funding and mandatory attendance; however, many lawyers
on both sides handle death penalty cases without adequate
training.410
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. While private lawyers can sometimes devote more time than some public defenders, given the extraordinary demands of the public defender caseload,
private lawyers do not necessarily have more training or experience than public
defenders. In fact, sometimes the decision to hire a private lawyer in lieu of a
public defender can be disastrous. As Justice Gardner of the California Court of
Appeal said in People v. Huffman, 71 Cal. App. 3d 63, 70 fn.2 (1977):
"It is an odd phenomenon familiar to all trial judges who handle arraignment calendars that some criminal defendants have a deep distrust for the public defender. This erupts from time to time in savage
abuse to these long-suffering but dedicated lawyers. It is almost a truism that a criminal defendant would rather have the most inept private
counsel than the most skilled and capable public defender. Often the
arraigning judge appoints the public defender only to watch in silent
horror as the defendant's family, having hocked the family jewels, hire
a lawyer for him, sometimes a marginal misfit who is allowed to represent him only because of some ghastly mistake on the part of the Bar
Examiners...."
A recent example of this phenomenon involved a lawyer, already being sued by
other clients and under investigation by the State Bar, who convinced family
members of a defendant to hire her on a death penalty case. She had only been
practicing for two years and had no capital experience. After the death verdict,
she resigned from the State Bar with investigations pending. See People v.
Ryan Hoyt, Santa Barbara Superior Court Case Number 1014465, wherein the
author was substituted in to attempt to obtain a new trial; the appeal is pending before the California Supreme Court, number to be assigned.
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California law does not provide such funding. In recent
years, the Habeas Corpus Resource Center, the Office of the
State Public Defender, and the California Appellate Project
provide some training for defense lawyers. Private organizations, such as The California Public Defenders Association
and the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, provide
most of the extensive training sessions which are available to
capital case defense lawyers.411 The California District Attorney's Association provides training for prosecutors. Attendees at these training sessions must pay their own way or be
reimbursed by their employers. However, employers may not
have the budget to reimburse their employees. In addition,
employees take these training courses at their own election;
nothing requires that they be trained on capital litigation.
Recommendation 45.
All prosecutors and defense lawyers who are members of
the Capital Trial Bar who are trying capital cases should
receive peiodic training in the following areas and experts on these subjects should be retained to conduct
training and prepare manuals on these topics: (1) The
risks of false testimony by in-custody informants (Yailhouse snitches'; (2) The risks of false testimony by accomplice witnesses; (3) The dangers of tunnel vision or
confirmatory bias; (4) The risks of wrongful convictions in
homicide cases; (5) Police investigative and interrogation
methods; (6) Police investigatingand reportingof exculpatory evidence; (7)412Forensic evidence; and (8) The risks of
false confessions.
The Illinois Commission recommended that police and
judges also receive this training."3 The Commission made the
point that based on its extensive study, these problems recur
411. Each year CACJ, along with the California Public Defenders
Association, co-sponsors the Capital Case Defense Seminar in Monterey, during
the President's Day Weekend in February. The four-day program is an
intensive educational opportunity for those involved in death penalty defense
and it includes lectures, plenary sessions, and specialized workshops. With the
2001 seminar attendance topping 1,200, the CACJ/CPDA Capital Case Defense
Seminar is the largest of its type held in the nation. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA
ATTORNEYS

FOR

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE,

SEMINARS,

at

http://www.cacj.org/seminars.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2003).
412. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 111.

413. See id. at 39, 96 (describing the Commission's Recommendation 16, regarding police, and Recommendation 35, regarding judges).
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in capital cases and lead to injustice.4 14 It also emphasized
that both the defense and the prosecution should be aware of
these pitfalls.4 15 California has no such requirement.
7

PretrialProceedings:Recommendations
46 Through 54
The Illinois Commission made nine recommendations
pertaining to pre-trial proceedings in capital cases. 16 The
Commission identfied a number of procedures which will ensure that a defendant and his or her counsel are fully informed, have notice in order to defend, and can prepare to go
to trial or fairly enter a non-capital plea if it is available.1 7
Recommendation 46:
The Commission supports new Illinois Supreme Court

rule 416(e) which permits discovery depositions in capital
418

cases on leave of the court for good cause.

The Illinois Commission concluded that discovery depositions simply permit both sides to hear critical evidence before
a trial.4 9 The Commission echoed the Illinois Supreme
Court's conclusion that pre-trial discovery procedures provide
an extra step toward a fair trial, and that it is better for all
concerned, including witnesses, victims, and survivors, to do
it right the first time rather than having everyone endure a
second trial.
California law does not permit discovery depositions in
capital cases. California has a limited provision for a conditional examination where a witness may become unavailable,42' but this is not a discovery deposition.
California
414. Id. at 105, 111.
415. Id. at 111.
416. Id. at 115-26.
417. Id.at 115.
418. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 115.
419. Id. at 116-17 (quoting the Illinois Supreme Court Committee).
420. Id.
421. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1335-1345 (West 2003).
422. A conditional examination can only be taken if the witness is in danger
of becoming unavailable as a witness. The Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United Sates Constitution require that the state make a "good
faith effort to obtain [the witness's] presence at trial." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S.
719 (1968). The Court emphasized the importance of confrontation and crossexamination before the "contemporaneous trier of fact." Id. California cases
have further emphasized that transcript testimony, of which a conditional ex-
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used to have a liberal preliminary examination procedure
that allowed broad cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and allowed the defense to depose witnesses.4 "3 The
law was amended by initiative,4 24 however, to allow the prosecution to introduce police officer hearsay testimony in lieu of
live witnesses4 25 and to prevent the defense from deposing
most witnesses. 42 6 This latter provision expressly states that
the preliminary hearing "shall not be used for the purposes of
discovery" and that the section "shall not be construed to
compel or authorize the taking of depositions of witnesses. 427
In addition, many capital cases are indicted before the grand
jury where the defense counsel has no opportunity for participation at all.428
An opportunity to evaluate the live testimony of critical
witnesses prior to trial is invaluable to both the prosecution
and the defense. Prior to Proposition 115, when California allowed full preliminary hearings, both sides to the case had an
opportunity to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the
witness before trial. This made it easier and more meaningful to discuss pre-trial disposition of a case. It also allowed
the prosecution to better evaluate the charging decision at the
information stage.
Discovery depositions would accomplish much the same
purpose. Both sides would have an opportunity to evaluate
the strengths and weaknesses of testimony after it was subjected to cross-examination. Defense lawyers could be better
prepared, and both the defense and the prosecution could deamination is one form, can only be used after due diligence is exercised to bring
the live witness before the court by interstate process, People v. Jones 89
Cal.Rptr. 661 (1970); People v. Blackwood 188 Cal.Rptr. 359 (1983), or even by

international law, People v. St. Germain, 187 Cal.Rptr. 915 (1982) (requiring
the party to use federal law to obtain the attendance of a witness who is a na-

tional or resident of the United States who is presently in a foreign country).
Therefore, the use of conditional examinations is greatly limited.

Conditional examinations are limited to questions and answers which would be
admissible at trial. Discovery depositions, on the other hand, allow direct and
cross-examination of a witness in a fashion calculated to lead to the discovery of
relevant evidence.

423. CAL. PENAL CODE § 866 (West 1983), amended by Cal. Proposition 115
(1990).
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

Cal. Proposition 115 (1990).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (West 2003).
Id. § 866.
Id. § 866(b)-(c).
Id. §§ 888-92.
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tect false accusations and perjured testimony before trial.
Recommendation 47:
The Commission supports the provisions of the new Illinois Supreme Court rule 416(1) mandating case management conferences in capitalcases.
The Illinois Supreme Court should consider adoption of a
rule requiring a final case management conference in
capital cases to insure that there has been compliance
with the newly mandatedrules, that discovery
is complete
42 9
and that the case is fully preparedfor trial.
The Illinois Commission observed:
The trial judge has ultimate responsibility for ensuring
that the trial moves at an appropriate pace and that decisions are fairly made. The trial judge is the person responsible for managing the conduct of both the prosecution and
defense before the jury, and supervising the overall conduct of the trial to ensure that a fair and just result is obtained. A great many problems can be avoided by active
and interested judicial management. 410
California law does not mandate case management conferences which ensure compliance with discovery rules. In
fact, California law has been amended over recent years to
reduce judicial supervision of discovery procedures. 3 ' A false
economy exists in allowing the courts to withdraw from supervising discovery issues rather than affirmatively insuring
compliance. Failure to resolve discovery disputes early on results in even greater expenditure of judicial resources on appeal.432
Recommendation 48.
The Commission supports Illinois Supreme Court Rule
416(g), which requires that a certificate be filed by the
state indicating that a conference has been held with all
those persons who participatedin the investigation or trial
preparationof the case, and that all the information re429. Id. at 117.
430. ILLINOIS COMMISSION

REPORT,

supranote 5, at 117.

431. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054-1054.9 (West 2003).

432. See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?" An Economic Analysis of the Justificationsfor Entry and ConductRegulation, 33 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 429,450 (2001).
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quired to be disclosed has been disclosed.
The Illinois Commission reviewed cases where information was not disclosed to the defense,434 and found that "[t]he
omission of key information, regardless of whether intentional or accidental, can pose a serious threat to the truthseeking process."4 5 The Illinois Commission had before it one
of the truly tragic examples of a "tunnel vision" prosecution,
where prosecutors did not turn over exculpatory evidence because of their desire to win. 4" They prevailed at trial and Rolando Cruz received a death sentence.4 " 7 They tried the case
three times and Mr. Cruz spent years on death row. 38 In the
end, the prosecutors were wrong. Mr. Cruz was innocent. 9
Even more tragically, while the police, prosecutors, and
courts were tied up convicting and re-convicting Mr. Cruz, the
real killer was out raping and killing others, including an
eight-year-old girl." °
California law does not require the state to hold a conference with those who participated in the investigation and
trial preparation of the case. Nor does it require certification
that all information required to be disclosed has been disclosed. To avoid injustice such as that suffered by Mr. Cruz,
California should adopt these safeguards as recommended by
the Illinois Commission.

Recommendation 49.
The Illinois Supreme Court should adopt a rule delining
"exculpatory evidence"in order to provide guidance to
counsel in making appropriate disclosures. The commission recommends the following definition:
Exculpatory information includes, but may not be limited
to, all information that is mateialand favorable to the de433. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 118.
434. Id.

435. Id.
436. The Illinois Commission referred to Mr. Cruz's case. Id. at 126. For a
fuller account of the painful story, see THOMAS FRISBIE & RANDY GARRETT,
VICTIMS OF JUSTICE (1998).

437. See IllinoisDeathPenalty.com, For Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hera
Charm,
at
The
Third
Time
Was
nandez,
http://www.illinoisdeathpenalty.com/cruz.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
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fendant because it tends to: (1) Cast doubt on defendant's
guilt as to any essential element in any count in the indictment or information; (2) Cast doubt on the admissibility of evidence that the state anticipates offering in its
case-in-chiefthat might be subject to a motion to suppress
or exclude; (3) Cast doubt on the credibilityor accuracy of
any evidence that the state anticipates offering in its
case-in-chief, or (4) Diminish the degree of the defendant's
culpability
or mitigates the defendant's potential sen1
tence."
The Illinois Commission found value in requiring the police and prosecutors to be as candid as possible with the defense and the courts.4 2 Regardless of the prosecution's desire
to convict, prosecutors have an ethical obligation to seek justice, and a responsibility to ensure that justice is done. " '
California law does not define exculpatory evidence. Although both federal and state case law on exculpatory evidence exists, California does not have a statute or rule implementing the broad definition
contained in the
recommendation requiring disclosure.4"
Recently, the California Supreme Court expanded the definition of exculpatory
evidence to include evidence that is harmful to the prosecution's case. " 5 This recommendation goes beyond that definition.
Recommendation 50.
Illinoislaw should require that any discussion with a witness or a representativeof a witness concerning benefits,
potential benefits or detriments conferred on a witness by
any prosecutor,police otfcial, corrections official or anyone else, should be reduced to writing, and should be dis-

441. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 119.

442. Id. at 119-120.
443. See CAL. BAR. R. 5-110 (2002).
444. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that suppression, by the prosecution, of evidence favorable to an accused, upon request, violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution); see also In
re Sassounian, 887 P.2d 527 (Cal. 1995) (holding the prosecution's duty of disclosure applies only to evidence that is both favorable to the defendant and material on either guilt or punishment).
445. "Evidence is favorable and must be disclosed if it will either help the defendant or hurt the prosecution." People v. Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081, 1132

(2000).
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6

closed to the defense in advance of trial."
The Illinois Commission found that in a number of the
thirteen cases in which the state released death row inmates,
accomplices or informers had testified. 7 The Commission
noted that non-death cases had also been reversed because
defense counsel had not been fully informed about plea
agreements with testifying accomplices or informers. 48 These
findings from the Commission's two-year study made it clear
that full and candid disclosure was required.
Nevertheless, California law does not require that deals
made with witnesses be reduced to writing. In fact, it is
common practice for the prosecution to claim that no deal exists, only to find that the unwritten agreement with the witness benefits the witness later, after the defendant has been
convicted." 9 In People v. Kasim,45 ° the district attorney stated
in his closing argument that there was no plea agreement between his office and the main witnesses. 451 He further stated
that this should enhance the credibility of such witnesses.4 52
The court of appeals later discovered that while there was no
written agreement, the witnesses received benefits resulting
from their testimony.
California should adopt the Commission's recommendation requiring plea agreements to be in
writing to ensure that situations like Kasim are avoided in
the future.
Recommendation 51:
Whenever the state introduces the testimony of an
in-custody informant who has agreed to testify for the
prosecution in a capital case to a statement allegedly
made by the defendant, at either the guilt or sentencing
phase, the state shouldpromptly inform the defense as to
446. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 120.

447. Id.
448. Id.
449. See People v. Kasim, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1360 (Ct. App. 1997), for a particularly egregious example of this practice. In that case, the prosecutor argued
to the jury that the nonexistence of a deal should enhance the witness's credibility. Id. at 1370.
450. 56 Cal. App. 4th 1360 (1997).
451. Id. at 1371.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 1376 (explaining that the witnesses had criminal records expunged to avoid deportation, remained free of confinement, and had probation

infractions overlooked or probation terms revised).
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the identification and backgroundof the wi'tness.454

The Illinois Commission considered prompt disclosure
"particularly important." 455 Although it did not expand on the
remark, practical experience teaches that the circumstances
of in-custody informants are particularly hard to investigate
as time passes. Typically, it is necessary to interview other
inmates, and sometimes correctional officers, to understand
the context of the informant's purported testimony. These
people are hard to locate, and they have difficulty remembering critical facts as time passes.
Disclosure of information about an in-custody informant
may be governed by California statute,456 and may also be governed by federal law.5 7 Neither the timing nor the extent of
disclosure as recommended is required under current California law. As the Illinois Commission recommends, prompt
disclosure should be required, so that the defense may prepare an appropriate cross-examination of any in-custody informants.5 Without such a cross-examination, the jury will
be unable to make an accurate assessment of the informant's
credibility. '
Recommendation 52.
(a) Priorto trial, the trialjudge shall hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine the reliability and admissibility of
the in-custody informant's testimony at either the guilt or

sentencingphase;
(b) At the pre-trial evidentiary hearing, the trialjudge
shall use the following standards:
The prosecution bears the burden ofproving by a proponderance of evidence that the witness' testimony is reliable.
The trialjudge may consider the following factors, as well
as any other factors bearingon the witness' credibility:
(1) the specific statements to which the witness will testify; (2) the time andplace, and other circumstances of the
alleged statements; (3) any deal or inducement made by

454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.

ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 121.
Id.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (West 2003).
See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 121.
See id. at 122-23.
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the informant and the police orprosecutorin exchange for
the witness' testimony; (4) the criminalhistory of the witness; (5) whether the witness has ever recanted his/her
testimony; (6) other cases in which the witness testified to
alleged confessions by others; (7) any other evidence that
may attest to or diminish the credibilityof the witness, including the presence or absence of any relationship between the accusedand the witness.

(c) The state may file an interlocutoryappealfrom a ruling suppressingthe testimony of an in-custody informant,
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604.460
The Illinois Commission took note of considerable literature on the inherent problems with testimony from in-custody
informants.461 From the study it determined, "Testimony from
in-custody witnesses has often been shown to have been false,
and several of the thirteen cases of men released from death
row involved, at least in part, testimony from an in custody
informant."46' 2
California law provides for an in limine hearing on the
foundational facts pertaining to the admissibility of evidence.4 63 However, current California law does not require
that the court hold a hearing on admissibility or consider the
criteria set forth in this recommendation. California should
adopt these criteria to protect against the possibility of unreliable testimony.
Recommendation 53:
In capital cases, courts should closely scrutinize any tactic
that misleads the suspect as to the strength of the evidence againsthim/her, or the likelihood of his/herguilt, in
order to determine whether this tactic would be likely to
induce an involuntary or untrustworthyconfession.464

California law does not require the court to scrutinize the
police tactics within the meaning of this recommendation. Illinois has a procedure for a pre-trial hearing on the volun465
tariness of a confession if a defendant moves to suppress it.

460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.

Id. at 122.
Id.
Id.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 402 (West 2003).
ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 123.
Id.
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That practice is similar to the procedures for a hearing on a
motion in limine under California practice. 46 The Illinois
Commission intended for this rule to go beyond Illinois' existing procedures, requiring the trial judge in capital cases "to
carefully examine police or prosecutor methods during the interrogation process which misstate or overstate the evidence
of the suspect's guilt, or the likelihood that he or she will be
found guilty, in order to induce him or her to confess."467 The
Commission stated that the judges should address whether
the prosecution established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the confession was voluntary and sufficiently
trustworthy to be accepted as evidence against the defendant.468
Recommendation 54:
The commission makes no recommendation about whether
or not plea negotiations should be restricted with respect
469
to the death penalty.
The Commission was concerned that prosecutors may use
the threat of the death penalty during plea negotiations. 7 °
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed at least two cases where
capital punishment was imposed after the district attorney
promised not to seek such punishment.47 1 In both People v.
Walke
and People v. Brownell, 73 the court reversed because the defendant waived his right to a jury trial based on
the district attorney's promises during negotiations not to
seek the death penalty.474 The court found that allowing the
district attorney to change his mind was a violation of due
process7 5 as well as cruel and unusual punishment.
Although the Commission could not come to a specific
recommendation on restrictions on coercive plea bargaining,
it did so in the context of having adopted other recommenda466. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 402 (West 2003).

467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.

ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 123.
Id.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id.
419 N.E.2d 1167(111. 1981).
449 N.E.2d 1318 (Ill. 1983).
See, e.g., id. at 1322.
See, e.g., id. at 1323.
See Walker, 419 N.E.2d at 1177 (Ryan, J., concurring).
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tions that would "significantly narrow the class of cases in
which the death penalty is being sought."47 7 Illinois' decision
not to make specific recommendations was premised specifically on the prior recommendations that (a) the eligibility factors be limited to five and (b) the selection of cases for death
be subject to mandatory state-wide review. In the words of
the Illinois Commission, "the issue of potentially coercive plea
negotiations would likely be significantly reduced if all parts
'
of the new scheme are adopted."4 78
Since California does not follow the recommendations
which comprise "all parts of the new scheme," its death penalty system is susceptible to the abuse of coercive plea bargaining addressed in this section of the Commission Report.
8.

The Guilt-Innocence Phase:Recommendations
55 Through 59

The Illinois Commission made five recommendations regarding the guilt-innocence phase of the capital trial.479 One
of the recommendations is constitutionally required under existing precedent from the Supreme Court.48 That recommendation pertains to the requirement that expert testimony on
eyewitness identification be permitted on a case-by-case basis. Of the four remaining recommendations, California complies with only one.481 That one is also arguably compelled by
the Constitution, prohibiting introduction of polygraph results in the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. 82 California
case law is in accord.
The other three recommendations require that the courts
provide specific cautionary jury instructions on eyewitness
identification, jail-house informants, and non-recorded statements. California has pattern jury instructions in the California Approved Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC); however, they do not cover the specific material recommended by
the Commission.

477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.

ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 124.
Id.
Id. at 127-36.
See infra note 517.
See infra notes 516-18 (discussing Recommendation 59).
Id.
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Recommendation 55.Expert testimony with respect to the problem associated
with eyewitness testimony may be helpful in appropriate
cases. Determinations as to whether such evidence may
be admitted
by . should be resolved by the trialjudge on a case
by case baSiS,
•483

The Illinois Commission recognized a growing body of literature concerning problems with eyewitness identification
testimony.484 Expert testimony on the pitfalls of such identification could be helpful to the trier of fact in certain cases.
The recommendation of the Commission is extremely modest:
it should be up to the judge to determine if such expert testimony would be helpful in a given case. 481
As a matter of federal constitutional law, it seems that
this recommendation is required in all states. 6 The Illinois
Commission cites a state case in which a per se ban on such
expert testimony was imposed and upheld by the courts of
4 7 However, that case flies in the face of the United
that stateY.
States Supreme Court's rulings. 8
No California statutes or guidelines explicitly direct the

483. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 127.

484. Id. at 127 & 135 n.1; see also Wells et al., supra note 173; U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, supranote 177.
485. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 129.
486. While there is no United States Supreme Court case directly on point,
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), stands for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to experts to assist in his or her defense. This, read in conjunction with Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), suggests that the courts cannot make a blanket ruling excluding expert evidence of the circumstances of key
prosecution evidence: "[T]he Constitution leaves to the judges who must make
these decisions 'wide latitude' to exclude evidence that is 'repetitive... only
marginally relevant' or poses an undue risk of 'harassment, prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues."' Id. at 689-90 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 679 (1986)). Moreover, "we have never questioned the power of States to
exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that themselves
serve the interests of fairness and reliability - even if the defendant would
prefer to see that evidence admitted." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
302 (1973). Nonetheless, without "[signaling] any diminution in the respect
traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of
their own criminal trial rules and procedures," we have little trouble concluding
on the facts of this case that the blanket exclusion of the proffered testimony
about the circumstances of petitioner's confession deprived him of a fair trial.
Id. at 302-03.
487. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 135, n.2 (citing State v.
Coley, 32 S.W.3d 831, 838 (Tenn. 2000)).

488. Id.
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trial judge to determine whether expert testimony is admissible. However, California case law has specifically held that it
is error to exclude expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification if three criteria are met: first, the prosecutor
must rely on eyewitness testimony as a key element of his or
her case; second, the eyewitness testimony must not be substantially corroborated; and third, the expert must offer testimony on specific psychological factors shown by the record,
the explanation of which would be of assistance to the jury.8 9
California adopts Recommendation 55, but the recommendation appears to be compelled by the Federal Constitution, as
well as California case law.4 90
Recommendation 56:
Jury instructions with respect to eyewitness testimony
should enumerate factors for the jury to consider, including the difficulty of making a cross-racial identification.
The current version of [the instruction]is a step in the
right direction, but should be improved.
The [model jury instructions]should also be amended to
add a Final sentence which states as follows: Eyewitness
testimony should be carefully examined in light of other
evidence in the case.491

The Illinois Commission found that Illinois had come a
long way in recognizing the problems with eyewitness identification.492 Nevertheless, the Commission determined that
specific problems discovered in the research and in actual
misidentification cases should be put before the jury by way
of judicial comment.4 93 The Commission also found that the
489. People v. McDonald, 69 P.2d 709, 726 (Cal. 1984).
490. See supra note 487 (discussing constitutional requirements). The California Supreme Court has held that expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification can only be inadmissible where other evidence "substantially corroborates the eyewitness identification and gives it independent reliability."
People v. Jones, 70 P.3d 359, 374 (Cal. 2003). This analysis, favoring the introduction of expert testimony, necessitates a case-by-case analysis of the availability and sufficiency of other, corroborating evidence. See id. The trial court
does the analysis, and the decision to admit or exclude expert testimony remains primarily a matter within the trial court's discretion. Id.
491. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 129.
492. Id. at 130-31.
493. Id. at 130. Eyewitness identification raises the possibility of human error and mistake. Id. at 130-31. The chance of human error and mistake is often
due to the "probable likeness or similarity of objects and persons" or because of
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court should specifically admonish the jury to carefully examine the testimony in light of all of the other evidence in the
case. It made these recommendations "[i]n light of new information regarding the potential for mistaken eyewitness
testimony and the drastic consequences if such mistakes are
made in a capital case ....))494
California does not require such jury instructions. California jury instructions do contain some criteria for evaluating eyewitness identifications. 495 These criteria need not be
given sua sponte, however, and are limited to cases with "no
substantial corroborative evidence."496 California jury instruccross-racial identification. Id. at 131. Furthermore, cross racial identification
contributes to the chance of misidentification; if the identifying witness is a different race than the perpetrator, this may have an impact on the accuracy of the
witness's original perception and subsequent identification, because people may
have greater difficulty in identifying members of a different race. Id. at 130-31.
494. Id. at 129-31.
495. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 2.92 (2001 & Supp. 2003)
[hereinafter CALJIC] The instructions state:
In determining the weight to be given to eyewitness identification testimony, you should consider the believability of the eyewitness as well
as other factors which bear upon the accuracy of the witness's identification of the defendant, including, but not limited to, any of the following:
[The opportunity of the witness to observe the alleged criminal act and
the perpetrator of the act;]
[The stress, if any, to which the witness was subjected at the time of
the observation;]
[The witness's ability, following the observation, to provide a description of the perpetrator of the act;]
[The extent to which the defendant either fits or does not fit the description of the perpetrator previously given by the witness;]
[The cross-racial [or ethnic] nature of the identification;]
[The
witness's
capacity
to
make
an
identification;]
[Evidence relating to the witness's ability to identify other alleged perpetrators of the criminal act;]
[Whether the witness was able to identify the alleged perpetrator in a
photographic or physical lineup;]
[The period of time between the alleged criminal act and the witness's
identification;]
[Whether the witness had prior contacts with the alleged perpetrator;]
[The extent to which the witness is either certain or uncertain of the
identification;]
[Whether the witness's identification is in fact the product of [his] [her]
own recollection;]
[ ;] and
Any other evidence relating to the witness's ability to make an
identification.
Id.
496. People v. Wright, 755 P.2d 1049, 1059 (Cal. 1988).
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tions do not contain a cautionary admonition, 9' 7 but they
should, per the Commission's recommendation.
Recommendation 57"
The [state committee on pattern criminal jury instructions] should consider a jury instructionproviding special
caution with respect to
498 the reliability of the testimony of
in-custody informants.
Based on the Commission's two-year study, the need for
such a specific instruction was clear: "In light of the frequency
with which such testimony has appeared in cases of those
who were ultimately released from death row, the Commission believes that a special emphasis on this credibility issue
is warranted., 499 The Illinois Commission looked to the experience of other states for guidance on how to word the instruction properly. ° Specifically, the Commission looked to
Maryland's, Oklahoma's, and California's jury instructions relating to in-custody informant testimony. 0 1 Of the three, the
Commission found Maryland's and Oklahoma's instructions
to be the best examples of how Illinois should construct its instruction."2 Maryland's instruction advised the jury to give
careful consideration not only to accomplices or in-custody informants, but also to any witness promised leniency, whereas
the Oklahoma instruction specifically targeted informants. °
Under current California law, evaluation of in-custody informants is covered only by the standard credibility instruction.0 4 In 2000, the standard instruction was amended to allow jurors to consider one additional piece of evidence in
determining believability: "Whether the witness is testifying

497. CALJIC 2.91 does not admonish the jury to carefully examine the evidence. In other words, there is nothing cautionary about the instruction; it
simply restates the burden of proof that the prosecutor has to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Even this instruction need not be given sua
sponte since the jury is instructed that the people must prove each element of
the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Richardson, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 120, 127 (Ct. App. 1978).
498. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 131.
499. Id. at 132.
500. Id.

501. Id.
502. Id.

503. Id.
504. CALJIC, supra note 495, at R. 2.20.

178

SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW

[Vol: 44

under a grant of immunity.""5 However, the California courts

have held that the general instruction on bias, interest, or
other motive is adequate, and the court does not necessarily
have to instruct that the testimony of a paid informer should
be viewed with caution.0 6
Recommendation 58:
[Specialjury instructionsrelatingto an alleged statement
of a defendant] should be supplemented... , to be given
only when the defendant's statement is not recorded.-...
You should pay particularattention to whether or not the
statement is recorded, and if it is, what method was used
to record it. Generally, an electronic recording that contains the defendant's actual voice or a statement written
by the defendant is more reliable than a non-recorded
507
summary.

The Illinois Commission found that its recommendation
struck a proper "balance between the interests of effective law
enforcement and the rights of the defendant." 8° This recommendation should help encourage police to record interrogations and is consistent with the extensive literature on false
confessions or unreliable reports of confessions which were referred to in other parts of the report. 0 9
Like Illinois, California has a general instruction relating
to alleged confessions or admissions of the defendant. "0 Under Illinois law, if the court determines that the defendant
made a voluntary statement, then this statement will be ad505. Id. As with other recent amendments or additions, this amendment
falls short of the Commission's recommendation, and the vast majority of the
approximately 620 condemned people in California did not derive any benefit
from it. In determining whether California's current death row population was
tried justly and fairly and how many innocents are on death row, we have to
look at California's unamended credibility instruction.
506. People v. Castro, 160 Cal. Rptr. 156, 158-59 (Ct. App. 1979).
507. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 133.
508. Id. at 133.
509. See, e.g., id. at 24-29, 115-26; see also Clifford Zimmerman, Back from
the Courthouse: Corrective Measures to Address the Role of Informants in
Wrongful Convictions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED
JUSTICE, (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, 2001); See White, supra
note 163; Drizin & Colgan, Let the CamerasRoll: Mandatory Videotaping ofInterrogationsIs the Solution to Illinois'ProblemofFalse Confessions,32 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 339 (2001); DNA Voids Murder Confession, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 2002;
Cops Urged to Tape Their Interrogations,CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 2002.
510. CALJIC, supra note 495, at R. 2.71.
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missible in court and is substantive evidence of his or her
guilt.5 11 It is left up to the jury to determine whether the defendant actually made the statement and what weight the
statement should be given. 12 However, the Commission intended its recommendation to allow the court to advise the
jury that recorded statements may have greater reliability,
turning the jury's attention to the steps the police took to obtain the statement. 513 This will help the jury identify and reject questionable and untrustworthy statements.514 To strike
a proper balance between the interests of law enforcement
and the rights of defendants, California should adopt a jury
instruction similar to Recommendation 58.
Recommendation 59:
Illinois courts should continue to reject the results ofpolygraph examination
during the innocence/guilt phase of
515
capitaltrials.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments seemingly require rejection of polygraph results during the innocence/guilt
phase of the trial.516 A majority of the Supreme Court has
held "there
is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is
5 17
reliable.
California case law prohibits the introduction of polygraph results in all proceedings.5 18 Therefore, irrespective of
whether the Constitution compels this result, California is in
accord with Recommendation 59.
9.

The Sen tencing Phase:Recommendations
60 Through 64

The Illinois Commission made five recommendations regarding the sentencing phase of trial.5 19 These recommenda511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.

ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 133.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id. (citing People v. Melock, 599 N.E.2d 941 (1992)).
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 303 (1998).

518. The California Supreme Court continues to find that polygraph results
are unreliable under the "Kelly-Fryd' rule articulated in People v. Kelly 549
P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) (adopting the rule from Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). See also People v. Ayala, 1 P.3d 3 (Cal. 2000).
519. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 138-50.
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tions require discovery prior to the penalty phase of the trial
and seek to expand mitigating factors to include the defendant's extreme abuse as a child and reduced mental capacity.520 The recommendations would establish the defendant's
right to allocution, prohibit polygraph results, and require
that jurors be fully informed of the life without possibility of
parole alternative (LWOPP).5 21
Recommendation 60.
The Commission supports the new amendments to [Illinois] Supreme Court Rule 411, which make the rules of
discovery applicable to the sentencing phase of capital
cases.522
California meets this requirement with qualifications.
The California Penal Code requires both the prosecution and
the defense to provide discovery no less than thirty days before trial, unless one party shows good cause why it should
not provide discovery.52 3 The courts have held that this statute applies to the penalty phase of a capital case as well as
the guilt-innocence phase.524 In California, the prosecution
also has a statutory obligation to produce evidence which it
intends to introduce in aggravation "within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial., 525 The
Federal Constitution also requires disclosure of exculpatory
evidence to the defense.526
Illinois discovery rules require earlier discovery and differ in some other specifics. The California rules could be
amended to be more liberal, or at least provide for the earlier
disclosure of evidence relating to the penalty phase.
Recommendation 61:
The mitigatingfactors considered by the jury in the death
penalty sentencing scheme should be expanded to include
the defendant's history of extreme emotional or physical
abuse and that the defendant suffers from reducedmental
520. Id. at 141-42.
521. Id. at 142-48.
522. Id. at 138.
523. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.7 (West 2003).

524. People v. Superior Court (Mitchell), 859 P.2d 102, 106-08 (Cal. 1993).
525. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003).
526. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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capacity. [Expand the list of statutory factors to include:]
(6) Defendant's backgroundincludes a history of extreme
emotional or physical abuse; and (7) Defendant suffers
cait527
from reduced mental capacity.
In California, the defense may present mental health issues to the jury;528 however, the statutory mitigating factors
only pertain to the defendant's mental state at the time of the
offense.5 29 No provision specifically includes the "defendant's
history of extreme emotional or physical abuse" as referred to
in this recommendation. California law has a catch-all provision for mitigating evidence,8 ° but this provision is required
under the Federal Constitution. 3 ' Though it may be possible
to present evidence and argue the defendant's history, the
jury is not specifically instructed that such history is a mitigating factor.
The Illinois Commission also specifically recommended
expanding the list of statutory mitigating factors to include
that the defendant "suffers from reduced mental capacity."" 2
California juries are also not specifically instructed that this
evidence could be considered a mitigating factor; therefore,
California does not follow this recommendation.
Recommendation 62:
The defendant should have the right to make a statement
on his own behalf at [sic] during the aggravation/mitigation phase, without being subject to
533
cross-examination.
The California Supreme Court held that the defendant
has no right to allocution.. 4 although a contrary belief had
persisted for some time.535 There may be a federal constitu527. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 141.

528. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(d), (h) (West 2003).
529. Id.

530. Id. § 190.3(k).
531. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
532. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 141.
533. Id. at 142.

534. People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081, 1102 (Cal. 1988).
535. The right was thought to exist in California, in part because Bernard
Witkin referred to it in his influential treatise on California criminal law. B.E.
Witkin, a reWITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 607(3) (1963).
nowned California legal scholar and long-time attorney for the California Supreme Court, simply stated in his treatise that the defendant had a right of allocution without citation to any authority. However, after Mr. Witkin's
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tional right to allocution,536 but California continues to reject
this proposition."'
The Illinois Commission surveyed the law of several
other states on this subject and concluded that such a right
was workable and recognized elsewhere."' The Commission
reasoned that the prosecution may comment on the defendant's lack of remorse; thus, the defendant should be allowed
to make comments in his or her favor without crossexamination.53
California also permits the prosecutor to
comment on the defendant's lack of remorse. 4 ' If the defendant is not called to testify, often for good reason, he or she
has no way to express remorse before the jury. Regardless of
whether the Constitution recognizes a right to allocution, allocution plays an important role in avoiding wrongful convictions.
Recommendation 63:
The jury should be instructed as to the alternative sentences that may be imposed
in the event that the death
54 1
penaltyis not imposed.
Supreme Court precedent requires the court to instruct
the jury at the penalty phase that the alternative 4to
2 voting for
death will be life without the possibility of parole.
Recommendation 64:
[The state courts] should continue to reject the results of
polygraph examinations
during the sentencing phase of
543
capital trials.
retirement, the California Supreme Court held to the contrary. Keenan, 758
P.2d at 1102.
536. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
537. People v. Lucero, 3 P.3d 242, 262 (Cal. 2001).
538. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 142-44.
539. Id. at 144.
540. See, e.g., People v. Gonzales, 800 P.2d 1159, 1186-87 (Cal. 1990). The
court stated that remorse is a mitigating factor and that the absence of a mitigating factor cannot be considered aggravating unless it is specifically listed as
an aggravating factor in California Penal Code section 190.3. However, the
court circumvented this by finding that absence of remorse could be considered
an aggravating factor under section 190.3(a). For a discussion of the abuse of
this over broad factor, see supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
541. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 144.

542. Kelley v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 248 (2002).
543. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 148.
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California case law still prohibits the introduction of
polygraph results in all proceedings. 5"' Therefore, California
follows this recommendation.
10.

Imposition of Sentence: Recommendations
65 Through 69

The Illinois Commission made five recommendations relating to the imposition of the sentence of death."5 These recommendations impose procedural requirements on the manner in which the trial court imposes a death sentence.
Recommendation 65
The statute which establishes the method by which the
jury should arrive at its sentence should be amended to
include language... to make it clear that the jury should
weigh factors in the case and reach its own independent
conclusion about whether the death penalty should be imposed. The statute should be amended to readas follows:
"If the jury determines unanimously, after weighing the
factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the
446
appropriate sentence ....
This recommendation is met in California. California requires unanimity on the part of the jury, but it does not require unanimity as to particular factors in aggravation.54 7
California juries are instructed: "To return a judgment of
death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating
circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the
mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of
life without parole.5 48 The term "unanimously"
is not used
5,4 9
"
you.
of
"each
of
use
the
by
implied
is
but
Recommendation 66
After the jury renders its judgment with respect to the
imposition of the death penalty, the trialjudge should be
required to indicate on the record whether he or she con544. See supra note 518.
545. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 151-63.
546. Id. at 151.
547. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003); CALJIC, supra note 495, at

R. 8.88.
548. CALJIC, supra note 495, at R. 8.88.
549. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 152.
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curs in the result. In cases where the trialjudge does not
concur in the imposition of the death penalty, the defendant shall be sentenced to naturallife as a mandatoryalternative (assuming the adoption of a new death penalty
scheme limited to five eligibilityfactors)."'
The Illinois Commission specifically uses the term "concur" and states that the judge should impose natural life if he
In this regard, the Commission
or she does not concur.'
stated that, "[t]his proposal is designed to address the situation in which the trial judge has some lingering concern about
the defendant's guilt, or when the judge believes the verdict of
death may have been influenced by passion or prejudice. 52
This gives the judge much broader authority to avoid an injustice than under California law. In California, the judge is
limited to "[making] a determination as to whether the jury's
findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to the
53
law or the evidence presented.""
A California trial judge reviews procedure but only reweighs the evidence to determine if a death verdict is contrary to the law or the evidence.554 Under the California
death penalty system, the judge neither substitutes his or her
judgment, nor decides whether he or she concurs in the result. The California standard is more liberal than that applied at a motion for new trial but is not the same as asking
whether the judge concurs in the verdict of death. 55 Califor-

550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 153.
553. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West 2003).
554. Seeid.§ 190.4(e); People v. Rodrigues, 885 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1994).
555. California Penal Code section 190.4(e) requires the judge to independently weigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. People
v. Weaver, 29 P.3d 103, 171-72 (Cal. 2001). The judge is not asked if she or he
concurs in the judgment, which would give the judge an effective veto. A motion
for a new trial under California Penal Code section 1181 is less liberal. Under
Jackson v. Virginia,443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979), the court asks only whether a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
See also People v. Hatch, 991 P.2d 165, 173 (Cal. 2000) (affirming the Jackson
standard for California). Arguably, either the trial court or an appellate court
would be competent to apply the Jackson standard. Section 190.4(e) requires
re-weighing of the evidence, thereby giving the judge more leeway to reject a
death sentence than strictly applying the new trial standard, but less leeway
than in states where the judge can veto simply because she or he does not concur.
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nia should adopt this recommendation, because it would protect the defendant in those situations where the jury rendered its verdict based on sympathy and passion for the victim, or where the trial judge otherwise does not concur.
Recommendation 67:
In any case approved for capital punishment under the
new death penalty scheme with five eligibility factors, if
the finder of fact determines that death is not the appropriate sentence then the mandatory alternative sentence
would be naturallife.556
After a finding of special circumstances in California, the
two sentencing options are "death" or "life without possibility
of parole." However, the default alternative of "natural life"
in Illinois would be limited to the five eligibility factors,
whereas California has over twenty-five "special circum'
Reduction of the eligibility factors guarantees to a
stances."557
greater extent that only heinous crimes will trigger a possible
5
California's list of twenty-five eligibility
11
death sentence.
factors is too expansive and allows for a minimum sentence of
life without the possibility of parole for crimes that may not
warrant it.559
Recommendation 68.
[The state] should adopt a statute which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for those defendants found to
be mentally retarded.The best model to follow in terms of
specific languageis that found in the Tennessee statute.6 °
This is constitutionally required following the Supreme
Court's decision in Atkins v. Virgina.61 In his last days in office, Governor Gray Davis signed SB3, legislation allowing a
capital defendant to apply for a mental retardation hearing
before trial. 6 '
556. ILLINOIS COMMISSION

REPORT, supra note

5, at 155.

557. See id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2-.3 (West 2003).
558. See ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 155.

559. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2003).
560. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 156.
561. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

562. Davis Signs Bill to Ease Collection of Future Online Tax, SAN DIEGO
UNION

TRIB.,

Oct.

11,

2003,

http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/uniontrib/sat/news/newslnllbills.html
(last visited Oct. 16, 2003).

This law, adding California Penal Code section
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Recommendation 69.
[The state]should adopt a statute which provides:
A. The uncorroboratedtestimony of an in-custody informant witness concerning the confession or admission of
the defendant may not be the sole basis for the imposition
of a death penalty.
B. Convictions for murder based upon the testimony of a
single eyewitness or accomplice, without any other corroboration,
should not be death eligible under any circum56 3
stances.

The Illinois Commission was aware of the serious problems with testimony from in-custody informants, single eyewitnesses, and accomplices. 5" Scholarly studies and the
Commission's own review of the cases of people released from
Illinois death rows demonstrate the dangers of conviction of
the innocent and the attendant failure to apprehend the real
killers."' In this recommendation the Commission suggested
that a court should not impose the irreversible sentence of
death when such a significant possibility of a wrongful conviction exists."'
California has not implemented the recommended police
practices or the other procedural safeguards5 67 that the

Commission presupposed when it made this recommendation.
California does not require corroboration of in-custody informants regarding defendant admissions in capital cases, nor is
there an exclusion from death eligibility for cases based on a
single eyewitness without corroboration. California does,
however, have a general evidentiary prohibition against conviction of a person of any criminal offense based on the uncorroborated statement of an accomplice."6
California would
benefit from adopting a statute that both prohibits uncorroborated testimony of an in-custody informant and exempts convictions based on single eyewitness testimony from death eligibility. Such a statute would protect the accused from those
1376, implements the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002). See S.B. 3, 2003 Leg. (Cal. 2003).
563. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 158.

564.
565.
566.
567.

Id. at 158-60.
Id. at 19-43, 127-34.
Id. at 158-60.
Id.

568. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111 (West 2003).
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in-custody informants who may conjure up false testimony to
further their own interests or who may have misidentified the
accused.
11.

ProceedingsFollowing Conviction and Sentence:
Recommendations 70 Through 75

The Illinois Commission made six recommendations relating to proceedings that follow sentencing and conviction.6 9
They require proportionality review, ongoing discovery, time
periods for post-conviction relief, mandatory evidentiary hearings, extended procedures for actual innocence claims, and a
clear statute on clemency procedures.
California actually prohibits proportionality review by
the California Supreme Court 7
Prosecutors may be compelled to provide ongoing discovery after conviction on demand, but there are no uniform rules or requirements. Postconviction petitions, habeas corpus in California, must be
filed while the direct appeal is still pending. Furthermore,
there are no mandatory evidentiary hearings on habeas and
there are no special rules for actual innocence claims.57'
California has no statutory scheme for clemency procedures.
Recommendation 70.
In capitalcases the [State]Supreme Court should consider
on direct appeal (1) whether the sentence was imposed
due to some arbitraryfactor, (2) whether an independent
weighing of the aggravatingand mitigating circumstances
indicates death was the proper sentence, and (3) whether

569. ILLINOIS COMMISSION

REPORT,

supranote 5, at 165-76.

570. See, e.g., People v. Marshall, 790 P.2d 676, 691-92 (Cal 1990); see also

People v. Jones, 64 P.3d 762, 786-87 (Cal. 2003) (holding that the California
death penalty scheme is not unconstitutional for failing to provide inter-case

proportionality review).
571. CAL. CT. R. 4.551(f) provides that the court
must order an evidentiary hearing... if, after considering the verified
position, the return, any denial, any affidavits or declarations under
penalty of perjury, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken,
the court finds there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner may
be entitled to relief and the petitioner's entitlement to relief depends on
the resolution of an issue of fact.
Id. This mandate is largely illusory, however, as the court decides whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner may be entitled to relief.
There is no alternate provision or procedure for cases in which actual innocence
is alleged. See id. R. 4.550-4.551.
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the sentence of death was excessive or disproportionateto
the penaltyimposedin similarcases.572
The Illinois Commission recommendation for the state
supreme court to reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to do a proportionality review is intended to
supplement the trial court's concurrence procedures."'
In California, the trial judge performs a limited review,
restricted to determining "whether the jury's findings and
verdicts at aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances are contrary to the law or evidence presented."57 4 Neither the California Supreme Court5 75 nor the
trial court does a proportionality review.7
Although proportionality review is not constitutionally
required,5 7' nineteen other death penalty states require some
form of such a review.578 The Illinois Commission found value
in ensuring that the death penalty "is being applied in a rational and even-handed manner throughout the state" and to
monitor "geographic" and "race effects."5 75 To perform a
proper proportionality review, the state would have to develop a state-wide database on homicides similar to that developed in New Jersey.58

572. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 166.

573. Id. at 166-68.
574. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West 2003).
575. See People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 661-62 (Cal. 1989).
576. The trial judge has no authority to do an inter-case proportionality review. See People v. Marshall, 790 P.2d 676, 692 (Cal. 1990). However, the
judge can do an "intra-case" review to determine if the punishment is proportionate to the individual defendant's culpability. Id. at 937-38; see also People
v. Dillion, 668 P.2d 697, 720-21 (Cal. 1983).
577. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 51-54 (1984).
578. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 166 (referring to Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington).
579. Id. at 167.
580. Id. at 168. The New Jersey database collects information at the trial
level. Id. This database includes information on the defendant and victim, ra-

cial and socio-economic characteristics of all those involved, representation by
counsel, the aggravating factors the prosecution proposed and those actually
found, mitigation evidence, the factual circumstances of the crime, and the impressions of the trial judge. Id. The Administrative Office of the Courts completes the collection of the data. Id.
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Recommendation 71:
Rule 3.8 of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct [ABA Model Rule 3.9], Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,should be amended in paragraph
(c) by the addition of the [unlitalicizedlanguage:(c) A public prosecutor or other governmental lawyer in criminal
litigation shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the
defendant, or to the defendant if the defendant is not
represented by a lawyer, of the existence of evidence,
known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the
degree of the offense. Following conviction, a public
prosecutor or other government lawyer has the continuing
obligation to make timely disclosure to the counsel for the
defendant or to the defendant if the defendant is not
represented by a lawyer, of the existence of evidence,
known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that
tends to negate the guilt of the defendant or mitigate the
defendant's capital sentence. For the purposes of this
post-conviction
disclosure
responsibility
"timely
disclosure" contemplates that the prosecutor or other government lawyer should have the opportunity to
investigate matters related to new evidence.5""
The California Supreme Court does not promulgate any
special rules of professional conduct concerning the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. A California statute, effective January 1, 2003, permits post-conviction discovery upon request and a showing of good cause.5 82 No rule
creates an ethical, ongoing duty upon the prosecution to turn
over exculpatory information to the defendant or defense
counsel post-conviction as contemplated by this Illinois Commission recommendation. Like Illinois, California should
clarify that the prosecution's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence extends beyond the date of conviction.
Recommendation 72:
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act should be amended to
provide that a petition for a post-conviction proceeding in
a capital case should be filed within 6 months after the issuance of the mandate by the Supreme Court following af581. Id.
582. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.9(a)-(b) (West 2003).
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firmance of the directappealfrom the trial.
The Illinois Commission was concerned about allowing
post-conviction petitions to be filed too far in the future."
The statutory scheme in Illinois required a defendant to file
for relief before his or her direct appeal was completed.585
However, the Commission recognized that "requiring a capital defendant to file a post-conviction petition before his [or
her] original appeal is complete represents an unwise policy
choice.""5 6
The Illinois Commission recommended that postconviction petitions (a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
California) be filed after the conclusion of the direct appeal. 87
The California Supreme Court specifically requires that the
defendant file the petition within 180 days after the reply
brief is due on direct appeal. 8 This requirement was recently
increased from 90 days; however, the petition must still be
filed before the direct appeal concludes. The Commission also
pointed out that implementing this recommendation would
require that the state supreme court promptly dispose of all
capital cases, and that Illinois had a history of doing this.
Recommendation 73.
The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act should be
amended to provide that in capital cases, the trial court
should convene the ev4dentiary hearing on the petition
within one year of the date the petition is filed.5 89

When the Commission made its recommendations, Illinois law provided for the filing of the post-conviction petition
in the trial court. ° Under this recommendation, the trial
court would then have to set its evidentiary hearing within
one year of the filing of the petition.59
California does not specify a time period within which to
convene an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.

ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT,

supra note 5, at

169.

See id. at 169-70.
Id. at 170.
Id.
Id.

SUPREME CT. POLICIES REGARDING CASES ARISING FROM JUDGMENT OF
DEATH, supranote 268, Policy 3:1-1.1.

589. Id.
590. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 171.
591. Id. at 170.
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More significantly, California
for writ of habeas corpus.
does not require an evidentiary hearing at all. Unlike Illinois, California procedure does not have the additional safeguard of an evidentiary hearing in a trial court. In California
death penalty cases, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is
filed directly with the Supreme Court. 93 However, for systems that do employ evidentiary hearings, such a recommendation helps resolve the concern that post-conviction proceedings in capital cases delay the ultimate disposition of the
case. 94 This recommendation would help ensure that postconviction proceedings occur in a timely fashion.9
Recommendation 74:
The Post-Conviction HearingAct should be amended to
provide that in capital cases, a proceeding may be initiated in cases in which there is newly discovered evidence
which offers a substantialbasis to believe that the defendant is actually innocent, and such proceedings should be
available at any time following the defendant's conviction
regardless of other provisions of the Act limiting the time
within such proceedings can be initiated. In order to prevent frivolous petitions, the Act should provide that in
proceedings asserting a claim of actual innocence, the
court may make an initialdetermination with or without a
5 96
hearingthat the claim is frivolous.
Here, the Illinois Commission specifically made special
provisions for post-conviction petitions where actual innocence is asserted.597 The Commission recognized that constitutional due process may require some sort of relief; however,
they stated, "The commission has unanimously recommended
that specific provision should be clearly made in the PostConviction Hearing Act to permit the assertion of claims of
actual innocence at any time following conviction in capital

592. The ordinary rules governing petitions for writ of habeas corpus provide
that the court must immediately after the filing of a return proceed to hearing.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1483 (West 2003); see CAL. R. CT. 4.551(f). However, the
direct filings in the California Supreme Court do not follow these rules.
593. SUPREME CT. POLICIES REGARDING CASES ARISING FROM JUDGMENT OF
DEATH,

594.
595.
596.
597.

supranote 268, Policy 3.
ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 171.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 172.

SANTA CLARA LA WREVIEW

[Vol: 44

598

cases."

California law does not implement this recommendation.
A petition for writ of coram nobis or vobis may be filed under
common law but is disfavored by the courts.599 Bars to successive litigation effectively defeat the recommendation's purpose.
Recommendation 75.
[State]law shouldprovide that after all appealshave been
exhausted and the Attorney General applies for a final
execution date for the defendant, a clemency petition may
not be filed later than 30 days after the date that the
[court]enters an ordersetting an execution date.600
The Illinois Commission recognized that last minute petitions can place the administrative board in Illinois and the
governor under tremendous time pressure.6"' The Commission concluded that the recommended procedures would permit a more orderly review process in which the governor may
receive meaningful input from the board."2
The California Constitution has been interpreted to provide
the governor with the power to grant clemency in death penalty cases. +3 California statutes set forth procedures primarily for non-death cases."
The procedure is almost entirely
discretionary and provides no time restraints.
The idea of meaningful input and review by the governor
is questionable in California since no governor in forty years
60
has commuted a death sentenceY.
However, if there is to be
a system of executive review, it should be organized and
timely.
12.

Funding:Recommendations 76 Through 82
The Illinois Commission made seven recommendations
pertaining to funding by the state,6 6 one of which applies only
598. Id.
599. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996). Cr In re Clark,
855 P.2d 729, 748, 768 (Cal. 1993).
600. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 173.
601. Id. at 174.
602. Id.
603. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5.
604. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4800-4906 (West 2003).
605. See supra note 313.
606. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 177-86.
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to Illinois. °7 These recommendations attempt to ensure that
lawyers handling capital cases have adequate funding and
are properly compensated for their time. 68 They also seek to
assure that funds for law enforcement equipment, particularly recording devices, are available and properly administered throughout the state.6 "9
Recommendation 76:
Leaders in both the executive and legislative branches
should significantlyimprove the resourcesavailable to the
criminaljustice system in order to permit the meaningful
implementation ofreforms in capitalcases.610
Though its legislative and executive branches have devoted some attention to death penalty litigation,6 1' California
is not implementing the reforms contemplated by the Illinois
Commission.
California's executive branch, legislative committees, and
supreme court should formally coordinate efforts to effectuate
the recommended reforms. The cost of death penalty trials
affects the whole criminal justice system; money that could
have been spent on proving guilt or innocence is instead spent
on the execution of criminals, some who are later found to be
innocent. Capital cases are very costly; one report estimates
that between 1982 and 1997 the extra cost of capital trials
was $1.6 billion.612 California averages more than twenty new
death sentences per year, and it has carried out ten executions since it reinstated capital punishment in 1977.613 According to a report in the Sacramento Bee, the death penalty
costs California ninety million dollars in excess of the ordinary costs of the justice system annually, indicating that the
607. Id. at 178 (stating that "The Capital Crimes Litigation Act... should be
reauthorized by the General Assembly."). California does not have any present
legislation comparable to the act. Therefore, California does not follow this recommendation. To avoid dispute, this article deems this recommendation inapplicable and the author removes it from consideration.
608. Id. at 177-82.
609. Id.at 183.
610. Id. at 177.
611. See Legislative Session Complicated by Politics, of All Things, CHI.
DAILY LAW BULLETIN, Jan. 7, 2002, at 23.
612. NBER Working Paper No. w8382, Issued in July 2001, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=108&scid=7.
14,
2003,
at
Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
613. N.
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=108&scid=7.
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state has spent more than one billion dollars on the death
penalty in the course of achieving these ten executions.614
Recommendation 77:

The Capital Crimes Litigation Act, ... which is the state
statute containing the CapitalLitigation Trust Fund and
other provisions,
should be reauthorized by the General
615
Assembly.
Since January 1, 2000, Illinois has had in place a Capital
Crimes Litigation Act that provides for the Capital Litigation
Trust Fund, which in turn provides funding for both prosecution and defense.616 While the fund is a source of additional
attorney compensation, it also covers many expenses that result from a properly tried capital case.6"7 It includes funds for
investigation, experts, forensic, witnesses, and other costs associated with capital cases. 61 Existing California law covers
some of the provisions of the Illinois Act.619 California has
funding provisions for capital cases, including a statute providing for defense expenses in indigent cases."' Though the
statute does authorize funds for investigators and experts for
indigent defendants, the process is much more constricting
when compared to the Illinois process. 62' In California, an attorney can ask the court for funds for the specific payment of
investigators, experts, and others for defense preparation, but
the decision lies in the hands of the trial judge. 622 Further,
funds in California are distributed in the form of reimbursements, whereas funds in Illinois are done as appropriations.623
The Illinois Commission recommends that this Act continue in existence and be renewed. California should do the
same with what provisions it currently has in place and im614. SACRAMENTO
BEE,
Mar.
18,
1988,
at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=108&scid=7.
615. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 178.
616. Id. at 178-79.
617. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 124/15 (2003).
618. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 124/15 (2003).
619. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 124/15 (2003); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 987.2,
987.9 (West 2003).
620. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9.
621. Compare 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 124/15 (2003) with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 987.9 (West 2003).
622. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9.
623. Compare 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 12415 (2003) with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 987.9 (West 2003).
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plement the additional provisions of the Act.
Recommendation 78:
The Commission supports the concept articulatedin the
statute governing the CapitalLitigation Trust Fund, that
adequate compensation be provided to trial counsel in
capital cases for both time and expense, and encourages
regularconsiderationof the hourly rates authorizedunder
the statute
to reflect the actualmarket rates ofprivate at62
torneys. 4
Hourly rates for appointed counsel at the trial and appellate levels are far below the rates earned by competent private criminal defense counsel. Furthermore, where trial
counsel is appointed at an hourly rate, the courts routinely
reduce the number of hours for which they will provide compensation resulting in substantial underpayment of counsel.
In many cases in California, indigent defense services are
provided by contract lawyers who often take on the entire fiscal year's cases for a flat fee."'
Expenses may be covered by application for funds 26 but
no central statewide system ensures that individual courts
are providing adequate funding in any given case, or that different locations within the state receive equivalent funding.
Because public defenders, private lawyers, contract defense
lawyers, and other appointed lawyers handle death penalty
cases throughout the state, this proposal would have to be
implemented by a statewide statute as the Illinois Commission recommended. 7
Recommendation 79.
The provisionsof the CapitalLitigation Trust Fund should
be construed as broadly as possible to insure that public
defenders, particularlythose in rural parts of the state,
can effectively use its provisions to secure additionalcounsel and reimbursement of all reasonable trialrelated ex624. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 179.

625. The California Supreme Court has questioned whether contracts for indigent defense services create conflicts of interest. See People v. Barboza, 627
P.2d 188 (Cal. 1981). However, low-bid, flat-fee indigent defense contracts still
exist. See Meredith Anne Nelson, Comment, Quality Control for Indigent Defense Contracts,76 CAL. L. REV. 1147 (1988).
626. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West 2003).
627. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 179-80.
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penses in capitalcases.

The Illinois Commission observed that, particularly in
rural counties, funding may not be adequate to allow counsel
to adequately prepare for trial.129 The application for state
funds in California is subject to the discretion of the local
judges. 3 ' A state-wide system for allocating funds would be
an improvement because it would allow the public defender to
utilize resources that would enable proper preparation,
thereby effectuating fairness amongst all capital cases.63'
California law does not require a review for disparity between areas within the state. California does provide a
means by which public defenders throughout the state may
apply for money for assistance from experts, investigators,
and others, including second counsel.632 No provision accommodates other trial related expenses, however, which might
place a significant burden on small or rural public defender
offices.
Recommendation 80:
The work of the State Appellate Defender's office in providing statewide trial support in capital cases should continue, and funds should be appropriated for this pur633
pose.
The California State Public Defender's Office and the
State California Appellate Project (CAP) are both understaffed and underfunded. Despite that fact, they both do an
outstanding job of assisting other capital counsel. Their efforts largely focus on appointed appellate and habeas counsel,
however. Appointed counsel at the trial level and retained
counsel can avail themselves of the expertise of individuals at
the State Public Defender and CAP, but they have no formal
statewide support system. Education and training of trial
level counsel are left to privately funded organizations, such
as the California Public Defenders Association and California
Attorneys for Criminal Justice.

628.
629.
630.
631.
632.

Id. at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 181.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West 2003).

633. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 181.
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Recommendation 81:
The Commission supports the recommendations in the
Report of the Task Force on ProfessionalPracticein the Illinois Justice System to reduce the burden of student
loans on those entering criminaljustice careers and improve salarylevels and pension contributions for those in
the6 3system
in order to insure retention of qualified coun4
sel.

Current California law provides for some assistance to
public defenders and prosecutors on student loans.635 Private
lawyers appointed to represent indigent capital defenders
bear the burden of a large part of the capital litigation in
California, yet receive no assistance. 6 Certainly, the salaries
of public defenders at all levels could be increased significantly to attract the most qualified lawyers for death penalty
cases.
Recommendation 82.
Adequate funding should be provided by the [state] to all
[state]police agencies to pay for the electronic recording
equipment, personnel and facilities needed to conduct
electronicrecordingsin homicide cases.637

Police agencies receive state money in various forms, but
the earmarked funds are inadequate for the purposes of implementing the recommendations of the Illinois Commission
regarding recording of interviews, interrogations, and identification procedures.
13.

GeneralRecommendations:Recommendations
83 Through 85

The Illinois Commission made three general recommendations which pertain to improving the capital system and

634. Id. at 182.
635. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 69740-69748 (West 2003). Effective Jan. 1,
2002, these statutes provide for $2,000 per year up to a total of $11,000 contribution to student loans. Id. At the time of this writing, however, the program
has not been funded. Interview with Jim Egar, Public Defender for Santa Barbara County, Cal., in Santa Barbara, Cal. (Sept. 11, 2003).
636. Dave Orrick, Fund Created to Pay for Quality Death Penalty Defense
Attorneys Runs Dry,CHI. DAILY HERALD, Aug. 9, 2002.
637. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 5, at 183.
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avoiding errors."' The Commission recommends applying the
recommendations to non-capital cases, collecting and disseminating comparative information throughout the judicial
system, and encouraging the reporting of attorney misconduct
to the state bar.
Recommendation 83:
The Commission strongly urges consideration of ways to
broaden the application of many of the recommendations
made by the Commission
to improve the criminaljustice
639
system as a whole.

California law does not follow most of the recommendations, and therefore, no attempt to broaden the application of
such recommendations to non-capital cases has been made.
All three branches of government within the state of California will have to work independently and coordinate with each
other to effectuate these necessary changes. Once that is underway, California could begin to consider how to improve the
criminal justice system as a whole. Many of the recommendations, such as those regarding police practices, forensics,
and funding could transfer directly to non-capital litigation.
Recommendation 84:
Information should be collected at the trial level with respect to prosecutionsof first degree murder cases, by trial
judges, which would detail information that could prove
valuable in assessingwhether the death penaltyis, in fact,
being fairly applied. Data should be collected on a form
which provides details about the trial, the background of
the defendant, and the basis for the sentence imposed. The
forms should be collected by the [state's administrativeoffice of the courts] and the form from an indiidual case
should not be a public record. Data collected from the
forms should be public, and should be maintained in a
public access database by the CriminalJustice Information Authority. 4

Some data is collected but no systematic collection of data
on the details of capital cases and the background of the defendant is or has been obtained sufficient to conduct a mean638. Id. at 186-206.
639. Id. at 187.
640. Id. at 188-89.
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ingful analysis as recommended by the Illinois Commission.
Recommendation 85.
Judges should be reminded of their obligation under
Canon 3 to report violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct by prosecutorsand defense lawyers.61
The California Code of Judicial Ethics suggests that a
judge has an ethical duty to "take appropriate corrective action" if the judge has personal knowledge that a lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 2
The judge has no duty to report the violations to the state bar
or to take any other specific action unless a defense lawyer
has been found to have provided ineffective assistance of
counsel. No similar provision pertains to prosecutors.
V. NEED FOR A MORATORIUM AND FURTHER STUDY
The Illinois Commission has made eighty-five specific
recommendations to try to avoid the travesty, documented in
its state, of condemning the innocent to death while the real
killers are free to kill again. Connecticut, Nevada, Arizona,
and other states have recognized the wisdom of many of these
same recommendations.
It is clear that the death penalty system in California is
broken. California's system has condemned 622 people to its
death row. Most have never had their cases reviewed by the
courts, and many do not even have lawyers to initiate a review. 3 California has recently enacted standards for lawyers
appointed to handle capital trials, but they do not help this
large population who did not have the benefit of these new
rules. Yet, even these new rules do not meet Illinois standards, leaving California's current compliance with the Illinois Recommendations at a mere 6.17%.
We know that there are innocent people condemned to

641. Id. at 191.
642. CAL. CT. R., APPENDIX: CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Cannon D(2).
643. Approximately 140 of the 622 prisoners on California's death row do not
have an attorney representing them. Interview with Michael Millman, supra
note 18. Another 110 have an appellate lawyer, but no attorney to prepare and
file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Id. As of March 31, 2002, only 189 of
the 610 prisoners had their sentences affirmed by the California Supreme Court
or reversed on appeal. CONDEMNED INMATE SUMMARY, supranote 3, at 103.
644. See infra Part IV.
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die in California. To assume otherwise would fly in the face
of what we know from other jurisdictions and would ignore
the real infirmities already identified in California's death
penalty system. Taking a conservative figure from Illinois'
experience and the history of exonerations nationwide, we
must assume that at least ten percent of the condemned people in California are innocent." 5 That means that over sixty
innocent people are awaiting death, over sixty killings have
been unsolved, and over sixty real killers have not been identified.
This article simply brings the problem to the forefront. It
does not identify or answer all of the questions which need to
be asked. It certainly does not solve the problems. The problems need to be addressed systematically and hundreds of
cases need to be scrutinized individually. Systemic changes
need to be made consistent with the Illinois Commission Report. Even then, the penal system, which is susceptible to the
frailties of human nature, cannot ensure that California will
not execute the innocent or that it will not convict based on
race, geography, poverty, mental illness, or mere randomness.
At the very least, California must impose a moratorium
on executions while these problems are studied. The call for a
moratorium of executions throughout the death penalty
states has been surveyed by Jeffrey Kirchmeier in an article
published in the University of Colorado Law Review .4 6 A
moratorium on executions may engender emotion and political debate. With a system as broken as California's, however,
what is needed is a rational and dispassionate look at what is
really happening in this state, around the country, and, for
that matter, the world.

645. See id.
646. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty
MoratoriumMovement in the UnitedStates, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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Appendix
The Illinois Recommendations: Comparison to California
Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 1: After a suspect has been
identified, the police
should continue to pursue
all reasonable quiry
lines
of in-wheher
hesesue
quiry, whether these
point towards or away
from the suspect.
Recommendation 2: (a)
The police must list on
schedules all existing
items of relevant evidence, including exculpatory evidence, and their
location. (b) Record-keeping obligations
must be assigned to specific police officers or employees, who must certify
their compliance in writing to the prosecutor. (c)
The police must give copies of the schedules to the
prosecution. (d) The police
must give the prosecutor
access to all investigatory
materials in their possession.

California
Compliance

NOT MET

NOT MET

Comments on
California Law
Ntrqie
ne
Not
required under
current California law,
and current case law
excuses failure to purleads, interview
witnesses and collect
evidence.

No requirement under
current California law.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 3: In a
death eligible case, representation by the public
defender during a custodial interrogation should
be authorized by the
[state] legislature when a
suspect requests the advice of counsel, and where
there is a reasonable belief that the suspect is indigent. To the extent that
there is some doubt about
the indigency of the suspect, police should resolve
the doubt in favor of allowing the suspect to have
access to the public defender.

Recommendation 4:
Custodial interrogations
of a suspect in a homicide
case occurring at a police
facility should be videotaped. Videotaping should
not include merely the
statement made by the
suspect after interrogation, but the entire inter-

[Vol: 44

California
Compliance

Comments on
California Law

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.
The public defender is
only appointed for
adults at the arraignment. Therefore, invocation of right to counsel by an arrestee
results in returning
arrestee to custody until arraignment. Arrestees often "voluntarily" waive their right to
counsel while awaiting
arraignment. Also, it
is arguably permissible
for officers to deliberately violate Miranda
in order to obtain confessions which can be
used for further investigation and impeachment if the defendant
testifies.

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.
Video taping is common but not required.
Also, it is common to
video tape only after
preliminary discussions with the defendant have taken place.

rogation process.

Recommendation 5: Any
statements by a homicide
suspect which are not recorded should be repeated
to the suspect on tape,
and his or her comments
recorded.

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 6:
There are circumstances
in which videotaping may
not be practical, and some
uniform method of recording such interrogations, such as tape recording, should be
established. Police investigators should carry tape
recorders for use when
interviewing suspects in
homicide cases outside
the station, and all such
interviews should be
audiotaped.
Recommendation 7: The
[state eavesdropping act]
should be amended to
permit police taping of
statements without the
suspects' knowledge or
consent in order to enable
the videotaping and audio
taping of statements as
recommended by the
Commission. The amendment should apply only to
homicide cases, where the
suspect is aware that the
person asking the
question is a police officer,
Recommendation 8: The
police should electronically record interviews
conducted of significant
witnesses in homicide
cases where it is reasonably foreseeable that their
testimony may be challenged at trial.
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California
Compliance

Comments on
California Law

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.

NOT MET

NOT MET

California Penal Code
Section 633 allows a
blanket exception to
the California "eavesdropping statutes" for
law enforcement personnel or anyone acting at their direction.
Therefore, there is no
restriction that the
suspect be aware that
he is talking with a police officer or that, in
fact, the person be a
police officer.

No requirement under
current California law.
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Illinois Commission
California
Report
Cali n ce
Recommendation
Compliance
Recommendation 9: Police should be required to
make a reasonable attempt to determine the
suspect's mental capacity
before interrogation, and
if a suspect is determined
NOT MET
to be mentally retarded,
the police should be limited to asking nonleading
questions and prohibited
from implying they believe the suspect is guilty.
Recommendation 10:
When practicable, police
departments should insure that the person who
conducts the lineup
or betigating
photsprad
no
houl NOT MET
photospread should not be
aware of which member of
the lineup or photo spread
is the suspect.
Recommendation 11:
(a) Eyewitnesses should
be told explicitly that the
suspected perpetrator
might not be in the the
lineup or photospread,
and therefore they should
not feel they must make
NOT MET
an identification.
(b) Eyewitnesses should
also be told that they
should not assume that
the person administering
the lineup or photospread
knows which person is the
suspect in the case.

[Vol: 44

Comments on
C o rna Ln
California Law

No requirement under
current California law.

No requirement under
current California law.
curre Cacticenia law.
Police practice is contrary in that
theusuinvesofficers
ally conduct the
identification procedures.

No requirement under
current California law.
A requirement similar
to (a) is often followed
bt is otequired
but is not required, and
there is no requirement similar to (b).
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 12: If
the administrator of the
lineup or photospread
does not know who the
suspect is, a sequential
procedure should be used,
so that the eyewitness
views only one lineup
member or photo at a
time and makes a decision (that is the perpetrator or that is not the perpetrator) regarding each
person before viewing another lineup member or
photo.
Recommendation 13:
Suspects should not stand
out in the lineup or photo
spread as being different
from the distractors,
based on the eyewitnesses' previous description of the perpetrator, or
based on other factors
that would draw attention
to the suspect.

California
Compliance

NOT MET

NOT MET

Comments on
California Law
No requirement under
current California law.
(This writer believes
that this recommendation should be instituted only if the procedure is "double-blind"
since there would be a
greater risk of suggestibility if the administrator knew the suspect's identity and
showed subjects to the
witness one at a time.)
No requirement under
current California law.
Current case law may
require suppression at
trial of an unduly suggestive line-up or photospread. However,
the specifics of this
recommendation are
not met. Also, research
shows that a false
identification at an improper line-up or photo
spread can significantly contaminate the
identifying witnesses'
testimony.
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Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 14: A
clear written statement
should be made of any
statements made by the
eyewitness at the time of
the identification procedure as to his or her confidence that the identified
person is or is not the actual culprit. This statement should be recorded
prior to any feedback by
law enforcement personnel.
Recommendation 15:
When practicable, the police should videotape
lineup procedures, including the witness' confidence statement.

California
Compliance

NOT MET

NOT MET

[Vol: 44
Comments on
California Law

No requirement under
current California law.
(See comment for Recommendation 13 regarding contamination
of witness testimony.)

No requirement under
current California law.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 16: All
police who work on homicide cases should receive
periodic training in the
following areas, and experts on these subjects
should be retained to conduct training and prepare
manuals on these topics:
1. The risks of false testimony by in-custody informants ("jailhouse
snitches").
2. The risks of false testimony by accomplice witnesses.
3. The dangers of tunnel
vision or confirmatory
bias.
4. The risks of wrongful
convictions in homicide
cases.
5. Police investigative and
interrogation methods.
6. Police investigating
and reporting of exculpatory evidence.
7. Forensic evidence.
8. The risks of false confessions.
Recommendation 17: Police academies, police
agencies, and the [department of corrections]
should include within
their training curricula
information on consular
rights and the notification
obligations to be followed
during the arrest and detention of foreign nationals.

California
Compliance

Comments on
California Law

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.
There may be some
training on this issue
but it is not mandatory
nor is it universal.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 18: The
[state attorney general]
should remind all law enforcement agencies of
their notification
obligation
VinnaVCCR.
undr te
tions under the Vienna
Convention on Consular
Relations and undertake
regular reviews of the
measures taken by state
and local police to ensure
full compliance. This
could include publication
of a guide based on the
U.S. State Department
Manual.
Recommendation 19: The
statue relating to the
[state law enforcement
training standards board]
should be amended to add
police perjury of
(regardless
s wethr
acurrent thre
of whether there is a
criminal conviction) as a
basis upon which the
Board may revoke certification of a peace officer.
Recommendation 20: An
independent state forensic laboratory should be
created, operated by civilian personnel, with its
own budget, separate
from any policy agency or
supervision.

California
Compliance

NOT MET

[Vol: 44
Comments on
California Law

California Penal Code
Section 834(c) now requires advisement of
rires ademe
rights under
the
It is unknown
how much discussion of
this issue has occurred
or the extent to which
it has reached the offiworking on actual
cases. o n
requirement of regular
reviews to ensure full
compliance.

NOT MET

No requirement
under
California
law.

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.
The State of California
does have a State Department of Justice Forensic Laboratory
within its Division of
Law Enforcement.
However, it is not independent and is used
selectively by law enforcement. It is not
available for use by the
defense, even on court
order.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 21:
Adequate funding should
be provided by the [state]
to hire and train both entry level and supervisory
level forensic scientists to
support expansion of DNA
testing and evaluation
Support should also be
provided for additional
up-to-date facilities for
DNA testing. The State
should be prepared to
outsource by sending evidence to private companies for analysis when
appropriate.
Recommendation 22: The
Commission supports the
[state supreme court rule]
establishing minimum
standards for DNA evidence.
Recommendation 23: The
Federal government and
[state] should provide
adequate funding to enable the development of a
comprehensive DNA database.
Recommendation 24:
[State] statutes should be
amended to provide that
in a capital case a defendant may apply to the
court for an order to obtain a search of the DNA
database to identify others who may be guilty of
the crime.

California
Compliance

NOT MET

NOT MET

NOT MET

NOT MET

Comments on
California Law

No requirement under
current California law.
Some funding and outsourcing is available
but not to the degree
required by the recommendation.

No requirement under
current California law.

No requirement under
current federal or state
law. The proposed Innocence Protection Act
has not been enacted.

No requirement under
current California law.
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Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 25: In
capital cases forensic testing, including DNA testing pursuant to [state
law], should be permitted
where it has a scientific
potential to produce new,
noncummulative evidence
relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual
innocence, even though
the results may not completely exonerate the defendant.
Recommendation 26: The
provisions governing the
Capital Litigation Trust
Fund should be construed
broadly so as to provide a
source of funding for forensic testing pursuant to
[state law] when the defendant faces the possibility of a capital sentence.
...

Recommendation 27: The
current list of 20 eligibility factors should be reduced to a smaller number.

California
Compliance

NOT MET

MET WITH
QUALIFICATIONS

NOT MET

[Vol: 44
Comments on
California Law

No requirement under
current California law.
California Penal Code
Sections 1405 and
1054.9(e), effective
January 1, 2003, adJany
s,
of the
dress only some of the
mendation.

California Penal Code
Section 987.9 provides
for the funds for capital
defense at the trial
level in cases where
the defendant can
show indigence.
Individual trial court
judges have wide discretion to grant or deny
particular requests.
Furthermore, funds
available on direct appeal and habeas corpus
proceedings are limited
and are insufficient for
expensive procedures
or complex cases.
California currently
has a list of 25 separate eligibility factors
under California Penal
Code Section 190.2 and
the additional sections
referred to in 190.3,
many of which have
subparts.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 28:
There should be only five
eligibility factors: [murder
of multiple persons, murder of a police officer or
firefighter, murder of an
officer or inmate in a correctional institution,
murder to obstruct justice, and murder involving torture.]
Recommendation 29: The
[state attorney general]
and the [state's prosecutor association] should
adopt recommendations
as to the procedures
[prosecutors] should follow in deciding whether
or not to seek the death
penalty, but these recommendations should not
have the force of law, or
be imposed by court rule
or legislation.

California
Compliance

NOT MET

NOT MET

Comments on
California Law

See comment for
Recommendation 27.

There is great disparity in the filing decisions from county to
county in California,
which gives rise to serious geographical denial of equal protection.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 30: The
death sentencing statute
should be revised to include a mandatory review
of death eligibility undertaken by a state-wide review committee. In the
absence of legislative action to make this a mandatory scheme, the Governor should make a
commitment to setting up
a voluntary review process, supported by the presumption that the Governor will commute the
death sentences of defendants when the prosecutor has not participated in
the voluntary review
process, unless the prosecutor can offer a compelling explanation, based on
exception circumstances,
for the failure to submit
the case for review....
Recommendation 31: The
Commission supports [Illinois] Supreme Court
Rule 416(c), requiring
that the state announce
its intention to seek the
death penalty, and the
factors to be relied upon,
as soon as practicable but
in no event later than 120
days after arraignment.

[Vol: 44

California
Compliance

Comments on
California Law

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.
The death penalty itself can be elected at
almost any time by the
prosecutor and even
after initially declining
to pursue it. California
Penal Code Section
190.3 requires the
prosecution to disclose
aggravating evidence
within a "reasonable
time" prior to trial, but
there is no requirement its intention to
seek the death penalty
at a particular time or
to announce the factors
to be relied upon.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 32: The
[state supreme court]
should give consideration
to encouraging the [state
administrative office of
the courts] to undertake a
concerted effort to educate
trial judges throughoutjudicial
the state in the parameters of the Capital Crimes
Litigation Act and the
funding sources available
for defense of capital
cases.
Recommendation 33: The
Commission supports [expanded judicial training
be required prior to assignment of a capital case
to a judge.]
Recommendation 34: In
light of the changes in the
Illinois Supreme Court
rules governing the discovery procedures capital
cases, the Supreme Court
should give consideration
to ways the Court can insure that particularized
training is provided to
trial judges with respect
to implementation of the
new rules governing capital litigation, especially
with respect to the management of the discovery
process.
Recommendation 35: All
judges who are trying
capital cases should receive periodic training in
the following areas, and
experts on these subjects
should be retained to conduct training and prepare
manuals on these topics:
[same as topics required
for police in Recommendation 16.]
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California
Compliance

Comments on
California Law

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law
although there is noneducation.

NOT MET

NOT MET

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.

No requirement under
current California law.

No requirement under
current California law.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 36: The
Illinois Supreme Court,
and the [administrative
office of the courts] should
consider development of
and provide sufficient
funding for state-wide
materials to train judges
in capital cases, and additional staff to provide research support.
Recommendation 37: The
Illinois Supreme Court
should consider ways in
which information regarding relevant law and
other resources can be
widely disseminated to
those trying capital cases,
through development of a
digest of applicable law by
the Supreme Court and
wider publican of the outline of issues developed by
the State Appellate Defender or the State Appellate Prosecutor and/or Attorney General.

[Vol: 44

California

Comments on

Compliance

California Law

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.
California has some
resources but training
is not mandatory and
does not meet the recommendations.

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 38: The
Illinois Supreme Court, or
the chief judges of the
various judicial districts
throughout the state,
should consider implementation of a process to
certify judges who are
qualified to hear capital
cases either by virtue of
experience or training.
Trial court judges should
be certified as qualified to
hear capital cases based
upon completion of specialized training and
based upon their experience in hearing criminal
cases. Only such certified
judges should hear capital
cases.
Recommendation 39: The
[state supreme court]
should consider appointment of a standing committee of trial judges
and/or appellate justices
familiar with capital
cases management to
provide resources to trial
judges throughout the
state who are responsible
for trying capital cases.
Recommendation 40: The
Commission supports new
Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 416(d) regarding
qualifications for counsel
in capital cases.

California
Compliance

California Law

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.

NOT MET

NOT MET

Comments on

No requirement under
current California law.

No requirement under
current California law
regarding minimum
qualifications for retained counsel. There
are minimum requirements for appointed
counsel at trial and on
direct appeal and habeas corpus, but these
do not apply to retained counsel.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 41: The
Commission supports new
Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 701(b) which imposes the requirement
that those appearing as
lead or co-counsel in a
capital case be first admitted to the Capital
Litigation Bar under Rule
714.
Recommendation 42: The
Commission supports new
Illinois Supreme Court
rule 714 which imposes
requirements on the
qualifications of attorneys
handling capital cases.
Recommendation 43: The
office of the State Appellate Defender should facilitate the dissemination
of information with respect to defense counsel
qualified under the proposed Supreme Court
process.
Recommendation 44: The
commission supports efforts to have training for
prosecutors and defenders
in capital litigation, and
to have funding provided
to insure that training
programs continue to be
of the highest quality,

[Vol: 44

California
Compliance

Comments on
California Law

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.

NOT MET

NOT MET

NOT MET

See comment for
Secomment for
Recommendation 40.

No requirement under
current California law.

No requirement under
current California law,
particularly with respect to public funding.
Limited programs in
recent years have been
funded and provided by
the Habeas Corpus Resource Center. Private
organizations, such as
the California Public
Defender's Association
and the California Attorneys for Criminal
Justice, hold more extensive training sessions which are available to capital case
defense lawyers.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 45: All
prosecutors and defense
lawyers who are members
of the Capital Trial Bar
who are trying capital
cases should receive periodic training in the following areas, and experts
on these subjects should
be retained to conduct
training and prepare
manuals on these topics:
[same as topics required
for police and judges in
Recommendations 16 and
35.]
Recommendation 46: The
Commission supports new
Illinois Supreme Court
rule 416(e) which permits
discovery deposition in
capital cases on leave of
the court for good cause.
Recommendation 47: The
Commission supports the
provisions of the new Illinois Supreme Court rule
416(f) mandating case
management conferences
in capital cases. The Illinois Supreme Court
should consider adoption
of a rule requiring a final
case management conferences in capital cases to
insure that there has
been compliance with the
newly mandated rules,
that discovery is complete
and that the case is fully
prepared for trial.
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California
Compliance

Comments on
California Law

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.

NOT MET

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.

No requirement under
current California law.
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Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 48: The
Commission supports Illinois Supreme Court Rule
416(g) which requires
that a certificate be filed
by the state indicating
that a conference has
been held with all those
persons who participated
in the investigation or
trial preparation of the
case, and that all the information required to be
disclosed has been disclosed.

[Vol: 44

California
Compliance

Comments on
California Law

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.

2003]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 49: The
Illinois Supreme Court
should adopt a rule defining "exculpatory evidence"
in order to provide guidance to counsel in making
appropriate disclosures.
The Commission recommends the following definition: "Exculpatory information includes, but
may not be limited to, all
information that is material and favorable to the
defendant because it
tends to: (1) Cast doubt on
defendant's guilt as to any
essential element in any
count in the indictment or
information; (2) Cast
doubt on the admissibility
of evidence that the state
anticipates offering in its
case-in-chief that might
be subject to a motion to
suppress or exclude; (3)
Cast doubt on the credibility or accuracy of any
evidence that the state
anticipates offering in its
case-in-chief; or (4) Diminish the degree of the
defendant's culpability or
mitigate the defendant's
potential sentence.
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California
Compliance

Comments on
California Law

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.
There is federal and
state case law on exculpatory evidence but
no statute or rule
implementing the
broad definition contained in the
recommendation requiring disclosure.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 50: Illinois law should require
that any discussions with
a witness or the representative of a witness concerning benefits, potential
benefits or detriments
conferred on a witness by
any prosecutor, police official, corrections official,
or anyone else, should be
reduced to writing, and
should be disclosed to the
defense in advance of
trial.
Recommendation 51:
Whenever the state introduces the testimony of an
in-custody informant who
has agreed to testify for
the prosecution in a capital case to a statement
allegedly made by the defendant, at either the
guilt or sentencing phase,
the state should promptly
inform the defense as to
the identification and
background of the witness.

[Vol: 44

California

Comments on

Compliance

California Law

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.

NOT MET

Disclosure is governed
by federal law, e.g.,
Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), and
by California Penal
Code Section 1054.1.
Neither the timing nor
the extent of disclosure
as recommended is required under current
California law.

2003]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 52: (a)
Prior to trial, the trial
judge shall hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the reliability
and admissibility of the
in-custody informant's
testimony at either the
guilt or sentencing phase.
(b) at the pre-evidentiary
hearing, the trial judge
shall use the following
standards: ... (1) The
specific statements to
which the witness will
testify. (2) The time and
place, and other circumstances of the alleged
statements. (3) Any deal
or inducement made by
the informant and the police or prosecutor in exchange for the witness'
testimony. (4) The criminal history of the witness.
(5) Whether the witness
has ever recanted his/her
testimony. (6) Other cases
in which the witness testified to alleged confessions
by others. (7) Any other
evidence that may attest
to or diminish the credibility of the witness, including the presence or
absence of any relationship between the accused
and the witness....

California
Compliance

NOT MET

Comments on
California Law

California Evidence
Code Section 402 provides for an in limine
hearing on the admissibility of evidence.
However, current California law does not require the court to consider the criteria set
forth.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 53: In
capital cases, courts
should closely scrutinize
any tactic that misleads
the suspect as to the
strength of the evidence
against him/her, or the
likelihood of his/her guilt,
in order to determine
whether this tactic would
be likely to introduce an
involuntary or untrustworthy confession.
Recommendation 54: The
Commission makes no
recommendation about
whether or not plea negotiations should be restricted with respect to
the death penalty.

[Vol: 44

California

Comments on

Compliance

California Law

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law.

NOT MET

While the Commission
could not come to a
specific recommendation on restrictions on
coercive plea bargaining, it did so in the context of its other recommendations being
adopted. First, there
are no restrictions on
coercive plea bargaining in California of the
sort contemplated in
the Report. Second, the
failure to make specific
recommendations was
premised specifically
on the prior recommendations that (a) the
eligibility factors be
limited to five (there
are at least 25 under
California law) and (b)
there be a review process on the selection of
cases for death. Therefore, California fails to
meet these criteria and
is susceptible to the
abuse of coercive plea
bargaining addressed
in this section of the
Report.

2003]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Illincis Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 55:
Expert testimony with
respect to the problem associated with eyewitness
testimony may be helpful
in appropriate cases. Determinations as to
whether such evidence
may be admitted should
be resolved by the trial
judge on a case by case
basis.
Recommendation 56:
Jury instructions with
respect to eyewitness testimony should enumerate
factors for the jury to consider, including the difficulty of making a
cross-racial identification.
The [model jury instructions] should also be
amended to add a final
sentence which states as
follows: Eyewitness testimony should be carefully examined in light of
other evidence in the case.
Recommendation 57: The
[state committee on pattern criminal jury instructions] should consider a jury instruction
providing special caution
with respect to the reliability of the testimony of
in-custody informants.
Recommendation 58: [A
special jury should be
given when a confession is
not recorded.]
Recommendation 59: Ilinois courts should continue to reject the results
of polygraph examination
during the innocence/guilt
phase of capital trials.
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California
Compliance

Comments on
California Law

CONSTITUTIONALLY
REQUIRED

No requirement under
current California
statutory law. The requirement appears to
be mandated by the
Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments and California case law.

No requirement under
current California law.
California Jury Instructions - Criminal
(CALJIC) 2.92 does
contain some criteria
for evaluating eyewitness identifications. It
is not required to be
given sua sponte, it is
limited to cases where
there is "no substantial
corroborative evidence," and it does not
contain the cautionary
admonition.

NOT MET

NOT MET

MET

No requirement under
current California law.

No requirement under
current California law.
Seemingly required by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
However, there is some
dispute in other states
and California case law
does meet this requirement.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 60: The
Commission supports the
new amendments to [Illinois] Supreme Court Rule
[611] which makes the
rules of discovery applicable to the sentencing
phase of capital cases.
Recommendation 61: The
mitigating factors considered by the jury in the
death penalty sentencing
scheme should be expanded to include the defendant's history of extreme emotional or
physical abuse, and that
the defendant suffers
from reduced mental capacity.

Recommendation 62: The
defendant should have
the right to make a
statement on his own behalf during the aggravation/mitigation phase,
without being subject to
cross-examination.
Recommendation 63: The
jury should be instructed
as to the alternative sentences that may be imposed in the event that
the death penalty is not
imposed.

California
Compliance

MET WITH
QUALIFICATIONS

NOT MET

NOT MET

CONSTITUTIONALLY
REQUIRED

[Vol: 44
Comments on
California Law

California Penal Code
Section 190.3 requires
discovery to be provided to the defense,
however, the timing
and detail of the Illinois Rule is more favorable to the defense.
California Penal Code
Section 190.3 (d) and
(h) present mental
health issues to the
jury, however, there is
no provision to specifically include the "defendant's history of extreme emotional or
physical abuse." Section 190.3 (k) is a catch
all provision required
under the federal Constitution to cover other
mitigating evidence.
To the extent that this
recommendation goes
beyond that which is
required by the federal
Constitution, it is not
met.

There is no right to allocution under current
California law.

This recommendation
follows the federal requirement under Kelley v. South Carolina
534 U.S. 246 (2002).

2003]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 64:
[The state] courts should
continue to reject the results of polygraph examinations during the sentencing phase of capital
trials.
Recommendation 65: The
statute which establishes
the method by which the
jury should arrive at its
sentence should be
amended to include language... to make it clear
that the jury should
weigh factors in the case
and reach its own independent conclusion about
whether the death penalty should be imposed.
The statute should be
amended to read as follows: If the jury unanimously, after weighing
the factors in aggravation
and mitigation, that
death is the appropriate
sentence....
Recommendation 66: After the jury renders its
judgment with respect to
the imposition of the
death penalty, the trial
judge should be required
to indicate on the record
whether he or she concurs
in the result. In cases
where the trial judge does
not concur in the imposition of the death penalty,
the defendant shall be
sentenced to natural life
as a mandatory alternative (assuming adoption of
a new death penalty
scheme limited to five
eligibility factors).
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California
Compliance

Comments on
California Law

MET

California case law still
prohibits the introduction of polygraph rets atpoly g
.
suits at sentencing.

MET

CALJIC 8.88 states,
"To return a judgment
of death, each of you
must be persuaded
that the aggravating
circumstances are so
substantial in comparison with the mitigating
circumstances that it
warrants death instead
of life without parole."
The term "unanimously" is not used but
unanimity is required
by this instruction.

NOT MET

California Penal Code
Section 190.4(e) requires the trial judge
to reweigh the evidence
presented to the penalty phase jury. Howalthe
juge However, the judge decides
contrary to the law or
the evidence. This
standard is more liberal than that applied
era tin
for ne
trial but is not the
sal as ing
whether or not the
judge concurs in the
verdict of death.
verdict of death.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 67: In
any case approved for
capital punishment under
the new death penalty
scheme with five eligibility factors, if the finder of
fact determines that
death is not the appropriate sentence, the mandatory alternative sentence
would be natural life.

Recommendation 68:
[The state] should adopt a
statute which prohibits
the imposition of the
death penalty for those
defendants found to be
mentally retarded. The
best model to follow in
terms of specific language
is that found in the Tennessee statute.
Recommendation 69:
[The state] should adopt a
statute which provides: A.
The uncorroborated testimony of an in-custody
informant witness
concerning the confession
or admission of the defendant may not be the sole
basis for the imposition of
the death penalty. B.
Convictions for murder
based upon the testimony
of a single eyewitness or
accomplice without any
other corroboration,
should not be death eligible under any circumstances.

California
Compliance

NOT MET

CONSTITUTIONALLY
REQUIRED

NOT MET

[Vol: 44
Comments on
California Law

After a finding of special circumstances in
California, the two sentencing options are
death or life without
possibility of parole.
However, the recommendation of "natural
life" in Illinois would
be limited to the five
eligibility factors
whereas there are over
25 under Penal Code
Section 190.2 and the
sections referred to in
190.3.

The recommendation is
consistutionally mandated by Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304
(2002).

No requirement under
current California law.

2003]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 70: In
capital cases the [state]
Supreme Court should
consider on direct appeal
(1) whether the sentence
was imposed due to some
arbitrary factor, (2)
whether an independent
weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances indicates
death was the proper sentence, and (3) whether the
sentence of death was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.
Recommendation 71:
Rule 3.8 of the Illinois
Supreme Court Rules of
Professional Conduct
[ABA Model Rule 3.9],
Special Responsibilities of
a Prosecutor, should be
amended in paragraph (c)
by the addition of [language concerning the ongoing duty to turn over
exculpatory information].
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California

Comments on

Compliance

California Law

NOT MET

No requirement under
current California law
to do a proportionality
review. There is an
independent weighing
of sorts by the trial
judge under Penal
Code Section 190.4(e).
However, the
recommendation that
the Supreme Court reweigh in addition to
the trial court's concurrence is not followed in
California.

NOT MET

There are no special
rules of professional
conduct promulgated
by the California Supreme Court for prosecutors. State and federal case law suggests
that prosecutors are
held to higher standards. California Penal Code Sections
1054.9(a) and (b) were
added, effective January 1, 2003, permitting
post-conviction discovery upon request and a
showing of good cause.
However, there is no
rule creating an ongoing ethical duty upon
the prosecution to turn
over excuplatory information.

228

SANTA CLARA LA WREVIEW

Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 72: The
Post-Conviction Hearing
Act should be amended to
provide that a petition for
a post-conviction proceeding in a capital case
should be filed within 6
months after the issuance
of the mandate by the Supreme Court following
affirmance of the direct
appeal from the trial,

Recommendation 73: The
Illinois Post-Conviction
Hearing Act should be
amended to provide that
the trial court should convene the evidentiary hearing on the petition within
one year of the date the
petition is filed.

California
Compliance

NOT MET

NOT MET

[Vol: 44
Comments on
California Law

The Illinois Commission recommends that
the time for filing a
post-conviction petition
(a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus in California) be after the direct appeal is concluded. California
Supreme Court Policy
3:1-1.1 requires that
the Petition be filed
180 days after the Reply Brief is due on direct appeal. The practical effect, however, is
still to require the filing of the Petition before the direct appeal is
concluded.
There is no time period
under current California law and, more importantly, no requirement of an evidentiary
hearing at all.

2003]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 74: The
Post-Conviction Hearing
Act should be amended to
provide that in capital
cases, a proceeding may
be initiated in cases in
which there is newly discovered evidence which
offers a substantial basis
to believe that the defendant is actually innocent,
and such proceedings
should be available at any
time following the defendant's conviction regardless of other provisions of
the Act limiting the time
within such proceedings
can be initiated. In order
to prevent frivolous petitions, the Act should provide that in proceedings
asserting a claim of actual
innocence, the court may
make an initial determination with or without a
hearing that the claim is
frivolous.
Recommendation 75:
[State] law should provide
that after all appeals
have been exhausted and
the Attorney General applies for a final execution
date for the defendant, a
clemency petition may not
be filed later than 30 days
after the date [after the
setting of] an execution
date.

California
C
Compliance

NOT MET

NOT MET

229
Comments on
California Law

There is no requirement under current
California law. A Petition for Writ of Coram
Nobis (or Vobis) may
be filed under common
law but is disfavored
by the courts. Bars to
successive litigation
effectively defeat the
recommendation's purpose.

The California Constitution, Article 8, Section V, has been interpreted to provide the
Governor with the
power to grant clemency in death penalty
cases. California Penal
Code Sections 4800 et
seq. set forth procedures primarily for
non-death cases. The
procedure is almost
entirely discretionary.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 76:
Leaders
in both
the executive and
legislative
bracuties shod
legitie
branches should significantly improve the resources available to the
criminal justice system in
order iguimlmnainof
to permit the meaningful implementation ofnois
reforms in capital cases.
Recommendation 77:
The Capital Crimes Litigation Act,... which is
the state statute containing the Capital Litigation
Trust Fund and other
provisions, should be reauthorized by the General
Assembly.

Recommendation 78: The
Commission supports the
concept articulated in the
statute governing the
Capital Litigation Trust
Fund, that adequate compensation be provided to
trial counsel in capital
cases for both time and
expense, and encourages
regular consideration of
the hourly rates authorized under the statute to
reflect the actual market
rates of private attorneys,

California
Compliance

NOT MET

NOT APPLICABLE

NOT MET

[Vol: 44
Comments on
California Law

Some attention is being
giv
isbeing
given ento
to capital
case
litigation by the legislative and executive
branches but actual
reforms are not being
implemented as conimpl tedby the
as contemplated
IlliCommission.
noisCommission.
Because California
does not have such an
Act and, it could be argued that recommendation is not met. On
the other hand, this is
arguably peculiar to
Illinois and, therefore,
the recommendation
should be deemed inapplicable.
Hourly rates for appointed counsel at the
trial and appellate levels are far below the
rates earned by competent private criminal
defense counsel. Furthermore, the courts,
and in particular the
California Supreme
Court, routinely reduce
the number of hours
for which they will
provide compensation
resulting in substantial
underpayment of counsel.

2003]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Illinois Commission
ReotComliance
Reportm[ai
Recommendation

1

Recommendation 79:
The provisions of the
Capital Litigation Trust
Fund should be construed
as broadly as possible to
insure that public defenders, particularly those in
rural parts of the state,
can effectively use its
provisions to secure additional counsel and reimbursement of all reasonable trial related expenses
in capital cases.

California
Compliance

NOT MET

Recommendation 80: The
work of the State Appellate Defender's office in
providing statewide trial
support in Capital Cases
should continue, and
funds should be appropriate for this purpose.
NOT MET

Comments on
Caormna Law
California Law
There is no requirement in current California law that there
be no disparity between areas within the
state. California Penal
Code Section 987.9 provides a basis for an
application by public
defenders throughout
the state for experts,
investigators and others, including second
counsel. However,
there is no provision to
accommodate other
trial related expenses
which might place a
significant burden on
small or rural public
defender offices. In
addition, the application for these funds is
subject to the discretion of the local judges
to a certain extent.
The California State
Public Defender's Office and CAP are both
understaffed and
underfunded. Despite
that fact, both do an
outstanding job of assisting other capital
counsel. However,
their efforts are largely
focused on appointed
appellate and habeas
counsel, leaving support and education to
largely privately
funded organizations
such as CPDA and
CACJ.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 81: The
Commission supports the
recommendation in the
Report of the Task Force
on Professional Practice
in the Illinois Justice System to reduce the burden
of student loans on those
entering criminal justice
careers and improve salary levels and pension
contributions for those in
the system in order to insure qualified counsel.
Recommendation 82:
Adequate funding should
be provided by the [state]
to all [state] police agencies to pay for the electronic recording equipment, personnel and
facilities needed to conduct electronic recordings
in homicide cases.
Recommendation 83: The
Commission strongly
urges consideration of
ways to broaden the application of many of the
recommendations made
by the Commission to improve the criminal justice
system as a whole.

[Vol: 44

California

Comments on

Compliance

California Law

NOT MET

Under current California law, public defenders and prosecutors
receive some assistance
on student
loans. Privt
ayrwoba
vate lawyers, who bear
the burden of a large
part of the capital litigation in California,
receive no assistance.

NOT MET

NOT MET

Police agencies receive
state money in various
forms but none is earmarked specifically for
these purposes (to the
thee
of the
knowledge of this
wrter).
California law does not
meet the recommendations regarding capital
cases and, therefore,
there is no attempt to
broaden the application of such recommendations to noncapital cases.

2003]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 84: Information should be collected at the trial level
with respect to prosecutions of first degree murder cases, by trial judges,
which would detail
information that could
prove valuable in assessing whether the death
penalty is, in fact, being
fairly applied. Data
should be collected on a
form which provides details about the trial, the
background of the defendant, and the basis for the
sentence imposed. The
forms should be collected
by the [state's administrative office of the
courts], and the form from
an individual case should
not be a public record.
Data collected from the
forms should be public,
and should be maintained
in a public access
database by the Criminal
Justice Information Authoritv.

California
Compliance

NOT MET

233

Comments on
California Law

Some data is collected
but (to the knowledge
of this writer) no systematic collection of
data on the details of
capital cases is or has
been conducted.
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Illinois Commission
Report
Recommendation
Recommendation 85:
Judges should be reminded of their obligation
under Canon 3 to report
violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct by
prosecutors and defense
lawyers.

TOTALS

[Vol: 44

California
Compliance

Comments on
California Law

NOT MET

Cannon D(2) of the
California Code of Judicial Ethics suggests
that a judge has an
ethical duty to "take
appropriate corrective
action" if the judge has
personal knowledge
that a lawyer has
committed a violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. There
is no duty to report the
violations to the State
Bar or to take any
other specific action
unless a defense lawyer has been found to
have provided ineffective assistance of counsel. There is no similar
provision pertaining to
prosecutors.

NOT MET: 76
MET: 3
MET WITH
QUALIFICATIONS: 2
CONSTITUTIONALLY
REQUIRED: 3
NOT APPLICABLE: 1
COMPLIANCE: 5 OF
81=6.17%

